Ingila v. Dish Network, LLC , 615 F. App'x 513 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 22, 2015
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Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FIFI MENO INGILA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-1087
(D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00809-MSK-MJW)
DISH NETWORK, LLC, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellee.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
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Fifi Meno Ingila, pro se, appeals from the district court’s order of summary
judgment in favor of Dish Network, LLC (Dish) on her claims for racial
discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts. Briefly, Ms. Ingila, an
African-American, worked for Dish as a customer service representative beginning in
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
2008. She alleged that her co-workers often referred to her as “Oprah” and “Winnie
Mandela.” When Dish failed to take corrective action, she filed charges of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in January and
February 2010. Dish terminated Ms. Ingila’s employment in 2011 following an
incident in the workplace. According to Dish, Ms. Ingila threw a bottle of water at a
co-worker who she thought was talking too loud. For her part, Ms. Ingila said the
bottle slipped out of her hand.
In 2013, Ms. Ingila, represented by counsel, filed suit alleging numerous
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), § 1981, and
the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). An amended complaint,
also filed by counsel, abandoned all the claims except those under § 1981.
Eventually, Ms. Ingila’s counsel withdrew and Ms. Ingila proceeded pro se.
As to the claims under § 1981, the district court carefully examined each one
and concluded, in a comprehensive and well-reasoned twenty-page opinion and
order, that Dish was entitled to summary judgment. As an overarching matter, the
court recognized that although Ms. Ingila’s pro se filings were entitled to a liberal
construction, she failed to address the relevant claims or muster any evidence in
opposition. The court then applied the law to the undisputed facts and concluded that
Dish was entitled to summary judgment.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standard used by the district court.” Kendrick v. Penske Transp.
Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The district court analyzed Ms. Ingila’s claims of disparate treatment and retaliation
under § 1981 using the proper framework and found no evidence of pretext. See
Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1225 (“the analytical framework [of McDonnell Douglas]
applies . . . to claims [of discrimination] brought pursuant to section 1981”)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Davis v. Unified Sch. Dist. 500, 750 F.3d 1168,
1170 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[a] plaintiff may prove [retaliation in] violation of . . . § 1981
. . . by adhering to the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas”) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). As to Ms. Ingila’s claim of a racially hostile work
environment under § 1981, the court concluded that “[t]aken as a whole and in the
light most favorable to Ms. Ingila . . . the facts alleged fail to establish a genuine
issue of whether a reasonable person would construe the name-calling to be
sufficiently severe and pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of
employment.” R. at 735.
Ms. Ingila has failed to raise any relevant arguments on appeal; instead she
argues about claims that were dropped from the amended complaint and expresses
frustration with Dish for its alleged failure to renew a pre-litigation settlement offer.
We have carefully examined the parties’ briefs, the record, and the controlling law,
and conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of
Dish. According, we affirm for substantially the same reasons as those set forth in
the court’s order dated February 14, 2014.
Because Ms. Ingila has failed to present any reasoned, non-frivolous
arguments, we deny her motion to proceed in forma pauperis and direct her to remit
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the full filing and docketing fees to the clerk of the district court forthwith. See
DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991) (“In order to succeed
on [a] motion [to proceed in forma pauperis] an appellant must show a financial
inability to pay the required filing fees and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous
argument on the law and facts”) (emphasis added)).
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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