C. M. v. Urbina , 640 F. App'x 825 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 19, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
C. M.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-1067
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-01878-RBJ)
CHRISTOPHER URBINA; REBECCA (D. Colo.)
JORDAN; NANCY WOLFF; PATRICIA
MOSHURE; RACHELLE BOESPFLUG;
MELISSA EVERTS; JASON JOHNSON,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Plaintiff-appellant C.M., a registered sex offender, brought this action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting one claim against four public-health officials and
another claim against three probation officers. He appeals the dismissal on qualified
immunity grounds of both claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Background
In 2002, C.M. pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault and was
sentenced to twenty-five years of probation. As a condition of his probation, he was
required to complete sexual-offense-specific therapy. He enrolled and began
participating in a treatment program with Aurora Mental Health. Other conditions of
his probation included that he disclose to potential romantic partners his status as a
registered sex offender by the third date, and that he disclose to his treatment
provider his intention to enter into a sexual relationship and obtain permission to do
so.
In 2005, C.M. tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). In
2006, he tested positive, and was treated, for chlamydia. Despite the treatment, after
his initial positive test, C.M. repeatedly tested positive for chlamydia for some time
until he was cured with a more rigorous antibiotic therapy. Per state law, the positive
test results for HIV and chlamydia were reported to the Colorado Department of
Public Health and Environment (CDPHE). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-4-402.
The CDPHE contacted C.M. in 2010 and, in the process of trying to locate
him, learned he was a registered sex offender. When C.M. met with defendant Pat
Moshure, a CDPHE employee, she asked him to sign a release to allow the CDPHE
to share information about his HIV status with Aurora Mental Health. He declined to
do so and was then offered a choice between participating in ten sessions of
risk-reduction counseling or being subject to a public health order. C.M. chose the
counseling. He was referred to a counselor who told him she would not begin the
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counseling sessions unless he signed a release allowing her to share information with
Aurora Mental Health and his probation officer. C.M. refused to do so, and no
counseling sessions took place.
C.M. later learned that the referral letter from Ms. Moshure to the counselor
advised that most of his sex partners were younger men, that a number of charges had
been made against him for failing to disclose his HIV status before having sex, and
that the CDPHE “would like to see [the counselor] address the dating younger men
issue and tie that into nondisclosure.” Aplt. App. at 28 (internal quotation marks
omitted). According to the third amended complaint, Ms. Moshure disapproved of
C.M. choosing younger sex partners and was trying to make him choose older ones.
Later in 2010, the CDPHE contacted C.M. again and served him with a
notice-of-counseling order. The order stated that health professionals had received
reports of C.M. failing to disclose his HIV status before having sex on at least three
occasions and that he continued to “demonstrate behavior that endangers the health
of others.” Id. at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). C.M. denies these
allegations, stating in the third amended complaint that he “has never engaged in
sexual relations, while on probation, without first disclosing his HIV status.” Id.
The order directed him to receive ten sessions of risk-reduction counseling from the
counselor he was referred to previously.
In response to the order, C.M. called the CDPHE. This time he spoke with
defendant Nancy Wolff, another CDPHE employee. After he explained that he did
not want to sign the counselor’s release, Ms. Wolff advised him to comply with the
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counselor’s demand. The third amended complaint alleges that Ms. Wolff told him
this because she and other CDPHE employees were motivated by the improper goal
of making him choose older sex partners.
In May 2011, the CDPHE served C.M. with a cease-and-desist order
demanding that he “(1) cease and desist from withholding his HIV positive status
from sex partners prior to sexual contact; (2) cease and desist from engaging in oral,
vaginal or anal sexual intercourse without proper latex condom use; and (3) cease and
desist from engaging in other behaviors that may result in HIV transmission such as
sharing injection drug use paraphernalia with other persons and donating blood,
plasma, sperm, organs or tissues.” Id. at 33-34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant Christopher Urbina, the executive director of the CDPHE, signed the
order. The third amended complaint alleges that C.M. was already complying with
those demands. Id. at 34.
In June 2011, the CDPHE sought to enforce the cease-and-desist order by
bringing an action in state court. After two hearings, the district court entered a
written order in October 2011 mandating that C.M. comply with the three demands in
the cease-and-desist order and submit to ten sessions of risk-reduction counseling
with Aurora Mental Health, in addition to the therapy he was receiving as part of the
treatment program. The order did not require C.M. to sign a release but did state that
the Department and Aurora Mental Health may exchange information
regarding [C.M.’s] HIV status and whether [C.M.] is complying with
the Department’s order, including whether [C.M.] is adequately and
appropriately informing sexual partners about his HIV status and
whether he has contracted other STDs transmitted in a means similar to
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HIV. However, the Court does not find that the Department is entitled
to know about other, unrelated, aspects of [C.M.’s] counseling at Aurora
Mental Health, and will not permit the exchange of information outside
the scope discussed above.
