McDaniels v. Goff , 646 F. App'x 609 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 2, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
KEVIN WAYNE MCDANIELS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-4147
(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-00124-DN-DBP)
FNU GOFF, Detective, Ogden City Police (D. Utah)
Department, individually and in his official
capacity; OGDEN CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT; TIM SCOTT, Officer,
Ogden City Police Department,
individually and in his official capacity;
MIKE CALDWELL, Mayor of Ogden ,
Utah, individually and in his official
capacity,
Defendants Cross Claimants -
Appellees,
and
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION; WILLIAM
KENDALL, U.S. Attorney, Utah,
individually and in his official capacity;
OGDEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S
OFFICE,
Defendants Cross Claim
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
(continued)
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Kevin Wayne McDaniels, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s order denying his motions to compel an investigation, to enter a
default against the defendants, and to amend his complaint. The district court
adopted the recommendation of a magistrate judge. We have subject-matter
jurisdiction over only the portion of the order denying the motions to compel an
investigation. Even so, we do not address the merits because Mr. McDaniels failed to
file an objection to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The
remainder of the order being appealed is not a final order. Therefore, we lack
jurisdiction to review it. Accordingly, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
I. Background
Mr. McDaniels maintains that, while in prison, another prisoner told him who
had committed the unsolved 2008 murder of Jeffrey Bancroft. He asserts that he told
this information to the defendants, who are law-enforcement personnel, believing that
he would be entitled to a reduction of his sentence. He claims that he is now in
danger from other prisoners who know that he is an informant. In his amended
complaint, Mr. McDaniels sought monetary damages against the defendants for their
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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failure to arrange a sentence reduction in exchange for his information about the
Bancroft murder.
Mr. McDaniels filed several motions in the district court. In the order under
review here, the court addressed and denied the three motions referred to above. On
appeal, however, Mr. McDaniels argues (1) the defendants breached their promise of
a sentence reduction; (2) the magistrate judge and the district judge conspired with
the defendants to obstruct justice, “defraud[] the courts and the public,” Aplt.
Opening Br. at 2, fraudulently conceal Mr. McDaniels’s role in solving the Bancroft
murder, and cover up their errors in investigating the murder; (3) he was denied
meaningful access to the courts because he deserves a sentence reduction for solving
the murder but has not received one; and (4) the defendants have denied his request
to serve the remainder of his sentence in a protective-custody facility. In addition, he
requests an order directing the appropriate defendants to file a motion to reduce his
sentence.
II. Discussion
We have liberally construed Mr. McDaniels’s pro se filings. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux &
Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). We do not, however, “take on the
responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and
searching the record.” Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840. Moreover, “pro se parties [must]
follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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The district court denied Mr. McDaniels’s motions seeking to compel the
defendants to investigate the Bancroft murder. To the extent Mr. McDaniels’s
appellate briefs can be construed as an appeal of an order denying a request for
injunctive relief, we have jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (providing that
federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction over interlocutory orders refusing
injunctions); Petrella v. Brownback, 787 F.3d 1242, 1254 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is
well established that we have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders expressly
denying injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).”). Even though we
have jurisdiction, we do not address this claim because Mr. McDaniels did not file an
objection to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.
Under our firm-waiver rule, Mr. McDaniels’s failure to object “waives
appellate review of both factual and legal questions.” Casanova v. Ulibarri,
595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This rule
does not apply, however, when (1) a pro se litigant has not been informed of the time
period for objecting and the consequences of failing to object, or when (2) the
interests of justice require review.” Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1119
(10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The first exception is inapplicable because the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation stated:
Copies of the foregoing Report and Recommendation are being sent to all
parties who are hereby notified of their right to object. Within fourteen
(14) days of being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written
objections. Failure to object may constitute a waiver of objections upon
subsequent review.
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R. Vol. I, at 278.
