United Steel Workers Local Union No. 348 v. Magellan Midstream Holdings GP, LLC , 652 F. App'x 694 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 16, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STEEL WORKERS
LOCAL UNION NO. 348,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 15-3249
v. (D.C. No. 2:14-CV-02428-JTM)
(D. Kan.)
MAGELLAN MIDSTREAM
HOLDINGS GP, LLC,
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
A labor union (plaintiff) and employer (defendant) entered into a
collective bargaining agreement, but they disagree on whether this
agreement requires the employer to staff certain positions with union
workers. The issue on appeal is whether this disagreement falls within an
arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement. The district
*
The parties have not requested oral argument, and we do not believe
it would be helpful. As a result, we are deciding the appeal based on the
briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
court concluded that the dispute was subject to the arbitration provision
and granted summary judgment to the union. We affirm because the
collective bargaining agreement is susceptible to an interpretation that the
arbitration provision covers the dispute.
I. The parties disagreed on the need to arbitrate their dispute.
The employer owns and operates interstate pipeline systems. For
these pipeline systems, the employer uses controllers who operate the
pipelines through computer consoles.
This dispute centers on one console (Console No. 9) at the
employer’s Tulsa headquarters. At this console, the employer used six non-
union employees. The union wanted the employer to use union workers for
these positions and filed a grievance under the collective bargaining
agreement, arguing that Article I of the agreement required the employer to
use employees represented by the union.
The employer refused to process the grievance for three reasons:
(1) the grievance was not substantively arbitrable because it raised an issue
of union representation that was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB); (2) the arbitrability issue had
already been determined in two binding arbitrations; and (3) the grievance
was untimely. The employer added that it was unwilling to engage in
arbitration, which was the next step in the collective bargaining
agreement’s dispute-resolution process.
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The union filed this federal action to compel arbitration, and the
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court
granted the union’s motion, denied the employer’s motion, and ordered the
employer to submit the grievance to arbitration. The employer appeals.
II. Our review of the district court’s summary-judgment decision is
de novo.
We engage in de novo review of the disposition of cross-motions for
summary judgment, applying the same standard as the district court.
Pirkheim v. First Unum Life Ins., 229 F.3d 1008, 1010 (10th Cir. 2000).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
III. The collective bargaining agreement can reasonably be read to
require arbitration of this dispute.
Arbitration can be compelled only if the parties agreed to arbitrate
the dispute. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582 (1960). The question here is whether the employer agreed to
arbitrate the need to staff the six positions with union workers. We
conclude that the employer agreed to arbitrate this type of dispute.
A. We resolve doubts in favor of arbitrability.
In deciding whether a dispute is arbitrable, we must follow three
guideposts. First, an “order to arbitrate [a] particular grievance should not
be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
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clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute.” Id. at 582–83. Second, “[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of
coverage.” Id. at 583. Third, where the arbitration provision is broad and
the collective bargaining agreement lacks “any express provision excluding
a particular grievance from arbitration, . . . only the most forceful evidence
of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.” Id. at 584–
85.
B. Article IX can reasonably be read to require arbitration.
Article IX contains a dispute-resolution provision stating that “[a]ll
complaints arising out of the interpretation or performance of [the
collective bargaining agreement] shall be governed in the manner of the
settlement by the terms of [the agreement] according to the following
procedure.” Appellant’s App’x, vol. I at 57. The procedure begins with a
grievance process. If that process does not fully resolve the dispute, either
party can invoke arbitration under Article X, which states that the dispute
“shall . . . be submitted to arbitration by an impartial arbitrator.” Id. at 58.
Facially, these provisions indicate that if the grievance process does
not fully resolve the disputes, the union can submit the dispute to an
arbitrator. That being the case, we inquire only “whether the party seeking
arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the
contract.” United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
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C. Article I does not foreclose arbitrability of this dispute.
In arguing that the arbitration provision does not apply, the employer
points to Article I, which addresses the types of employees subject to the
collective bargaining agreement:
[The collective bargaining agreement] shall include all
operating and maintenance employees of [the employer] on the
system of [the employer], including all pipelines, stations, and
terminals and including all Mainline Controllers at [the
employer’s] general office, but excluding all other employees
at [the employer’s] general office and Region offices and all
other supervisory employees. It is expressly understood in
connection with this stated coverage that should any difference
of opinion or dispute develop with reference thereto, the
difference of opinion or dispute shall be determined solely
from the language of the [NLRB] orders in the following
numbered cases[,] . . . and shall not be determined in any
manner by reference to the coverage stated above.
Appellant’s App’x, vol. I at 49.
According to the employer, the second sentence requires use of
NLRB orders to determine whether employees are covered by the collective
bargaining agreement. Thus, the employer argues that coverage issues are
determined by the NLRB rather than the arbitrator. In support, the
employer notes Article X.2.’s limitation on the arbitrator’s function: “The
Arbitrator is restricted to interpreting, applying and determining any
violation of the performance and/or provisions of [the collective
bargaining agreement] and cannot add to, modify, delete, or otherwise
change any provision of [the agreement].” Id. at 58. According to the
employer, this language limits the arbitrator to interpreting the collective
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bargaining agreement, preventing him or her from referring to the NLRB
orders as required in Article I.
We disagree. Arbitrators are not limited to “interpreting” the
collective bargaining agreement; they can also “apply[]” the agreement and
“determin[e]” whether it has been violated. Id. If application of the
agreement requires reference to certain NLRB orders, the arbitrator
arguably must enjoy the power to refer to these orders. Therefore, the
union’s interpretation of the arbitration provision is at least reasonable.
The employer also argues that in the second paragraph of Article I,
the parties recognized that the NLRB would be solely responsible for
determining whether the collective bargaining agreement covers employees
working in newly created consoles. The second paragraph provides:
Other Coverage: If the Union is designated by the [NLRB] as
the exclusive representative for the purpose of the collective
bargaining for other operating units of [the employer], this
[collective bargaining agreement] shall be extended to include
such units for the classes of employees therein covered.
Id. at 49. This language does not give the NLRB exclusive responsibility
for determining whether the collective bargaining agreement applies.
Instead, this language describes what happens “[i]f” the NLRB designates
the union “as the exclusive representative” for the employer’s “other
operating units.” Id. And the provision does not state that the NLRB would
bear sole responsibility for making this determination.
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D. The nature of the underlying NLRB proceedings is
irrelevant to our assessment of the order compelling
arbitration.
The employer also contends that because the NLRB orders specified
in Article I were entered in proceedings concerning representational
elections, submitting the grievance to arbitration would violate the
workers’ right to vote on union representation. This argument goes to the
merits of the union’s grievance, which is not at issue in the appeal. See
Int’l Union, UAW v. Telex Comput. Prods., Inc., 816 F.2d 519, 526 (10th
Cir. 1987) (“[H]ow the Union may ultimately fare on the merits is
immaterial to our determination since ‘the collective agreement calls for
the submission of grievances in the categories which it describes,
irrespective of whether a court may deem them to be meritorious.’”
(brackets omitted) (quoting United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 567 (1960))). If the specified NLRB orders require an election, the
collective bargaining agreement would allow the arbitrator to apply that
requirement.
E. The outcomes of prior arbitrations do not affect the
outcome here.
Finally, the parties point to three prior arbitration decisions
involving similar grievances. In two of those, the arbitrator concluded that
the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction. In the other, the arbitrator exercised
jurisdiction and decided in the union’s favor. We need not decide which of
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the prior arbitration decisions was correct, for our only task is to determine
whether the parties agreed to submit this grievance to arbitration. See
United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1960).
IV. Disposition
We affirm.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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