Parker v. Commissioner, SSA , 922 F.3d 1169 ( 2019 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 30, 2019
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
BILLY J. PARKER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 18-1160
(D.C. No. 1:17-CV-01280-CMA)
COMMISSIONER, SSA, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, BACHARACH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
This appeal grew out of a denial of disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income. The applicant, Mr. Billy Parker, sought
these benefits based on alleged physical and mental impairments. Under
the applicable regulations, the Social Security Administration had to assess
Mr. Parker’s ability to perform work-related activities with his
*
Oral argument would not materially aid our consideration of the
appeal, so we have decided the appeal based on the briefs and appendix.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
But our order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); Tenth Cir. R. 32.1(A).
limitations. 1 To help with this assessment, the agency obtained opinions
from two doctors; both said that Mr. Parker would face moderate
limitations when engaging in certain activities. The Social Security
Administration denied benefits, and the district court affirmed.
The agency appeared to credit both doctors’ opinions, but the
agency’s findings regarding Mr. Parker’s capabilities conflicted with the
doctors’ opinions about his limitations. This conflict might have been
permissible if the agency had explained why it chose to reject the doctors’
opinions, but the agency didn’t supply an explanation. Given the lack of
explanation, we conclude that the district court should have reversed the
agency’s denial of benefits and remanded for reconsideration of what Mr.
Parker could do given his limitations.
1. The agency obtains medical opinions involving Mr. Parker’s
mental limitations.
The agency found that Mr. Parker had both physical and mental
impairments. Here we are focusing on the mental impairments, which
included post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety disorder, adjustment
disorder with depression, and antisocial personality disorder. Given these
conditions, the agency had to determine what Mr. Parker could still do in a
work setting.
1
The agency refers to this assessment as one involving “residual
functional capacity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1).
2
To assist with this determination, the agency obtained medical
opinions from Ellen Ryan, M.D. and Donald Degroot, Ph.D. Dr. Ryan
reviewed the pertinent medical records and opined that Mr. Parker had
some moderate limitations in his mental abilities, including in his ability to
accept supervision and interact with coworkers. 2 Dr. Degroot examined
Mr. Parker and opined that he was moderately limited in various mental
activities, including his ability to respond appropriately to usual work
situations and routine changes in his work setting. 3
2. The agency evaluates the medical opinions and assesses
Mr. Parker’s capacity.
After obtaining the two medical opinions, the agency was obligated
to evaluate them in assessing Mr. Parker’s ability to perform work-related
tasks. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996) (evaluating
medical opinions in assessing residual functional capacity); see generally
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) & (e), 416.920(a)(4) & (e) (describing the
agency’s obligation to assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity
based on all of the relevant evidence). Because the agency bore the
ultimate responsibility to assess Mr. Parker’s abilities, the agency could
2
Dr. Degroot also opined that Mr. Parker was moderately impaired in
his ability to interact appropriately with supervision and coworkers. But
Mr. Parker does not rely on Dr. Degroot’s opinion as to this impairment.
3
In addition, Dr. Ryan opined that Mr. Parker had a moderate
limitation in his ability to respond appropriately to changes in a work
setting. But this part of Dr. Ryan’s opinion is not involved in the appeal.
3
decide whether it agreed or disagreed with the medical opinions. In
carrying out this responsibility, the agency apparently agreed with the two
medical opinions, stating that it gave “significant” weight to Dr. Ryan’s
opinion and “great” weight to Dr. Degroot’s.
But Mr. Parker questions whether the agency actually incorporated
these medical opinions when assessing his ability to perform work-related
activities. If the agency had decided to omit particular limitations
embodied in the two medical opinions, the agency needed to explain the
omissions. See Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1291 (10th Cir. 2012)
(stating that the agency may dismiss or discount medical opinions but
“must provide specific, legitimate reasons” for doing so (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
3. We engage in de novo review.
The issue here is whether the agency applied the correct legal
standards in assessing Mr. Parker’s residual functional capacity. See Mays
v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 571 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating the standard for
review of agency decisions). This issue is a legal one, see Byron v.
Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 1984), so our review is de novo,
4
see Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (stating that questions of
law are subject to de novo review).
4. In assessing Mr. Parker’s mental limitations, the agency failed to
incorporate the pertinent parts of the two medical opinions.
We conclude that the agency didn’t incorporate pertinent parts of the
two medical opinions in assessing Mr. Parker’s work-related capabilities.
For example, the agency didn’t incorporate Dr. Ryan’s assessment of
Mr. Parker’s ability to interact with his supervisors and coworkers.
Dr. Ryan had opined (1) that Mr. Parker could not work closely with
supervisors and coworkers and (2) that he could only accept supervision or
relate to coworkers if the contact were infrequent. But the agency
ultimately concluded that Mr. Parker could frequently interact with
supervisors and coworkers.
