Montez v. Hickenlooper ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 10, 2011
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
JESSE F. MONTEZ,
Plaintiff, No. 08-1399
v.
JOHN HICKENLOOPER; FRANK
GUNTER, Former Executive Director
of the Colorado Department of
Corrections; BEN JOHNSON, Former
Warden of Colorado Territorial
Correctional Facility; CHERYL
SMITH, Medical Administrator at
CTCF; ARI ZAVARAS, Executive
Director of Colorado Department of
Corrections; BOB FURLONG, Warden
of Limon Correctional Facility;
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; BILL PRICE,
Warden of the Arkansas Valley
Correctional Center; R. MARK
McDUFF, Warden of the Arrowhead
Correctional Center, the Four Mile
Correctional Facility, the Skyline
Correctional Center, and the Pre-
Release Correctional Center; GARY
NEET, Warden of the Buena Vista
Correctional Facility; WARREN
DIESSLIN, Former Warden of the
Buena Vista Correctional Facility;
FRANK MILLER, Warden of the
Centennial Correctional Facility;
DONICE NEAL, Warden of the
Colorado State Penitentiary; MARK
WILLIAMS, Warden of the Colorado
Women’s Facility; MARK McKINNA,
Warden of the Colorado Territorial
Correctional Facility; J. FRANK
RICE, Dr. Warden of the Denver
Reception and Diagnostic Center;
LARRY EMBRY, Warden of the
Fremont Correctional Facility;
TOM COOPER, Former Warden of the
Fremont Correctional Facility; BILL
BOGGS, Warden of the Rifle
Correctional Facility; BILL BOKROS,
Warden of the Pueblo Minimum
Center; DAVID HOLT, Medical
Administrator at the Arrowhead
Correctional Facility, the Centennial
Correctional Facility, the Colorado
State Penitentiary, the Fremont
Correctional Facility, and the Skyline
Correctional Facility; JEAN MOLTZ,
Medical Administrator at the Buena
Vista Correctional Facility and the
Rifle Correctional Facility; RON
JOHNSON, Medical Administrator at
the Denver Reception and Diagnostic
Center; DON LAWSON, Clinical
Administration Director at the Limon
Correctional Facility and the Arkansas
Valley Correctional Facility; BOB
MOORE, who supervises the medical
department at the Pueblo Minimum
Center, and JOHN DOE(S), Current
and former Wardens of any
Correctional facility maintained,
operated or controlled by the Colorado
Department of Corrections, and JOHN
ROE(S); RONALD G PIERCE;
COLORADO TERRITORIAL
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; BRAD
ROCKWILL; ANNETTE PORTER;
DENVER RECEPTION &
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DIAGNOSTIC CENTER; SGT. R.
MURPHY; GLENNTTE [sic] SMITH;
BECKY RHOMONA; JIM WEBER;
NARD CLAAR; BILL REED;
FREMONT CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,
Defendants-Appellees.
LARRY GORDON,
Claimant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 92-CV-00870-JLK-OES)
Eric V. Hall of Rothgerber Johnson & Lyons LLP, Colorado Springs, Colorado,
for Claimant–Appellant.
James X. Quinn, Assistant Attorney General (John W. Suthers, Attorney General;
Berina Ibrisagic and Chris W. Alber, Assistant Attorneys General, with him on
the briefs), Civil Litigation and Employment Law Section, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendants–Appellees. *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
This case raises several issues relating to our appellate jurisdiction. In
*
Current Colorado State Governor John Hickenlooper is substituted for
former Governor Bill Owens. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
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particular, we are called upon to decide whether we have jurisdiction over an
appeal from the district court’s review of a claim for damages filed by an
individual claimant pursuant to the dispute-resolution mechanism established in a
class action consent decree.
BACKGROUND
In the early 1990s, Colorado state prisoners initiated a class action lawsuit
alleging that state officials were committing ongoing violations of disabled
prisoners’ rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 2003, the parties entered into a consent decree, called a
“Remedial Plan,” setting forth the actions Defendants would take to bring the state
prison system into compliance with the applicable statutes and establishing a
procedure through which individual inmates could bring damage claims for
injuries incurred. Specifically, the consent decree provided that the damage
claims of individual class members would be determined by a special master,
subject to abuse-of-discretion review by the district court. The consent decree was
silent as to the possibility of further review by this court. Although class
counsel’s involvement was required for compliance issues relating to the prison
system as a whole, the consent decree explained that “[c]lass counsel does not
have an obligation to represent any individual with respect to their individual
damage claim.” (Appellant’s App. to Supplemental Br. at 79.)
