United States v. Clare ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 7, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 16-5041
(D.C. Nos. 4:15-CV-00276-JHP-PJC and
DANNY EUGENE CLARE, 4:12-CR-00195-JHP-1)
(N.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
On November 7, 2012, Danny Eugene Clare was indicted on a number of
charges, including being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Court appointed
William Widell to represent Clare. Attorney Widell moved for a competency
determination. On January 31, 2013, the court held a hearing and found Clare
incompetent. He was transferred to FMC Butner for competency restoration. On July
23, 2013, the court held a second competency hearing and found that Clare was then
competent to proceed.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
On September 3, 2013, Clare appeared before United States Magistrate Judge
Paul Cleary to enter a change of plea. Both Clare and the district court quoted from
the transcript of that hearing extensively in this proceeding. Because there is no
dispute about what actual words were spoken—the disputes relate to inflection and
tone—we rely on those quotations as needed.
On November 27, 2013, Clare appeared before United States District Judge
James Payne for sentencing. Clare’s U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range was 77 to 96
months. Attorney Widell argued for a significant variance, based on Clare’s history
of mental illness and mental state at the time of the crime. In light of Clare’s
individual circumstances, Judge Payne awarded Clare a downward variance, reducing
his guideline range to 57 to 71 months. Ultimately, Clare received a 57-month
sentence.
On direct appeal, Attorney Widell filed an Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), brief and Clare responded. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Attorney Widell,
granted his request to withdraw, and dismissed the appeal. United States v. Clare,
569 F. App’x 553, 559 (10th Cir. June 19, 2014) (unpublished). On May 15, 2015,
Clare filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction. On March 24,
2016, the district court denied the motion and refused to issue a certificate of
appealability (COA). Clare filed a joint application for a COA and an opening brief
in this court. Because Clare is pro se, we construe his pro se pleadings liberally, but
we do not serve as his advocate. James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir.
2013).
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Before Clare can appeal the district court’s decision, he must obtain from this
court a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We may issue a COA only if a petitioner
makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2).
This standard requires a “showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotation marks
omitted). Where a district court rejects the petitioner’s constitutional claims on the
merits, the “petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s assessment of the [petitioner’s] constitutional claims debatable or wrong” to
obtain a COA. Id. Here, we conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate
whether the district court properly denied Hill’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
argument.
The district court concluded that the first three grounds of Clare’s motion were
procedurally barred: (1) that a magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to accept Clare’s
guilty plea, (2) that Clare did not waive his right to have an Article III judge accept
his guilty plea, and (3) that Clare’s guilty plea was not entered into intelligently.
Failure to raise an issue on direct appeal bars a defendant from raising the issue in a
habeas motion “unless he can show cause for his procedural default and actual
prejudice resulting from the alleged errors, or can show that a fundamental
miscarriage of justice will occur if his claim is not addressed.” United State v. Allen,
16 F.3d 377, 378 (10th Cir. 1994). We agree. Clare failed to raise these issues on
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direct appeal, so he cannot raise them now. While Clare asserts that he can show
cause for the procedural default because his counsel was ineffective, he cannot
overcome his procedural default unless his attorney’s alleged error rises to the level
of constitutionally deficient representation. United States v. Majid, 196 F. App’x 685,
687 (10th Cir. Sept. 18, 2006) (unpublished). As discussed below, Clare’s counsel’s
performance was not constitutionally deficient. Therefore, Clare has not established
cause for his procedural default.
Unlike other types of claims, procedural bar does not apply to ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims. United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th
Cir. 1995). Those claims are analyzed under the Strickland standard. First, the
defendant must show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). This
standard is highly deferential and employs a “strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689.
Second, the defendant must show that his counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced
his defense. Id. at 692. In other words, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s deficient performance, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. We may dispose of a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel on either part of the Strickland standard as a failure
of either component is fatal to the claim. United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792,
796–97 (10th Cir. 2006).
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Clare supplies three grounds for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel:
(1) that his counsel failed to inform Clare of his right to have an Article III judge
accept his guilty plea, (2) that his counsel promised him a sentence of probation,
coercing Clare into pleading guilty, and (3) that his counsel failed to argue Clare’s
mental-health issues at sentencing.1
Clare alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
counsel failed to inform him that he had a right to have an Article III judge accept his
guilty plea. This claim fails for lack of prejudice. During Clare’s change of plea
colloquy, Magistrate Judge Cleary explained Clare’s rights:
Now, as I mentioned, you have to consent to my jurisdiction to go
forward with this plea today. You have a right to have this guilty plea
proceeding conducted by a district judge. I’m a U.S. Magistrate Judge.
You can waive your right, that is give up your right to proceed before a
district judge and go ahead and have the hearing before me. The
advantage is really one of convenience, because this is a Judge Payne
case. He sits primarily in Muskogee. It’s difficult sometimes for him to
be up here, so it’s easier if I can take your plea, easier for him, easier for
you maybe.
As I mentioned before, your plea proceeding before me will have the
same force and effect as if Judge Payne conducted it, but it’s your right.
