Turley v. Estep ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 12, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
DAVID TURLEY,
Petitioner–Appellant,
v. No. 09-1215
(D.C. No. 1:04-CV-00789-PAB-CBS)
AL ESTEP, Limon Correctional (D. Colo.)
Facility; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents–Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before LUCERO, PORFILIO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
David Turley requests a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We deny a COA
and dismiss the appeal.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Adopting the recommendations of a magistrate judge, the district court
dismissed several of Turley’s claims on procedural grounds and denied his
remaining claims on the merits. To obtain a COA for the procedural rulings,
Turley must demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). To obtain a
COA for the merits rulings, Turley must show “that reasonable jurists would find
the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
Id.
I
The district court found that many of Turley’s claims had not been
exhausted through the course of Turley’s direct appeals and two state post-
conviction proceedings relating to the convictions challenged here. 1 Concluding
that state court review would now be unavailable, the court dismissed these
claims under the “anticipatory procedural bar” doctrine. See Coleman v.
1
The direct appeals are People v. Turley, Denver Dist. Court Nos.
89CR1651 & 89CR1652, aff’d, 870 P.2d 498 (Colo. App. 1993) (affirming
convictions in 89CR1651), cert. denied, 93SC539 (Colo. Mar. 21, 1994), and
aff’d, 92CA0874 (Colo. Mar. 24, 1994) (affirming convictions in 89CR1652),
cert. denied, 94SC357 (Colo. Nov. 29, 1994). The post-conviction proceedings
are People v. Turley, 18 P.3d 802 (Colo. App. 2000), cert. denied, 00SC711
(Colo. Feb. 20, 2001), and People v. Turley, 01CA1991 (Colo. App. Nov. 6,
2003), cert. denied, 03SC794 (Colo. Mar. 22, 2004).
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Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991). The propriety of that ruling is not
debatable.
As the magistrate judge explained, claims three, nine, and ten—in which
Turley objected to the admission of evidence relating to his arrest warrant, a
search warrant for his wife’s vehicle, and the probable cause determinations
underlying the warrants—were not raised in Turley’s direct appeals or post-
conviction proceedings. 2 Similarly, claim eight, regarding severance of Turley’s
habitual criminal proceeding from that of his co-defendant, and claim eleven,
regarding a jury instruction on complicity, were never raised before the Colorado
Court of Appeals either on direct appeal or during post-conviction proceedings.
Turley also failed to exhaust part of his fifth claim, which challenges three
prior convictions upon which the state court relied for the habitual criminal
adjudication. Turley did challenge a 1979 conviction in his initial post-conviction
proceeding, see Turley, 18 P.3d at 806, but omitted this challenge from the
certiorari petition he filed with the Colorado Supreme Court. “Claims not
included in a petition for discretionary review to the state’s highest court are not
2
Turley insists that he exhausted these claims, but he merely raised similar
objections in state proceedings involving a separate sexual assault prosecution not
at issue in this habeas proceeding. See People v. Turley, Denver Dist. Court No.
89CR1827, aff’d, 90CA1542 (Colo. App. May 20, 1993), cert. denied, 93SC485
(Colo. Dec. 27, 1993); People v. Turley, 99CA0037 (Colo. App. July 27, 2000)
(affirming denial of post-conviction relief), cert. denied, 00SC710 (Colo. Feb. 20,
2001).
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exhausted and are procedurally defaulted when, as here, they are now
time-barred.” Gonzales v. McKune, 279 F.3d 922, 924 (10th Cir. 2002).
Claim twelve—ineffective assistance of trial counsel—was only partially
exhausted. Turley’s allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately investigate and challenge the prior convictions underlying his habitual
criminal determination was rejected on the merits in his last post-conviction
proceeding. See Turley, 01CA1991. 3 But his additional allegations that trial
counsel improperly informed Turley about his right to testify in the habitual
criminal phase of the trial and failed to move for a mistrial based on the
incompetence of co-defendant’s counsel were not exhausted.
Finally, Turley’s claim four—in which he complains the prosecution
elicited testimony from his wife regarding the fact that he was in jail—was
addressed by the district court on the merits. The court evidently concluded that
this claim was preserved as part of the cumulative error claim presented in
Turley’s first post-conviction proceeding challenging the convictions currently
3
Turley raised this issue in conjunction with a claim of ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel for failing to argue trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness in earlier post-conviction proceedings. Although Colorado
recognizes claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel under state
law, see Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164, 1168-69 (Colo. 2007), there is no federal
constitutional right to such counsel and hence no corresponding claim cognizable
in habeas proceedings. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752. For this reason, ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot serve as “cause and prejudice” in
habeas proceedings to excuse a state procedural default. Cummings v. Sirmons,
506 F.3d 1211, 1223 (10th Cir. 2007).
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under review. However, this claim was not raised independently or as a
component of a broader cumulative error claim in that or in any other state
proceeding related to the criminal prosecution under review here. 4
These exhaustion deficiencies bar habeas review under the anticipatory
procedural bar doctrine. Procedural bar may be avoided if “the petitioner can
demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Smith
v. Workman, 550 F.3d 1258, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 238
(2009). But Turley has not attempted to show that either exception applies here.