Pursuant to the dispute-resolution mechanism established in the consent
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decree, Claimant Larry Gordon filed an individual claim for damages. After
reviewing the evidence, the special master denied Mr. Gordon’s claim, concluding
that he did not suffer from a covered disability as defined by the consent decree
and, moreover, that there was no evidence Mr. Gordon was discriminated against
based upon his claimed disabilities. The district court affirmed this ruling and
held that Mr. Gordon’s complaints regarding the quality of his medical care
needed to be “addressed through a separate individual action, and not as a part of
the remedial plan in this case.” (Id. at 130.)
Mr. Gordon then filed an appeal to this court. In response, Defendants filed
a jurisdictional memorandum brief and motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that
the consent decree did not authorize the district court’s rulings on individual
damage claims to be appealed to this court. Because this issue had been raised and
remanded in a related appeal brought by a different individual claimant in the
underlying class action litigation, see Montez v. Owens, 307 F. App’x 160, 163-64
(10th Cir. 2009), the panel abated Mr. Gordon’s appeal pending resolution of that
remand order.
In the earlier appeal, the panel reasoned that remand was appropriate “in
deference to the terms of the parties’ own agreement.” Id. at 163. Specifically,
the panel noted that the consent decree provided a process under which a
disagreement concerning the proper interpretation of the Remedial Plan would first
be subjected to a good-faith attempt by the representatives of each party to resolve
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the disagreement and, if unsuccessful, thereafter submitted to the district court for
resolution. The panel reasoned that because the appeal authorization issue
involved a disagreement concerning the proper interpretation of the Remedial
Plan, the contractually agreed-upon process should be followed in the first
instance before this court took up the matter. The panel also suggested, without
deciding, the involvement of class counsel might be necessary in this process, “as
‘individual prisoners lack standing to individually litigate matters relating to a
class action.’” Id. at 164 (brackets omitted) (quoting McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d
1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 1991)).
On remand, the parties could not resolve their disagreement concerning the
interpretation of the Remedial Plan, and the matter was submitted to the district
court for consideration. The district court then ruled that its orders on appeal from
the special master’s decisions “were intended under the operative consent decree
to be FINAL decisions [that] ARE NOT APPEALABLE to the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals.” (Appellant’s App. at 299.) This court subsequently lifted the
abatement of Mr. Gordon’s appeal and appointed counsel to represent him on
issues relating to appellate jurisdiction. Having received supplemental briefing
and heard arguments from the parties, we are now prepared to rule on the matter.
DISCUSSION
We first consider Defendants’ argument that Mr. Gordon’s appeal is
unequivocally barred by the district court’s ruling on appealability, which this
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court cannot review as a matter of law because it was not appealed by class
counsel. We are not persuaded by this argument. The consent decree makes clear
that class counsel’s involvement is not necessary with respect to individual
claimants’ damage claims. This contractual provision is in accordance with our
precedent, which explains that “class members may bring individual actions when
they seek money damages,” McNeil, 945 F.2d at 1166 n.4, despite the rule that
“individual prisoners lack standing to individually litigate matters relating to the
class action,” id. at 1166. Although we suggested in our earlier remand order that
the involvement of class counsel might be necessary to resolve the dispute
regarding the proper interpretation of the consent decree, we did not definitively
decide this question. Moreover, even if class counsel’s participation might be
deemed necessary in the contractually agreed-upon process for resolving disputes
in interpretation, it does not thereby follow that class counsel’s involvement is
necessary for us to determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction over an
individual claimant’s appeal from an order affecting only his own right to
individual damages. Although as a matter of stare decisis our ruling on the matter
may affect Defendants’ ability to rely on the consent decree to argue against
appellate jurisdiction in other individual claimants’ appeals, this does not change
the fact that Mr. Gordon is appealing only the resolution of his own individual
claim for damages. Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded that class
counsel’s involvement is necessary for us to consider whether an appeal may be
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had under the terms of the consent decree. Nor are we persuaded that Mr. Gordon
was required to separately file an appeal from the district court’s ruling on a legal
issue that was remanded for consideration by the district court in the first instance
while Mr. Gordon’s appeal on the merits was properly filed and pending before
this court.
Having held that we may properly consider the question of our appellate
jurisdiction over the appeal, we now turn to the question of the appropriate
standard of review for this question. Defendants argue the district court’s ruling
on appealability under the consent decree was premised on factual findings that we
should review only for clear error. However, nothing in the district court’s ruling
suggests it was based on anything other than the court’s interpretation of the
language of the consent decree itself, and we review this interpretation de novo.