We also determine that the second exception—interests of justice—does not
warrant granting Mr. McDaniels relief from the firm-waiver rule. “We may grant
relief from the firm waiver rule in the interests of justice, considering such factors as
a pro se litigant’s effort to comply, the force and plausibility of his explanation for
not complying and the importance of the issues raised.” Klein v. Harper, 777 F.3d
1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2015). Mr. McDaniels does not claim that he attempted to file
an objection to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Instead, he relies
on his objection to the district court’s order. See Aplt. Reply Br., Attach. 1. This is
insufficient, so the first two factors weigh against Mr. McDaniels.1
“[T]he interests of justice analysis . . . is similar to reviewing for plain error.”
Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008). A plain-error showing
requires “(1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which
(4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. McDaniels has offered no argument or
authority to refute the district court’s determination that “the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that ‘a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the
1
Defendants Goff, Scott, and Caldwell have provided a copy of a document
they received purporting to be a “Notice of Objection to Report and
Recommendation” submitted by Mr. McDaniels. See Aplee. Br. (Goff, Scott,
Caldwell), Attach. 1. But the district court docket sheet does not reflect that such a
document was filed, the district court’s order states that no objection to the report and
recommendation was filed, and Mr. McDaniels does not claim he filed the document.
Therefore, we do not consider it.
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prosecution or nonprosecution of another.’” R. Vol. 1, at 275-76 (quoting Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 767 n.13 (2005)). He merely states in
conclusory fashion that solving the Bancroft murder warrants review of his claims
and the district court abused its discretion in holding that it is not his duty or right to
solve a murder. Not only are these statements insufficient to meet the interests-of-
justice exception to the firm-waiver rule, they are insufficient even to invoke
appellate review. See Kerber v. Qwest Pension Plan, 572 F.3d 1135, 1146 (10th Cir.
2009) (rejecting appellate claim as inadequately briefed because the claim was
addressed in only conclusory fashion). Consequently, we do not address
Mr. McDaniels’s challenge to the ruling denying his motions seeking to compel the
defendants to investigate the Bancroft murder.
The remaining rulings by the district court are not a final order so we lack
jurisdiction to address them. See 28 U.S.C. 1291 (providing that federal courts of
appeals have jurisdiction over all final decisions of the district courts). “As a general
rule, this court has jurisdiction over only final orders, those that end the litigation on
the merits and leave nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Oil,
Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l Union (AFL-CIO) v. Conoco, Inc., 241 F.3d 1299,
1302 (10th Cir. 2001) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The rulings
denying Mr. McDaniels’s motions to enter a default against the defendants and to
amend his complaint did not end the litigation on the merits. That his appellate
arguments do not address these rulings is irrelevant to our determination that this
court lacks jurisdiction over the nonfinal order.
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III. Pending Motions
We deny Mr. McDaniels’s second motion for appointment of counsel. We
also deny his “Motion Requesting an Order by the Court for the Defendants to
Contact Plaintiff[’]s U.S. Atty Lance Crick, Greenville, S.C. to Make Sure Plaintiff
Receives a Downward Departure for His Assistance” and “Motion to Compel the
U.S. Attorney[’]s Office as a Whole to file a Downward Departure for Substantial
Assistance in Solving the Jeffrey Bancroft Murder.” Both motions ask this court to
require prosecutors to seek a sentence reduction for Mr. McDaniels. It is beyond our
purview to order this relief. Cf. United States v. Perez, 955 F.2d 34, 36 (10th Cir.
1992) (“The government is in the best position to determine whether a defendant
provides assistance substantial enough to warrant filing a [motion to lower a
defendant’s sentence], and we are not convinced that the government here erred
significantly in its assessment.”).
Mr. McDaniels’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) is granted; he is
authorized to proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees, but he is nevertheless
“required to pay the full amount of [the] filing fee,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Mr. McDaniels has also filed a motion seeking reimbursement of all filing fees he has
paid in the district court and this court. He contends, without citing any legal
authority, that he is not required to pay these fees because he solved the Bancroft
murder. The motion seeking reimbursement is denied.
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IV. Conclusion
The district court’s order denying Mr. McDaniels’s motions to compel an
investigation is affirmed. The remainder of the appeal is dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Mr. McDaniels’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal is
granted and he is reminded that he is obligated to continue making partial payments
until the entire fee has been paid. He is not entitled to the reimbursement of any
filing fees, however, so his motion for reimbursement is denied. All other pending
motions are denied.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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