Aplee. Suppl. App. at 46.1
Later that month, defendant Rebecca Jordan, another CDPHE employee,
disclosed to Aurora Mental Health C.M.’s HIV status as well as allegations the
CDPHE had received about C.M. having violated the terms of the cease-and-desist
order. As a result, C.M. was discharged from the treatment program in November
2011.
Defendants Rachelle Boespflug and Jason Johnson, probation officers, then
filed a complaint for revocation of C.M.’s probation because he was no longer in
compliance with his probation requirements. C.M. was arrested and spent seventy-
seven days in jail before the state court dismissed the complaint and ordered him to
resume treatment.
After his release, Aurora Mental Health did not allow C.M. to reenroll in the
treatment program, and three other treatment providers would not accept him either.
Defendant Melissa Everts, another probation officer, and Mr. Johnson filed a second
complaint for revocation of C.M.’s probation in March 2012. C.M. was arrested
1
On appeal, the district court’s order was vacated in April 2013 because it was not
supported by competent evidence. Aplee. Suppl. App. at 23. A witness for the
CDPHE had testified that in seeking the order the CDPHE relied on statements from
three unnamed individuals that C.M. had not disclosed his HIV status to them before
having sex. Id. at 21. The appellate court concluded “the witness’s testimony, which
was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, was not legally sufficient to
sustain the CDPHE’s burden of proof in this case.” Id. at 22.
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again and jailed for seven days. In July 2012, he started another treatment program
with a different provider but had to redo some work he had already completed with
Aurora Mental Health.
C.M. filed this action in July 2013 and the third amended complaint in June
2014. The gist of his claim against the public-health officials is that their actions
were motivated by the improper goal of preventing him from having consensual sex
with younger partners and therefore violated his rights under the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. His claim against the probation officers is based on the
legal theory that they failed to disclose material exculpatory information (i.e., that he
had cooperated fully in the treatment program with Aurora Mental Health but was
discharged “through no fault of his own” due to allegations by the CDPHE that the
probation officers knew lacked evidentiary support, Aplt. Opening Br. at 31-32)
when they filed revocation complaints against him, thereby violating his rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss asserted a qualified immunity defense among
other grounds for dismissing the third amended complaint. The district court agreed
that all the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the complaint
failed to show they had violated C.M.’s clearly established rights.
On appeal, C.M. argues that the district court erred by dismissing the claims
against the public-health officials because “[t]he right of homosexual adults to
associate as they themselves determine . . . is clearly established.” Id. at 17. He
argues that the claims against the probation officers should not have been dismissed
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because the omission of material exculpatory facts from the affidavits seeking
revocation of his probation and warrants for his arrest violated his clearly established
rights.
II. Analysis
We review de novo dismissals based on qualified immunity. Stewart v. Beach,
701 F.3d 1322, 1330 (10th Cir. 2012). Where, as here, we must determine whether a
motion to dismiss was properly granted, “[w]e accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.” Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir. 2010). But purely conclusory
allegations are not entitled to be presumed true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681
(2009). We may also consider facts subject to judicial notice, such as documents that
are matters of public record, without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment. Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1265 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006).
“In resolving a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, a court must
consider whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a
constitutional right, and whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time
of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164
(10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation. Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000). Courts may
address either prong of the qualified immunity analysis first. Quinn v. Young,
780 F.3d 998, 1004 (10th Cir. 2015). In dismissing C.M.’s third amended complaint,
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the district court addressed only the second prong. We agree the second prong is
dispositive in this case.
A constitutional right is clearly established if its contours are clear enough that
a reasonable official would understand what he or she was doing violated it. Id. at
1004-05. “Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight
of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains.” Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655, 669 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Courts should not define clearly established law at a high
level of generality but instead on the basis of the specific context of the case. Quinn,
780 F.3d at 1005. General statements of law are insufficient to satisfy the “clearly
established” prong of the qualified immunity test. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
753 (2002). Rather, the unlawfulness of the official action must be apparent in light
of the pre-existing law. Id. at 739. In determining whether a right is clearly
established, “it is crucial to look at precedent applying the relevant legal rule in
similar factual circumstances. Such cases give government officials the best
indication of what conduct is unlawful in a given situation.” Id. at 753.