See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Scherer, 7 F.3d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1993). We also
review de novo the other questions Defendants raise relating to our jurisdiction
over Mr. Gordon’s appeal. See United States v. Lot 85, County Ridge, 100 F.3d
740, 742 (10th Cir. 1996).
Defendants maintain that because the consent decree did not expressly
authorize appeals to this court, no appeals may be taken from the district court’s
review of the special master’s resolution of individual damage claims. They argue
that Tenth Circuit law requires a party to a consent decree to specifically reserve
the right to appeal in order to raise any challenges relating to the decree. For
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support, Defendants cite to Mock v. T.G.&Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522 (10th Cir.
1992), in which we repeated “the well-accepted rule” that “an appeal ordinarily
may not be taken from a consent judgment” because “a party to a consent
judgment is thereby deemed to waive any objections it has to matters within the
scope of the judgment.” Id. at 526. 1
We are not persuaded the rule discussed in Mock is applicable to the instant
case. Mock involved a consent decree in which the plaintiffs agreed to drop their
claims against the defendants in return for the entry of judgment in their favor. Id.
at 527. We thus held in Mock that the plaintiffs, having freely consented to the
entry of judgment, could not later seek to undo that consent and litigate claims
they had agreed to dismiss in the consent decree. Id. As we explained in Mock,
the general rule regarding the non-appealability of consent decrees is based on
principles of waiver—when “‘the decree appealed from was assented to by the
appellant, we cannot consider any errors that may be assigned which were in law
waived by the consent.’” Id. at 526 n.5 (quoting 15 C. Miller, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902, at 91-92 (1992) (in turn quoting
Pac. R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 295 (1879))). Here, unlike in Mock, the class
members did not waive their right to bring claims against the defendants. Instead,
1
We note that the terms “consent judgment” and “consent decree” are
generally used interchangeably. See Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U.
Chi. Legal F. 43, 45 (explaining that the former distinction between these terms
has been blurred by the merger of equity and law).
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the consent decree simply set up a mechanism through which class members could
pursue their individual damage claims. Thus, unlike the plaintiffs in Mock, Mr.
Gordon is not attempting to back out of the agreement or object to matters within
the scope of his consent; rather, he is only seeking appellate review of the result of
the agreed-upon mechanism for resolving his claim.
The Second Circuit faced a similar situation in United States v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 905 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1990). In that
case, like the instant case, the consent decree did not itself resolve claims, but
instead simply established a mechanism under which claims would be decided.
Specifically, the parties agreed that an independent administrator would sit as a
decisionmaker in disciplinary labor cases, with his decisions to be “final and
binding, subject to the [district] Court’s review as provided herein.” Id. at 615.
The consent decree further provided that the district court would “have exclusive
jurisdiction to decide any and all issues relating to the Administrator’s actions or
authority” under the consent decree. Id. When certain individuals attempted to
appeal the district court’s affirmance of the administrator’s disciplinary sanctions
against them, the investigations officer and the federal government argued the
Second Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider these appeals under the
terms of the consent decree. However, the Second Circuit concluded the consent
decree did not contain a clear and unmistakable expression of the intent to waive
appellate rights, reasoning the statement that the district court had “exclusive
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jurisdiction” did not unambiguously exclude appellate review, since it could be
construed simply as a provision on venue. Id. The Second Circuit thus concluded
it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s decisions implementing the consent
decree. Id.Similarly, in the somewhat analogous situation of appeals from district court
orders reviewing arbitration decisions, we have held that limitations on the right to
appeal from the district court’s judgment will be valid only if the intent to limit
appellate rights is “clear and unequivocal.” MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d
821, 830 (10th Cir. 2005). Thus, even if the language of the arbitration agreement
provides that the district court’s review of an arbitration award will be “final,” a
further appeal may be had to this court, since “the very statute from which we
derive our jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, grants the appellate courts jurisdiction
from ‘all final decisions of the district court.’” Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254
F.3d 925, 931 (10th Cir. 2001). We have explained in these cases that, at least as
it relates to the waiver of appellate review, there is “no reason to treat district
court decisions concerning arbitration awards differently than any other kind of
district court judgment.” MACTEC, 427 F.3d at 830.
