Laurson v. Lind , 639 F. App'x 575 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 6, 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ERIC LAURSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 15-1476
(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-00933-LTB)
RANDY LIND; CYNTHIA (D. Colo.)
COFFMAN, The Attorney General of
the State of Colorado,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY
Before HARTZ, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
Proceeding pro se, Eric Laurson seeks a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) from this court so he can appeal the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing no
appeal may be taken from a final order disposing of a § 2254 petition unless the
petitioner first obtains a COA). Because Laurson has not “made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” this court denies his request for a
COA and dismisses this appeal. Id. § 2253(c)(2).
In 1998, a Colorado jury convicted Laurson of first degree (felony) murder,
attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, and attempted aggravated
robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
plus eighteen years. Laurson challenged both his convictions and his sentence in
a direct criminal appeal, arguing, inter alia, the trial court erred by failing to
properly instruct the jury and by denying his motion for mistrial. People v.
Laurson, 15 P.3d 791, 794-96, 797 (Colo. App. 2000). The Colorado Court of
Appeals rejected all of Laurson’s claims and affirmed his convictions and
sentence. Id. at 798. Laurson’s subsequent petition for certiorari to the Colorado
Supreme Court was denied. Laurson then sought post-conviction relief by filing
two pro se Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c) motions in state court. 1 He was unsuccessful
at having his convictions overturned.
On June 18, 2015, Laurson filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. Laurson identified the following alleged errors: (1) trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to request jury instructions and the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense, (2) trial counsel was
biased against him, (3) the trial court improperly permitted prejudicial evidence to
be introduced, (4) a biased juror was seated on the jury, (5) his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to act in his best interest and failing to keep him informed,
1
The first of these motions appears to have languished in Colorado state
court for more than ten years.
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(6) he was tried while incompetent, and (7) his federal due process rights were
violated when a state statute was applied in an unconstitutional manner.
Respondents filed a pre-answer response, arguing Laurson’s § 2254 petition
should be dismissed because the claims he sought to raise were not properly
exhausted in state court. See Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 398 (10th Cir.
1992) (“In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a federal habeas corpus
petitioner must show that a state appellate court has had the opportunity to rule on
the same claim presented in federal court, or that at the time he filed his federal
petition, he had no available state avenue of redress.” (citation omitted)). The
district court noted the Colorado Court of Appeals declined to address claims (1),
(2), (4), and (5) because they were presented to the appellate court in a “skeletal”
manner during Laurson’s first round of post-conviction proceedings. Based on
this, the district court concluded the claims were procedurally defaulted in
Colorado state court and the state procedural bar was independent and adequate.
As to the remaining claims, the district court concluded Laurson failed to fairly
present those claims to the Colorado state court because he did not “alert[] the
[state] court to the alleged federal nature of the claim[s].” Baldwin v. Reese, 541
U.S. 27, 33 (2004); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) (holding
a § 2254 habeas claim is not exhausted unless it was presented to the state courts
as a federal constitutional claim). The court further ruled these unexhausted
claims would be procedurally barred in state court. See Moore v. Schoeman, 288
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F.3d 1231, 1233 n.3 (10th Cir. 2002) (“‘Anticipatory procedural bar’ occurs when
the federal courts apply procedural bar to an unexhausted claim that would be
procedurally barred under state law if the petitioner returned to state court to
exhaust it.”).
The district court concluded Laurson failed to demonstrate cause for the
default and actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hickman v.
Spears, 160 F.3d 1269, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the court dismissed
Laurson’s § 2254 petition with prejudice for failure to exhaust his state court
remedies.
Laurson cannot appeal the district court’s dismissal of his habeas
application unless he first obtains a certificate of appealability (“COA”). See 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c). To be entitled to a COA, Laurson must show “that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000) (holding that
when a district court dismisses a habeas petition on procedural grounds, a
petitioner is entitled to a COA only if he shows both that reasonable jurists would
find it debatable whether he had stated a valid constitutional claim and debatable
whether the district court’s procedural ruling was correct).
Our review of the record demonstrates the district court’s dismissal of
Laurson’s § 2254 petition with prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies is
not deserving of further proceedings or subject to a different resolution on appeal.
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This court denies Laurson’s application for a certificate of appealability and
dismisses this appeal. Laurson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal
is granted.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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