A. Claim Against Public-Health Officials
C.M.’s claim against the public-health officials has several components. First,
he argues that by referring him to counseling and later bringing suit to enforce the
cease-and-desist order, they interfered with his clearly established right to freedom of
association, including his right to choose younger men as his sex partners. Second,
8
by bringing the suit for an improper purpose without any competent evidence, they
violated his clearly established right to due process. Third, by referring him to
counseling and bringing the suit, they were attempting to make him waive his clearly
established right to privacy in his medical records. Fourth, by disclosing his medical
information to the counselor and Aurora Mental Health, they violated his clearly
established right to privacy.
In arguing that the public-health officials violated his clearly established
rights, C.M. relies heavily on Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which held
that a state statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in
certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional. More broadly, the case stands
for the proposition that in the absence of a legitimate government interest, individuals
have the right to engage in private conduct without government intervention into
their personal lives. Id. at 578.
1. Freedom of Association
C.M. argues broadly that under Lawrence, the public-health officials should
have known that their attempts to interfere with his personal life violated his clearly
established rights. However, he fails to explain with any specificity how Lawrence
could have put the public-health officials on notice that attempting to get him to
receive risk-reduction counseling was unlawful. See Quinn, 780 F.3d at 1005 (“We
must scrupulously adhere to our longstanding duty to ascertain clear law (clear
answers) that would apply to the situation at hand.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Further, although the third amended complaint alleges that the public-
9
health officials attempted to limit and influence his choice of sex partners, C.M. does
not allege that any actual interference with his choice of sex partners occurred.
Nothing in the cease-and-desist order prohibits him from choosing younger sex
partners, and we are not persuaded that the action to enforce the order is analogous to
a criminal prosecution for engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. Cf.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563. C.M. also fails to explain how having to receive
risk-reduction counseling or being subject to a public-health order actually infringed
on his freedom of association. Indeed, with respect to the order, C.M. alleges that he
was already in compliance with it.
Moreover, limitations on the right of association may be justified if they serve
a compelling governmental interest. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987). In the interest of protecting the public health, the
Colorado General Assembly has authorized public-health officials to take measures –
even restrictive enforcement measures – to prevent the spread of HIV. Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 25-4-1401. In light of the governmental interest at stake, we cannot say that
clearly established law would have put a reasonable official in the public-health
officials’ position on notice that referring C.M. to counseling or enforcing the cease-
and-desist order was unlawful. See Quinn, 780 F.3d at 1014.
2. Due Process
Apparently relying on a legal theory akin to malicious prosecution, C.M.
seems to argue that the public-health officials violated his right to due process by
bringing the suit when they did not have competent evidence to support the issuance
10
of the cease-and-desist order. However, he makes no attempt in either the third
amended complaint or his opening brief to state the elements of such a claim, much
less show that they are satisfied here. See Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244,
1257-58 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen addressing § 1983 malicious prosecution claims,
we use the common law elements of malicious prosecution as the starting point of our
analysis . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And given that the state court
granted much of the relief requested by the CDPHE, we cannot conclude that
bringing the action violated C.M.’s clearly established due process rights.
C.M. offers no authority, nor are we aware of any, for the proposition that
public-health officials who prevail on enforcing a cease-and-desist order in court may
yet violate an individual’s clearly established rights. The fact that the court’s
decision was overturned on appeal does not materially change the analysis. Although
the statements relied on by the CDPHE in issuing the order were later deemed
insufficient to meet its burden in court, such a determination does not amount to a
finding that the officials acted unreasonably in bringing the action in the first
instance. C.M. cites no authority to the contrary. See Herring, 218 F.3d at 1176 (“A
plaintiff cannot simply identify a clearly established right in the abstract and allege
that the defendant has violated it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
3. Right to Privacy – Waiver
C.M. argues that the public-health officials’ attempts to have him release his
medical information violated his clearly established right to privacy. However, he
concedes that these attempts were unsuccessful in that he never agreed to waive his
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right to privacy and allow the CDPHE to share his medical information. In other
words, although the CDPHE attempted to make C.M. waive his privacy rights, he
never actually waived them. He cites no authority for the proposition that public-
health officials who seek a waiver of certain rights from a person who declines to
actually waive them constitutes a violation of his clearly established rights.