We similarly see no reason to treat the district court’s decision regarding
Mr. Gordon’s legal claim differently simply because the district court reached this
decision pursuant to a mechanism established in the consent decree between the
parties. Following the Second Circuit’s reasoning in International Brotherhood,
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we hold that we have the authority to review claims decided pursuant to a dispute-
resolution mechanism established in a consent decree, so long as that decree does
not contain a clear and unequivocal waiver of appellate rights. In so holding, we
do not disturb our holding in Mock that the parties to a consent decree generally
may not bring subsequent challenges to the consent decree or the claims resolved
therein. See Mock, 971 F.2d at 526. We simply hold that, when a consent decree
does not resolve claims itself but instead simply establishes a mechanism under
which the district court will resolve claims, the parties may appeal the district
court’s final resolution of such claims to this court unless the consent decree
contains a clear and unequivocal waiver of the right to appellate review. Such an
appeal, unlike an appeal that falls under the Mock rule, does not involve a
“retroactive[] attempt to undo consent properly given” or a complaint of errors
waived through entry of the consent decree, id. at 526 n.5, and thus it does not
implicate the same waiver-of-error concerns. Applying this ruling to the instant
case, we conclude that the terms of the class action consent decree—containing not
even a hint of the intent to waive appellate rights, much less the requisite clear and
unequivocal expression of such intent—do not bar appellate review of the district
court’s resolution of individual claimants’ damage claims pursuant to the
mechanism established in the consent decree.
This conclusion does not end our jurisdictional inquiry. This court typically
only has jurisdiction over “final decisions” of the district court, which generally
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means the district court’s decision “must reflect ‘the termination of all matters as
to all parties and causes of action.’” Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1221
(10th Cir. 2003) (quoting D&H Marketers, Inc. v. Freedom Oil & Gas, Inc., 744
F.2d 1443, 1444 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). Litigation is still ongoing in the
underlying class action, and thus the district court’s decision as to Mr. Gordon’s
claim did not finally end all matters as to all parties. However, as even
Defendants concede, the circumstances of this case warrant application of the
collateral order doctrine. “To establish jurisdiction under the collateral order
doctrine, [a party] must establish that the district court’s order (1) conclusively
determined the disputed question, (2) resolved an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the case, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment.” Crystal Clear Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 415
F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 2005). This appeal squarely fits within these criteria,
as (1) the district court’s order conclusively determined the question of Mr.
Gordon’s entitlement to monetary damages, (2) this question is important as it
relates to Mr. Gordon and is completely separate from the merits of the
overarching class action, and (3) the court’s order would be effectively
unreviewable if Mr. Gordon had to wait until the entry of final judgment on the
entire class action—ongoing for the past nineteen years and with no clear end date
in sight—to appeal from the resolution of his discrete claim for damages. We thus
conclude we have jurisdiction over this appeal under the collateral-order doctrine.
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In their jurisdictional memorandum brief, Defendants also contend we lack
jurisdiction over this appeal on the basis of untimeliness. Defendants
acknowledge that Mr. Gordon placed his notice of appeal in the prison’s legal mail
system one day prior to the deadline for filing a timely notice of appeal. However,
they argue we should not consider Mr. Gordon’s notice of appeal to be timely
because it did not include a declaration of the date of deposit and an attestation
that postage was pre-paid as required by Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1165-67
(10th Cir. 2005), for compliance with the provisions of the prisoner mailbox rule.
Defendants completely misunderstand our decision in Price. In that case we
stated:
[A]n inmate must establish timely filing under the mailbox rule by
either (1) alleging and proving that he or she made timely use of the
prison’s legal mail system if a satisfactory system is available, or (2)
if a legal system is not available, then by timely use of the prison’s
regular mail system in combination with a notarized statement or a
declaration under penalty of perjury of the date on which the
documents were given to prison authorities and attesting that postage
was prepaid.
Id. at 1166 (emphasis added). Because Mr. Gordon established timely filing
through his use of the prison’s legal mail system, he was not required to comply
with the requirements of the second prong. We therefore reject this jurisdictional
challenge to the appeal.
As for the merits of Mr. Gordon’s claim for damages, none of his filings to
this court convince us the special master erred in finding he did not suffer from a
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covered disability as defined by the settlement agreement. We therefore affirm the
dismissal of his claims for substantially the same reasons given by the special
master and the district court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction and AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr.
Gordon’s claims. We previously granted Mr. Gordon’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, and we again remind him of his obligation to
continue making partial fee payments until the filing fee has been paid in full. We
DENY Mr. Gordon’s pending pro se motion regarding the issuance of subpoenas.
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