R. at 135–36. After advising Clare of this right, Magistrate Judge Cleary continued as
follows:
Court: . . . do you wish to waive your right to appear before a district judge and
proceed before me?
1
Clare alleged in his district-court filings that Attorney Widell had a conflict
of interest. On appeal, he barely mentions that claim in his introduction when he lists
his claimed grounds from relief. Opening Br. at 2. Because Clare has provided no
facts or argument on this claim, if he even intends to include it in his appeal, we hold
that it is waived.
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Clare: I wish to proceed before you.
Court: Okay.
Clare: So I don’t know if my answer is yes or no.
Court: Okay, you answered.
Clare: I’m a little confused right there . . . .
Opening Br. at 6. Clare then signed a consent form which stated that Magistrate
Judge Cleary had explained Clare’s right to appear before a district court judge and
waived that right. Clare argues that “I wish to proceed before you” was a question.
But that contradicts not only what he said at the hearing but also the consent form he
signed. Clare’s attempts to discredit the consent form by stating that Magistrate
Judge Cleary never reviewed it are baseless: Magistrate Judge Cleary reviewed what
the consent form covered during the plea colloquy. In addition, Clare has failed to
show that, even if his counsel had not explained his right to appear before an Article
III judge, there is a reasonable probability that he would have declined to submit his
plea in front of Magistrate Judge Cleary. Reasonable jurists would not disagree on
that point so this claim fails.
Clare’s sworn testimony at his plea hearing defeats his present claims that
Attorney Widell coerced him into asserting that he was competent and to pleading
guilty. Magistrate Judge Cleary was aware of the earlier competency proceedings and
as part of his standard questioning asked Clare a series of questions including “[D]o
you understand these proceedings today?” and “[A]re you competent to proceed
today?” R. at 146. Clare answered “Yes” to both. Id.
6
During Clare’s plea colloquy, Magistrate Judge Cleary confirmed that there
was no written or oral plea agreement. Magistrate Judge Cleary asked, “Has anyone
from the government or even your own lawyer had [sic] made any promise or
assurance to you of any kind to get you to plead guilty?” R. at 147. Clare replied,
“No.” Id. After Clare pleaded guilty, Magistrate Judge Cleary asked Clare if he had
entered his plea and made all attendant waivers “voluntarily, and completely of [his]
own free choice?” Id. (alteration in original). Clay replied, “Yes, they are.”
Magistrate Judge Cleary then asked Clare if he was “being forced to plead guilty by
anybody,” “threatened by anyone to plead guilty,” or “under any time of pressure
[sic] to plead guilty.” Id. Claire replied “No.” Id. Finally, Magistrate Judge Cleary
asked, “Are you relying on any representation or promise that has been made to you
to get you to plead guilty?” Id. Clare replied, “No.” Id. Clare also confirmed that he
understood that the district court could impose a sentence up to ten years, that the
district court did not have to impose an sentence recommended by the sentencing
guidelines, that any sentencing calculations by his attorney was “only an estimate,”
and that the final sentence would be up to the district judge. Id.
In light of Magistrate Judge Cleary’s verifying Clare’s understanding of the
proceeding and his reviewing aloud Clare’s rights, Clare has failed to show any
prejudice. Even if Attorney Widell had really promised Clare that he would receive
only probation, Magistrate Judge Cleary’s questions during the colloquy would have
clarified that Attorney Widell could not promise that.
7
Clare asserts that his counsel did not argue at sentencing that Clare’s mental-
health issues should be considered a mitigating factor. But while that section of his
brief states that “[t]he majority of this issue is covered in the ‘Contested Fact’ section
of this motion,” Opening Br. at 12, nothing in that section—or the rest of the
Opening Brief—addresses this issue. Thus, we hold that the argument is waived. In
addition, we note that the district court varied downward in imposing Clare’s
sentence based on “factors present in this case.” R. at 138.
Clare argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on his
declaration that he did not in fact respond affirmatively that “I wish to proceed before
you,” but instead stated those words as a question. But no evidentiary hearing is
required by § 2255 if “the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We agree with the district
court that the record conclusively shows that Clare is entitled to no relief. Clare’s
knowingly and intelligently agreeing to change his plea before the magistrate is borne
out not only by the transcript’s words but by their surrounding context and the rest of
the hearing transcript.
Additionally, Clare argues that the district court violated his due process rights
by “cho[osing] to use a slightly re-worded government’s response as its final order in
this case.” Opening Br. at 12 (emphasis in original). As far as we can understand this
argument, Clare is asserting that his due process rights were violated because the
district court’s opinion agreed with the government and used some of the legal
sources that the government provided while not adopting those Clare put forward. It
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is not a violation of a person’s rights for the court to credit one party’s arguments
over another party’s.
We have reviewed Clare’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the
attached affidavit. To proceed in forma pauperis, “an appellant must show a financial
inability to pay the required filing fees and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous
argument on the law and the facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.”
DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991). Because Clare has
demonstrated an inability to pay the fee and his application is not patently frivolous,
we grant his motion. We deny Clare’s application for a certificate of appealability.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
9