A similar discrepancy exists between the agency’s assessment and
Dr. Degroot’s opinion. Dr. Degroot opined that Mr. Parker was moderately
impaired in his abilities to respond appropriately to usual work situations
and to changes in the usual work setting. This impairment, however, was
omitted in the agency’s findings about what Mr. Parker could do despite
his limitations.
The commissioner points out that the agency rejected Dr. Ryan’s
opinion involving Mr. Parker’s ability to interact with the general public.
According to the commissioner, one can easily infer that the agency had
5
the same reason for rejecting Dr. Ryan’s opinion involving interaction with
supervisors and coworkers. We disagree. In discussing Mr. Parker’s ability
to interact with the general public, the agency pointed to his ability to do
things like go to a dog park with his children and run errands with his
mother. Though these activities could bear on Mr. Parker’s ability to
interact with the public, they do not suggest that he could frequently accept
supervision and interact with coworkers in the face of a contrary medical
opinion. Indeed, we have treated interaction with the public as distinct
from interaction with supervisors or coworkers. Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d
1285, 1290 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2012). We thus conclude that the agency did
not incorporate Dr. Ryan’s opinion that Mr. Parker was moderately limited
in his ability to interact with supervisors and coworkers.
The commissioner also argues that the agency incorporated
Dr. Degroot’s opinion by finding that Mr. Parker was unable to (1) engage
in work that required complex tasks or instructions or (2) work at a pace
customary for a production line. We have generally held that restricting a
claimant to particular work activities does not adequately account for the
claimant’s mental limitations. See id. at 1290 n.3. On the other hand, we
have held that the agency can sometimes account for mental limitations by
limiting the claimant to particular kinds of work. See Vigil v. Colvin,
805 F.3d 1199, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2015) . Unless the connection (between
the limitation and the work) is obvious, however, the agency must
6
ordinarily explain how a work-related limitation accounts for mental
limitations reflected in a medical opinion. See id.; Wayland v. Chater,
No. 95-7059, 1996 WL 50459, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 7, 1996) (unpublished).
Here the connection isn’t obvious, and the agency didn’t explain how
its finding would account for Dr. Degroot’s opinion. Indeed, any job would
typically require an ability to respond appropriately to usual work
situations and changes in routine work settings. See SSR 85-15, 1985 WL
56857, at *4 (1985) (“The basic mental demands of competitive,
remunerative, unskilled work include the abilities (on a sustained basis)
. . . to respond appropriately to . . . usual work situations; and to deal with
changes in a routine work setting.”). We thus conclude that the agency’s
findings, restricting the complexity or pace of Mr. Parker’s work, did not
adequately incorporate Dr. Degroot’s opinion involving a moderate
limitation in the ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations
and changes in a work setting.
5. The agency fails to explain omission of the pertinent limitations
in the two medical opinions.
The agency presumably could have disagreed with Dr. Ryan and
Dr. Degroot. But the agency didn’t express any disagreement. The agency
instead said that it gave significant weight to Dr. Ryan’s opinion and great
weight to Dr. Degroot’s. See Part 2, above. Given the discrepancy between
the agency’s assessment of mental capacity and the medical opinions, the
7
agency had an obligation to provide an explanation. See SSR 96-8p, 1996
WL 374184, at *7 (1996) (stating that if the adjudicator’s assessment of
residual functional capacity “conflicts with an opinion from a medical
source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted”).
The agency adopted other opinions by Dr. Ryan and Dr. Degroot, but
not their opinions involving moderate limitations in the abilities (1) to
interact with supervisors or coworkers or (2) to respond appropriately to
usual work situations or changes in a work setting. The absence of
explanation required the district court to reverse the denial of benefits. See
Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
administrative law judge erred in failing to explain why he had rejected
some of the consulting doctor’s restrictions as to the residual functional
capacity “while appearing to adopt others”).
6. The presence of substantial evidence does not prevent reversal.
The commissioner argues that the agency had substantial evidence
for its assessment of Mr. Parker’s limitations. But Mr. Parker has not
questioned the existence of substantial evidence. He argues instead that the
agency legally erred by failing to explain why its assessment of
Mr. Parker’s mental limitations deviated from the two medical opinions. If
Mr. Parker is right about the legal error, we must reverse even if the
agency’s findings are otherwise supported by substantial evidence. Byron
v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, 1234–35 (10th Cir. 1984); see Jensen v.
8
Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that the agency’s
“failure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide this court with a
sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been
followed is grounds for reversal” (brackets & internal quotation marks
omitted)) .
7. The agency’s errors are prejudicial.
The commissioner contends that even if the agency had erred in
omitting moderate limitations in interacting with supervisors and
coworkers, the error wouldn’t have affected the outcome. For the sake of
argument, we can assume that the commissioner is right. But this
assumption would not have affected the impact of the error involving
limitations in the ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations
and routine changes in his work settings. This error would require reversal
even if the agency’s other errors would have been harmless. We thus
reverse and remand, with instructions to remand for the Social Security
Administration to reconsider its assessment of what Mr. Parker can do
despite his mental limitations.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
9