Bey v. Simmons , 69 F. App'x 931 ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                                                                            F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    JUN 27 2003
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    JAMAL BEY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                    No. 02-3350
    (D.C. No. 00-CV-3445-GTV)
    CHARLES SIMMONS, Secretary,                             (D. Kan.)
    Department of Corrections; STATE
    OF KANSAS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT           *
    Before BRISCOE , PORFILIO , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff Jamal Bey, a former Kansas state prisoner proceeding pro se,
    brought this action under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     alleging that defendants violated his
    constitutional rights. The district court dismissed some of his claims as moot due
    to his release from custody. Applying 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii), the court
    dismissed Mr. Bey’s remaining claim that he was denied his due process rights
    when he was erroneously classified as a medium-security inmate. We exercise
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm.
    Upon his entry into the prison system in August 2000, Mr. Bey was
    classified as a minimum-security inmate, but when he arrived at the Lansing
    Correctional Facility, he was classified as a medium-security inmate and housed
    with maximum-security inmates. Approximately four months later, the error was
    corrected. Mr. Bey sued, alleging he had a liberty interest in his classification
    within the prison system and that interest was abridged when he was reclassified
    as medium-security without any notice or explanation.   1
    He asserts that he suffered
    mental anguish as a result of the error in classifying him. After allowing Mr. Bey
    leave to amend his complaint, the district court dismissed this charge because it
    did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as provided by
    1
    Mr. Bey brought additional claims alleging that he was denied a diet and
    prison call-outs to accommodate his religious faith, and the prison wrongly denied
    his religious group funding to purchase books. He does not pursue these claims
    on appeal.
    -2-
    § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that
    may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
    determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief
    may be granted.”).
    We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.    Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of
    Corr. , 
    165 F.3d 803
    , 806 (10th Cir. 1999). “Dismissal of a pro se complaint for
    failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot
    prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an
    opportunity to amend.”      Curley v. Perry , 
    246 F.3d 1278
    , 1281 (10th Cir.)
    (quotation omitted), cert. denied , 
    534 U.S. 922
     (2001).      Because plaintiff is
    representing himself on appeal, his pleadings will be liberally construed. Haines
    v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520 (1972).
    Mr. Bey maintains Kansas created a liberty interest in prison classification,
    but he has not cited any state statute or prison regulation that creates or recognizes
    such a liberty interest. We have held that there is no constitutionally protected
    liberty interest in a prison classification.   Templeman v. Gunter , 
    16 F.3d 367
    , 369
    (10th Cir. 1994). Moreover, Mr. Bey’s allegations of the mental anguish he
    suffered as a result of the error in classifying him did not impose “atypical and
    significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,”
    -3-
    or threaten to lengthen his term of confinement.   Sandin v. Conner , 
    515 U.S. 472
    ,
    484, 487 (1995). Finally, Kansas law does not create a liberty interest regarding a
    prison inmate’s security classification.   Lile v. Simmons , 
    929 P.2d 171
    , 173 (Kan.
    Ct. App. 1996); cf. Murphy v. Nelson , 
    921 P.2d 1225
    , 1234, 1235 (Kan. 1996)
    (holding, as a matter of law, that Kansas prisoner has no liberty interest in
    confinement in administrative segregation). Accordingly, Mr. Bey’s complaint
    based on a liberty interest in his prison classification was properly dismissed as
    failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
    The district court granted Mr. Bey leave to proceed on appeal without
    prepayment of the filing fee. Mr. Bey is reminded that he is obligated to continue
    making partial payments until the entire fee has been paid. The judgment of the
    district court is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
    -4-