Degraw v. Exide Technologies ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 10, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
TERRY DEGRAW,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v. No. 10-3303
(D.C. No. 5:09-CV-04016-RDR)
EXIDE TECHNOLOGIES, (D. Kan.)
Defendant–Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Terry DeGraw appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to his former employer, defendant Exide Technologies (“Exide”), on his
retaliation claims under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act (“KWCA”),
Kan. Stat. Ann § 44-501, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”),
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.
I
DeGraw worked for Exide as a material handler from approximately August
20, 2001, until January 23, 2007, when he was discharged. Although DeGraw
contends that he primarily drove a forklift for Exide, his official job description
required him to manually lift batteries up to 80 lbs, and to walk, sit, lift, bend,
and twist.
DeGraw has a history of back problems predating his employment with
Exide. On three occasions from the start of his employment in 2001 through the
summer of 2006, DeGraw took FMLA leave because of back injuries. DeGraw
was again out on FMLA leave for non-work-related back problems for a
significant portion of June and July 2006. Toward the end of this leave,
Dr. Hanson, a local physician under contract with Exide, released DeGraw back to
work.
On August 7, 2006, a few weeks after returning, DeGraw complained to a
company nurse that working mandatory overtime was aggravating his back pain.
According to DeGraw, the nurse refused to help him fill out a work injury report
or a workers compensation claim, instead directing him to speak with his
supervisor. DeGraw spoke with his supervisor and took more FMLA leave.
Sometime near the middle of August, Exide told DeGraw not to return to work
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until he received medical clearance. DeGraw’s supervisor approved a form
requesting FMLA leave on August 22, 2006; DeGraw, however, did not sign the
request form.
Over the next few months, DeGraw saw different doctors, including
Dr. Hanson, and underwent multiple treatments for his back. Until late
November, each of the doctors refused to release DeGraw to return to work. At
that time, one of DeGraw’s personal doctors lifted DeGraw’s work restriction.
When DeGraw informed Exide, the company referred him to Dr. Hanson, who
again refused to release DeGraw to work as a material handler. Exide found no
other job for DeGraw that satisfied Hanson’s restrictions, and discharged him in
January 2007.
DeGraw filed this suit, alleging that Exide violated the KWCA by
discharging him in retaliation for reporting a work-related injury for which he
might file a workers compensation claim. He also asserted that Exide violated the
FMLA by retaliating against him for taking leave, interfering with his FMLA
rights, and failing to restore him to his position.
Exide moved for summary judgment, asserting that it had discharged
DeGraw in reliance on Hanson’s medical opinion that DeGraw could not safely
perform his job. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Exide
and denied DeGraw’s motion for reconsideration. DeGraw filed this appeal.
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II
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standard as the district court.” Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp.,
659 F.3d 987, 997 (10th Cir. 2011). “Summary judgment is appropriate if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quotation omitted). “In
applying this standard, we view the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
A
With respect to his KWCA claim, the district court determined that DeGraw
had established a prima facie case, but failed to overcome the legitimate non-
retaliatory reason offered by Exide for his termination: that DeGraw’s back
issues prevented him from performing his material handler duties. See Rebarchek
v. Farmers Coop. Elevator, 35 P.3d 892, 898 (Kan. 2001) (holding that the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff once a defendant articulates a legitimate non-retaliatory
reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment).
On appeal, DeGraw focuses on evidence from his own doctors ostensibly
showing that he was able to perform the requirements of his job at the time Exide
discharged him. As the district court correctly explained, however, the operative
question is not whether DeGraw could in fact have performed the duties of a
material handler, but whether Exide “honestly believed” DeGraw could not
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perform his job due to his medical condition. Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc.,
497 F.3d 1108, 1118-19 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that “[w]e do not ask whether
the employer’s reasons were wise, fair or correct; the relevant inquiry is whether
the employer honestly believed its reasons and acted in good faith upon them”);
McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that the test of “good faith belief” is applied to an employer’s
articulated motivating reason “at the time of [the employee’s] termination”).
DeGraw contends that Hanson had no basis for his opinion that DeGraw
could no longer safely perform his job because Hanson did not “examine”
DeGraw when the two met in December 2006. This argument cannot withstand
scrutiny. Hanson had examined DeGraw before, and on more than one occasion.
When he saw DeGraw in December, he ordered an MRI and reviewed the results,
as well as DeGraw’s prior medical history, including a CT scan performed in
June. Hanson also knew from DeGraw’s medical records that three epidural
steroid injections DeGraw had received over the summer had not provided him
much relief.
DeGraw also argues that Hanson provided the opinion at Exide’s direction
after the fact to support its decision to discharge him. In support of this
argument, DeGraw relies on the fact that the written opinion Hanson claims to
have recorded in December 2006 is not dated. However, Hanson stated that he
gave his opinion to Exide in December 2006, which was before Exide discharged
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DeGraw in January 2007, and that the service that transcribed his opinion merely
omitted the date. DeGraw, moreover, did not supply any meaningful support for
his assertion on appeal that Hanson wrote what management requested him to say.
Because we are unpersuaded by DeGraw’s arguments on appeal, we concur
with the district court’s conclusion that he failed to demonstrate a triable question
of fact on the issue of pretext.
B
The district court was also correct to grant summary judgment on DeGraw’s
FMLA claims. DeGraw’s arguments on his FMLA claims are not adequately
supported by citations to record evidence, the law, or the district court’s decision
to allow meaningful review. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (“[T]he argument
. . . must contain . . . appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with
citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.”).
On this showing, DeGraw cannot establish a prima facie case for FMLA
retaliation. To do so requires demonstrating a causal connection between his
termination and the protected activity of taking FMLA leave. Meltzer v. Fed.
Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006). DeGraw,
however, has shown only that his termination is connected to his medical
condition. Furthermore, evidence of a disagreement as to DeGraw’s ability to
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perform the job of material handler does not demonstrate pretext for terminating
DeGraw in retaliation for availing himself of FMLA leave.
DeGraw also claims that Exide violated his FMLA rights by failing to
reinstate him when he sought to return to work in November. While DeGraw is
correct that the FMLA entitles employees returning from qualifying leaves to
resume their previous positions, DeGraw exhausted his FMLA leave long before
he was terminated. He used FMLA leave during almost all of June and half of
July in 2006 (that is, approximately six weeks), and then again from August 10
until his FMLA leave expired at the end of September. The FMLA permits an
employer to terminate an employee who cannot return to work after his twelve
weeks of leave have expired. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(3)(B). Thus, even if the
court were to accept DeGraw’s doctor’s work release over Dr. Hanson’s opinion
that he could no longer perform the requirements of his job, DeGraw was not
entitled to reinstatement.
Finally, DeGraw argues that Exide violated his rights by forcing him to
take unnecessary leave so that he exhausted his leave time before late November.
But DeGraw does not explain which leave periods were unnecessary, much less
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provide any evidence to support this contention. Accordingly, we reject these
arguments and affirm the district court on DeGraw’s FMLA claims
III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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