United States v. Windom ( 2023 )


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  • Appellate Case: 22-1077     Document: 010110815825       Date Filed: 02/21/2023    Page: 1
    FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         February 21, 2023
    _________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                          No. 22-1077
    (D.C. No. 1:20-CR-00068-CMA-1)
    SAMUEL TERRAYE WINDOM,                                       (D. Colo.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                          No. 22-1119
    (D.C. No. 1:15-CR-00202-RM-1)
    SAMUEL TERRAYE WINDOM,                                       (D. Colo.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    _________________________________
    Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and EID, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
    of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
    its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    Appellate Case: 22-1077    Document: 010110815825         Date Filed: 02/21/2023      Page: 2
    I.     INTRODUCTION
    In September 2019, a confidential informant notified Denver police detective,
    Joshua Vance, that someone named Trey “was selling” methamphetamine from his
    apartment in south Denver. The tipster, who Vance described as previously reliable,
    said he or she had purchased methamphetamine “in the past” from Trey’s apartment
    and had observed firearms and drugs inside his residence “during the past six
    months.” Further investigation revealed the identity of “Trey” to be Appellant,
    Samuel Windom. Authorities successfully arranged a controlled buy to corroborate
    this information, at which Windom was observed selling methamphetamine to a
    confidential informant. 1 As a result, Vance submitted an affidavit to support the
    search of Windom’s residence. A warrant was issued, and officers executed a search
    of Windom’s home on December 2, 2019. The search yielded approximately 78
    grams of methamphetamine and two semi-automatic guns. Windom admitted to
    police that he owned both guns and had previously sold methamphetamine.
    Windom was charged with possession of a gun by a previously convicted felon
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (Count 1); knowingly and intentionally
    possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.
    1
    At one point in its description of the controlled buy, the affidavit appears to
    refer to the dealer of drugs as “Anthony” and not Samuel or Windom. R. Vol. I, at
    45. The same paragraph correctly identifies the subject of the controlled buy as
    Samuel seven times. 
    Id.
     Further, the name Anthony appears at no other point
    throughout the affidavit. Given the context of the description and the singularity of
    the reference, this court interprets the use of Anthony as a simple error that does not
    affect the substance of the affidavit. Therefore, we do not conclude the affidavit is
    inherently suspect on these grounds.
    2
    Appellate Case: 22-1077    Document: 010110815825        Date Filed: 02/21/2023     Page: 3
    § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii) (Count 2); and knowingly using and carrying a firearm
    in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(i)
    (Count 3). Prior to trial, Windom moved to suppress the evidence recovered during
    the search of his apartment. He argued the warrant failed to establish probable cause
    for two reasons: first, it did not prove a sufficient nexus between the purported drug
    sales and his residence; and second, the information provided by the informant was
    several months old and, thus, stale. In turn, he asserted the affidavit was so lacking in
    probable cause that executing officers could not have relied upon the resulting
    warrant in good faith. Windom requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
    suppression, which the district court denied on the grounds that his motion did not
    raise any material factual dispute.
    The district court denied Windom’s motion to suppress. It determined the
    informant’s tip was not stale because it demonstrated ongoing drug activity and was
    effectively corroborated by the controlled buy. Further, the district court concluded
    an appropriate nexus was formed by an investigation linking Windom to the
    apartment and the informant’s direct implication of Windom’s residence. A jury trial
    was set for July 26, 2021, and concluded with guilty verdicts on Counts 1 and 2 of
    the superseding indictment. On appeal, Windom argues the district court erred in
    denying a hearing on the motion to suppress and renews his probable cause
    challenges. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by forgoing a
    suppression hearing and affirm the district court’s rulings that neither staleness nor
    lack of nexus undermined the probable cause supporting a search of Windom’s home.
    3
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    II.     ANALYSIS
    Review of a district court’s analysis on the validity of a warrant is de novo.
    United States v. Pulliam, 
    748 F.3d 967
    , 970–71 (10th Cir. 2014). This court,
    however, “must accord ‘great deference’ to the probable-cause assessment of the
    state court judge who issued the warrant.” 
    Id. at 971
    . Probable cause requires “only a
    probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such
    activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 243 n.13 (1983). When making such a
    probable cause determination “we look to the totality of the circumstances as detailed
    in the affidavit accompanying the application for the search warrant.” Pulliam, 
    748 F.3d at 971
    .
    a. SUPPRESSION HEARING
    This court reviews the denial of an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress
    for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Glass, 
    128 F.3d 1398
    , 1408 (10th Cir.
    1997). A trial court is required to grant a suppression hearing only when a defendant
    both presents facts justifying relief and demonstrates disputed issues of material fact.
    
    Id.
     An evidentiary hearing on suppression is warranted when the motion raises
    “factual allegations that are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and
    nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to
    the validity of the search are in issue.” United States v. Chavez-Marquez, 
    66 F.3d 259
    , 261 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). A hearing is not required
    when a motion only challenges questions of law and not any underlying facts. United
    States v. Mathews, 
    928 F.3d 968
    , 978 (10th Cir. 2019).