Further, as a probationer, C.M. is subject to some limitations on his
constitutional rights. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1177. C.M. does not enjoy the absolute
liberty to which other citizens are entitled, but only conditional liberty subject to
restrictions. United States v. Warren, 566 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)). As a registered sex offender, he is
subject to additional restrictions on his private conduct and privacy. Again, his
reliance on Lawrence is misplaced given that the facts of that case bear little
resemblance to those in this case. Thus, Lawrence does not support the conclusion
that the public-health officials reasonably should have known that their conduct was
unlawful.
4. Right to Privacy – Disclosure
Relying on Herring, C.M. also argues that the public-health officials violated
his clearly established right to privacy by disclosing his medical information to the
counselor and to the probation officers. We disagree. In Herring, a probation
officer’s disclosure of information about a probationer’s HIV status to his sister and
employer was found to have violated his right to privacy. 218 F.3d at 1175.
However, the court went on to conclude that the probationer failed to demonstrate the
12
contours of that right were sufficiently clear when the disclosures were made. Id. at
1179.
Assuming that Herring established a clear right to privacy with regard to one’s
HIV status in a general sense, we conclude the public-health officials here were
presented with different factual circumstances such that it was not apparent that their
limited disclosures were unlawful. When the CDPHE “knows or has reason to
believe . . . that a person has HIV infection and is a danger to the public health,” it is
authorized to issue an order requiring that person “to report to a qualified physician
or health worker for counseling on the disease and for information on how to avoid
infecting others . . . .” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-4-1406(2)(b). And although public
health reports are considered “strictly confidential information,” “[r]elease may be
made of such information to the extent necessary to enforce . . . rules and regulations
concerning the treatment, control, and investigation of HIV infection by public health
officials.” Id. § 25-4-1404(1)(b). It is hard to fathom how the CDPHE could
exercise its authority under these statutes without disclosing a person’s HIV status
and the reasons for referring that person to counseling. Thus, we cannot conclude
that Ms. Moshure’s disclosures to the counselor were clearly unlawful.
Ms. Jordan’s disclosures to Aurora Mental Health also were not clearly
unlawful given that the CDPHE had obtained a court order expressly allowing it to
exchange “information regarding [C.M.’s] HIV status and whether . . . [C.M.] is
adequately and appropriately informing sexual partners about his HIV status . . . .”
Aplee. Suppl. App. at 46. C.M. cites no authority, nor are we aware of any, for the
13
proposition that a reasonable public-health official disclosing certain information
pursuant to a court order would know that her conduct was unlawful. We agree with
the district court that C.M.’s allegations fall short of establishing that conduct by the
public-health officials violated his clearly established rights.
Finally, in the absence of any specific allegation as to what information the
CDPHE disclosed that was outside the parameters of the court’s order, we decline to
conclude that the public-health officials violated the order. C.M.’s allegation that the
CDPHE disclosed more than the court order permitted is purely conclusory; thus, we
are not bound to accept it as true for the purpose of this appeal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 681.
B. Claim Against Probation Officers
With respect to his second claim, C.M. argues that the probation officers
violated his clearly established rights by failing to include material exculpatory
information when they submitted affidavits in support of revoking his probation and
issuing warrants for his arrest. We disagree. According to the third amended
complaint, both times the probation officers filed complaints to revoke C.M.’s
probation, he admittedly was not in compliance with the requirement that he be in a
treatment program. Aplt. App. at 40 (“The probation officers filed the probation
revocation complaint as a result of C.M.’s termination from treatment.”). Moreover,
the complaint does not allege that the probation officers had anything to do with
C.M.’s discharge from the treatment program with Aurora Mental Health. Indeed,
the complaint alleges the disclosures by the CDPHE caused him to be discharged.
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C.M. correctly points out that knowingly or recklessly omitting material
information from an arrest affidavit violates a plaintiff’s clearly established rights.
Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 582-83 (10th Cir. 1990). However, he provides no
authority for the proposition that these probation officers had a duty to disclose that
he was “improperly terminated” from the treatment program. We are not required to
accept C.M.’s bald allegation that the termination was improper. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 681 (“It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations . . . that disentitles
them to the presumption of truth.”). Further, the prohibition against deliberately
omitting information from an arrest affidavit “does not extend to immaterial
omissions” that would not have vitiated probable cause. Stewart, 915 F.2d at 583.
Given the undisputed fact that C.M. was not in compliance with a requirement of his
probation, there was probable cause to file the complaints and issue the warrants.
The alleged omissions were therefore immaterial, and the probation officers were
entitled to qualified immunity.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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