II
A
Turley argues that Colorado’s scheme for handling peremptory challenges
violated his constitutional rights in two respects. First, he contends that he was
afforded fewer peremptory challenges than a capital defendant would receive
when facing the same (life) sentence he faced as an habitual-criminal defendant.
Second, he claims that the joint peremptory challenges allotted the defense in
multi-defendant criminal prosecutions deprived him of the guaranteed number of
individual challenges he would have received had he been tried alone.
4
A similar claim was rejected on the merits in connection with a separate
sexual assault prosecution against Turley, which is not challenged in this habeas
proceeding. See People v. Turley, 99CA0037 (Colo. App. July 27, 2000),
cert. denied, 00SC710 (Feb. 20, 2001).
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The Supreme Court “has consistently held that there is no freestanding
constitutional right to peremptory challenges.” Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct.
1446, 1453 (2009). Consequently, “the ‘right’ to peremptory challenges is
‘denied or impaired’ only if the defendant does not receive that which state law
provides.” Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988). Turley does not allege
that he received fewer peremptory challenges than Colorado law provided for a
defendant in his circumstances.
However, Turley appears to argue that Colorado law violates equal
protection principles. Because neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is
involved, 5 the State need possess only a legitimate interest rationally related to
the challenged statutory distinction. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997). It
clearly does: Capital offenses, regardless of whether they implicate the death
penalty, are “plainly the most serious offenses,” warranting a unique allowance
(for the defense and the State) of peremptory challenges. Turley, 18 P.3d at 805.
Further, the State has a legitimate interest in “equaliz[ing] the number of
peremptory challenges allotted to each side in a criminal case in which defendants
are jointly tried.” People v. Gardenhire, 903 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Colo. App. 1995),
overruled on other grounds, Valdez v. People, 966 P.2d 587 (Colo. 1998).
5
Non-capital defendants are obviously not a suspect class, and “peremptory
challenges are not constitutionally protected fundamental rights,” Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992).
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B
Turley next claims that he was not adequately advised about the
considerations related to his decision whether to testify at trial. The only
authority he relies on for the necessity and content of this advisement, known in
Colorado as the “Curtis Advisement,” is state case law, specifically People v.
Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514 (Colo. 1984), and People v. Gray, 920 P.2d 787, 789-90
(Colo. 1996). As the district court noted, there is no general requirement under
federal law that a trial court inquire into a defendant’s decision whether to testify,
much less advise a defendant regarding the potential consequences of that
decision. See United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 1983).
Accordingly, Turley is not entitled to § 2254 relief on this ground.
C
Turley claims that the habitual-criminal verdict form used in his case did
not set out all elements for the enhancement, and therefore “contradicted” the
instructions read to the jury setting out those elements. The Colorado Court of
Appeals rejected this claim of error, noting that the verdict form was plainly
intended to be guided by the instructions. See Turley, 18 P.3d at 807 (“The
instructions and the verdict forms, taken together, properly informed the jury of
each and every necessary element . . . .” (citation omitted)). We agree. 6
6
Turley also claims that the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by
failing to re-instruct the jury in the habitual-criminal phase regarding such matters
(continued...)
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D
Turley claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
prior convictions underlying his habitual-criminal charges. The state courts
rejected this claim, holding that counsel could not be ineffective on this basis
because the time for challenging the prior convictions under Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 16-5-402 had expired before the prosecutions under review here were brought.
See People v. Mershon, 874 P.2d 1025, 1035-37 (Colo. 1994) (applying
§ 16-5-402 to bar similarly belated challenge to prior conviction in
habitual-criminal prosecution). Under these circumstances, an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is not viable.
E
Turley seeks habeas relief on the ground that the prosecution did not
provide the home address of one of Turley’s assault victims who, out of concern
for her safety, requested that such information not be disclosed. The district court
rejected this claim, noting that defense counsel had the opportunity to interview
the victim, as well as cross-examine her at both the preliminary hearing and trial.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Turley was not denied his right
6
(...continued)
as the defendant’s right not to testify and the impermissibility of inferring guilt
from the mere fact of formal accusation. Although this claim was presented to
the Colorado Court of Appeals, it was not included in Turley’s petition for
certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court and is thus procedurally barred. See
Gonzales, 279 F.3d at 924.
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to confront this witness. Nor has Turley suggested exculpatory information could
have been developed only through access to the victim’s home address.
F
Turley raised two issue below that he did not address in his appellate
briefing: (1) his objection to the consolidation for trial of his prosecutions for
two separate sexual assaults; and (2) his exhausted challenges to prior
convictions for sexual assault in 1981 and 1982. Because Turley did not argue
these points in his briefing to this court, they are waived. See Adler v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998).
G
Lastly, Turley claims the cumulative effects of the above-discussed alleged
errors resulted in prejudice. Given the preceding analysis of Turley’s substantive
claims, there is no arguable basis for a finding of cumulative error.
III
We DENY Turley’s application for COA and DISMISS this appeal. We do
not consider Turley’s filings in this matter frivolous, however, and therefore
GRANT his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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