    4
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    Rather than outline factual disputes, Windom’s motion to suppress offered
    three legal arguments—staleness, nexus, and lack of good faith—for why the
    affidavit was insufficient to support a search warrant. These arguments contained
    only perfunctory factual references, with none rising to the level of definite, detailed,
    and nonconjectural allegations. See United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 
    358 F.3d 1263
    ,
    1266–67 (10th Cir. 2004). This absence of disputed facts and primary reliance on
    issues of law alone demonstrate the district court did not abuse its discretion by
    proceeding without a hearing. Recognizing this deficiency in his motion, Windom
    argues on appeal that the affidavit raised several material factual disputes on its face,
    including the exact timing and number of drug sales between the informant and
    Windom, and whether the original tipster was the same informant who participated in
    the controlled buy. Not only was this argument not presented to the district court,
    thereby subjecting it to the heightened standard of plain error review, but it also lacks
    definite, material facts “that, if established, would entitle [Windom] to relief.”
    Chavez-Marquez, 
    66 F.3d at 261
    . Given the totality of the circumstances, the timing,
    numerosity, and party identity of Windom’s drug exchanges do not alter the probable
    cause determination in this case. Thus, even if disputed facts were present on the face
    of the affidavit, the district court did not err in bypassing a suppression hearing.
    b. STALENESS
    “[P]robable cause to search cannot be based on stale information that no longer
    suggests that the items sought will be found in the place to be searched.” United
    States v. Burkhart, 
    602 F.3d 1202
    , 1206 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations
    5
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    omitted). Whether staleness exists depends “on the nature of the criminal activity, the
    length of the activity, and the nature of the property to be seized.” United States v.
    Mathis, 
    357 F.3d 1200
    , 1207 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).
    Indication of “ongoing and continuous activity makes the passage of time less
    critical” when making determinations of staleness. 
    Id.
     (internal quotations omitted).
    Additionally, “otherwise stale information may be refreshed by more recent events”
    for the purpose of probable cause analysis. United States v. Cantu, 
    405 F.3d 1173
    ,
    1178 (10th Cir. 2005).
    As the district court articulated, staleness is not at issue here because the
    allegations offered by the informant indicated Windom’s drug activity was ongoing
    and the controlled buy effectively refreshed the information provided. The informant
    offered three critical pieces of information: a) Windom “was selling”
    methamphetamine from his apartment; b) he or she had purchased methamphetamine
    “in the past from [Windom’s] apartment;” and c) he or she had observed drugs and
    guns inside Windom’s apartment “during the past six months.” Although these details
    are not highly specific, they collectively suggest the type of ongoing trafficking that
    diminishes the significance of when the alleged activity took place. See United States
    v. Iiland, 
    254 F.3d 1264
    , 1269 (10th Cir. 2001). Despite Windom’s arguments to the
    contrary, there is no reason to doubt the reliability of the informant. The affidavit
    clearly contains hallmark indicia of trustworthiness: the informant had provided prior
    accurate tips to police and gave ample facts that were successfully corroborated by
    authorities. United States v. Quezada-Enriquez, 
    567 F.3d 1228
    , 1233 (10th Cir.
    6
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    2009). Most significantly, the officers fully corroborated the informant’s core drug
    trafficking allegation through a carefully constructed controlled buy. To the degree
    any information offered by the informant was in danger of being stale, the controlled
    buy cured this threat by comprehensively refreshing the allegation that Windom was,
    in fact, dealing methamphetamine.
    c. NEXUS
    Probable cause also requires a nexus between the suspected criminal activity
    and the place to be searched. United States v. Gonzales, 
    399 F.3d 1225
    , 1228 (10th
    Cir. 2005). Personal knowledge of illegal activity taking place in the area to be
    searched is not required to establish nexus. United States v. Biglow, 
    562 F.3d 1272
    ,
    1279 (10th Cir. 2009). Rather, “a sufficient nexus is established once an affidavit
    describes circumstances which would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the
    belief that ‘the articles sought’ are at a particular place.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotations
    omitted).
    Although the controlled buy did not take place at Windom’s home, the
    informant’s tip directly implicated his apartment. The tip referenced purchasing and
    observing drugs inside Windom’s residence. Further, independent investigation by
    police makes it clear that the apartment searched both belonged to Windom and was
    the scene of the tip’s allegations. This court has held it is “merely common sense that
    a drug supplier will keep evidence of his crimes at his home.” United States v.
    Sanchez, 
    555 F.3d 910
    , 914 (10th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Garcia, 
    707 F.3d 1190
    , 1195 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sparks, 
    291 F.3d 683
    , 689–90
    7
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    (10th Cir. 2002). Given this context, the strong evidence that Windom was engaged
    in drug trafficking, and the direct implication of his residence as a part of his drug
    activity, a reasonable person could certainly believe Windom kept drugs in his home.
    Accordingly, the affidavit successfully established a proper nexus to support the
    search warrant. 2
    III.   CONCLUSION
    The judgment 3 of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
    is hereby AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Michael R. Murphy
    Circuit Judge
    2
    Windom argues that if this court were to deem the search warrant invalid, the
    “good-faith exception” should not apply. See United States v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    ,
    922 (1984). This court concludes the warrant in this case is valid, and therefore, it
    need not reach the application of the exception.
    3
    Because no party makes any argument about the second appeal, we dismiss
    that appeal as abandoned. See Johnson v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty./Kan.
    City, 
    371 F.3d 723
    , 727 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The cross-appeals were not briefed and
    deemed to have been abandoned. Accordingly we dismiss the cross-appeals.”).
    Similarly, Appellant’s Second Unopposed Motion to Supplement the Record on
    Appeal is denied as moot because it only supplemented the second appeal and did not
    implicate any argument made to this court.
    8