United States v. Hernandez ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 14, 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 14-3211
(D.C. No. 6:14-CR-10022-MLB-1)
VICTOR HERNANDEZ, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Victor Hernandez pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. At the sentencing
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
hearing, the district court sentenced Hernandez to 108 months’ imprisonment, to
be followed by four years’ supervised release. Although the Presentence Report
(“PSR”) suggested several conditions of supervised release, the district court
specifically declined to impose any of the suggested conditions other than the
following: Hernandez was not to commit any other federal, state, or local crime
while on supervised release. In so doing, the district court stated as follows:
[T]he only condition that I’m going to impose on you, sir, is that you
not commit any other federal, state or local crimes because the
chances are very high that you’ll be deported. If you then return
illegally to the United States, that will be committing another crime;
and in all probability, you’ll be brought back before a judge, and as I
told you when you plead guilty, you could be sentenced to additional
time in this case.
R. Vol. 3. at 30.
Despite the district court’s unequivocal oral pronouncement of sentence at
the sentencing hearing, which limited the imposed conditions of supervised
release to the single condition set out above, the written judgment in this case
reflects some of the supervised-release conditions suggested in the PSR.
Hernandez appeals, asserting the district court’s orally pronounced sentence
controls and, therefore, this court should remand the matter to the district court so
that it can conform the written judgment to the sentence actually imposed. The
government confesses error and, like Hernandez, asks this court to remand to the
district court to bring its written judgment into conformity with its orally
pronounced sentence.
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This court has jurisdiction over Hernandez’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Upon an independent review, we agree that the
written judgment entered by the district court varies impermissibly from the oral
sentence announced at the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Resendiz-
Patino, 420 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting this court is not bound by a
party’s concession of error). The sentence orally imposed by the district court
operates as the final judgment in this case. United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d
1448, 1452 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc); United States v. Avalos-Zarate, 986 F.2d
378, 379 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A]n orally pronounced sentence controls over a
judgment and commitment order when the two conflict.”).
The sentence in a federal criminal case is the punishment
imposed orally by a sentencing judge in a defendant’s presence. The
written judgment and commitment order is not the sentence. If there
is an ambiguity in the sentence, then such extrinsic evidence as the
judgment and commitment order, the judge’s intentions, or the
defendant's understanding of what he believes the sentence to be,
may be consulted. In the absence of such ambiguity in the sentence,
as when there is a conflict between the oral sentence and the
judgment and commitment order, the sentence, as orally pronounced,
shall not be altered.
Id. at 1453 (footnotes omitted). The sentencing transcript in this case reflects
unambiguously that the district court imposed one, and only one, condition on
Hernandez’s supervised release—that he not commit any additional federal, state,
or local crimes while under supervision. Because the written judgment is at odds
with that unambiguous sentence, “we grant [the parties’ joint] request for a
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remand, with instruction to the district court to bring its written judgment into
conformity with its orally pronounced sentence.” United States v. Bowen, 527
F.3d 1065, 1080 (10th Cir. 2008).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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