United States v. Valdez , 492 F. App'x 895 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 31, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 12-1025
v. (D. Colorado)
VICTOR VALDEZ, (D.C. No. 1:05-CR-00374-PAB-22)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant and appellant, Victor Valdez, moved for a sentence reduction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to take advantage of the amended provisions
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
of the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”),
relating to crack cocaine. The district court granted the motion and revised
Valdez’s sentence to the extent allowed by the cocaine Guidelines amendments.
The court denied, however, any further reduction (like the one Valdez received in
his original sentence) based upon Valdez’s criminal history. On appeal, Valdez
contends that the court erred when it refused to depart downward one criminal
history category. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the Guidelines do not
permit the further remedy in question; thus, the district court did not err and we
affirm the revised sentence.
BACKGROUND
On March 31, 2006, Valdez pled guilty to one count of a second
superceding indictment charging him with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and more than fifty grams of crack
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and
(b)(1)(A)(iii). After granting the Government’s motion for a 25% downward
departure for substantial assistance, pursuant to USSG §5K1.1, the district court
initially sentenced Valdez to 202 months’ imprisonment. Significantly for this
appeal, in calculating that sentence, the court reduced Valdez’s criminal history
from a category III to a category II after concluding that category III
“significantly over-represents the seriousness of [Valdez’s] criminal history and
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the likelihood that he will commit further crimes.” Mem. of Sent. Hr’g at 4, R.
Vol. 2 at 83.
A series of motions followed, including Valdez’s motion to reduce his
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) in reliance on Amendment 706 to the
Guidelines, which retroactively lowered the base offense levels for crack cocaine
offenses. See USSG app. C, amend. 706 (effective Nov. 1, 2007). Because the
drug quantities involved in this case did not permit a reduction in Valdez’s base
offense level, the district court denied Valdez’s § 3582(c) motion based upon
Amendment 706. Our court affirmed that decision on direct appeal. United
States v. Valdez, 320 Fed. Appx. 863 (10th Cir. April 8, 2009) (unpublished).
On November 1, 2011, another amendment altered the Guidelines
pertaining to crack cocaine. See USSG app. C, amend. 750 (effective Nov. 1,
2011). Amendment 750 retroactively implemented the Fair Sentencing Act
(“FSA”), which reduced the disparity between crack and powder cocaine
sentences from 100:1 to 18:1. 1 See Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2329; United States v.
Osborn, 679 F.3d 1193, 1194 (10th Cir. 2012). Following this retroactive
Amendment, Valdez filed motions invoking Amendment 750 and seeking a
sentence of 128 or 129 months.
1
The FSA took effect on August 3, 2010. The Sentencing Commission
promulgated emergency Guidelines amendments implementing the FSA’s cocaine
revisions, which became effective on November 1, 2010. 75 Fed. Reg. 66188(2010). A permanent version of those Guidelines amendments took effect on
November 1, 2011. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (2012).
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Subsequently, on December 2, 2011, the Government and the Federal
Public Defender appointed to represent Valdez jointly filed an “Unopposed
Motion for Retroactive Application of Sentencing Guidelines.” This motion
asked the court to reduce Valdez’s sentence to 176 months’ imprisonment. On
December 6, 2011, the United States Probation Office filed an Addendum to the
presentence report (“PSR”) recommending a 176-month sentence as well. Neither
the motion nor the addendum advocated for a further sentence reduction based on
a criminal history category reduction from III to II.
One week later, Valdez, in turn, filed a pro se “Objection and Response,”
arguing that the joint “Unopposed Motion” was inadequate in that it failed to
advocate for an even lower sentence of 162 months, on the ground that the new
sentence should contain the same departure from criminal history category III to
II that the original sentence did. The district court then requested briefs from the
parties regarding the issue of whether USSG §1B1.10(b)(2)(B) allowed such a
criminal history departure and, if it did, whether it would be appropriate to so
depart in this case.
Both the Government and the Federal Public Defender argued that such a
further departure was prohibited by the November 1, 2011, amendment to USSG
§1B1.10(b)(2)(B). Prior to its amendment, §1B1.10(b)(2)(B) provided in
pertinent part:
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If the original term of imprisonment was less than the term of
imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the
defendant at the time of sentencing, a reduction comparably less than
the amended guideline range determined under subdivision (1) of this
subsection may be appropriate. However, if the original term of
imprisonment constituted a non-guideline sentence determined
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), a further reduction generally would not be
appropriate.
USSG §1B1.10(b)(2)(B) (2010). Following the 2011 permanent amendment, the
section now reads:
If the term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of
imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the
defendant at the time of sentencing pursuant to a government motion
to reflect the defendant’s assistance to authorities, a reduction
comparably less than the amended guideline range determined under
subdivision (1) of this subsection may be appropriate.
USSG §1B1.10(b)(2)(B) (2011) (emphasis added). The amended Application
Note 1 to the amended §1B1.10(b)(2)(B) provides that the “guideline range” in
the amended (current) section is “the offense level and criminal history category
determined pursuant to §1B1.10(a), which is determined before consideration of
any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance.” USSG
§1B1.10, comment. (n.1). The Government argues that this “change dramatically
narrowed the prior general provision, . . . and precluded [counsel] from arguing
that this guideline provision permits reductions based on prior grants of criminal
history departures.” Appellee’s Br. at 7.
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On January 12, 2012, the district court issued its decision regarding
Valdez’s motion to further reduce his sentence:
under §1B1.10(b)(2)(B), as amended effective November 1, 2011, the
Court cannot reduce the term of imprisonment to a term comparably
less than the amended guidelines range since §1B1.10(b)(2)(B) is
now limited to below guideline sentences that occurred as a result of
a government motion pursuant to § 5K1.1. A departure for over
representation of criminal history would constitute an impermissible
reduction below the minimum of the amended range. Thus, the Court
will not reduce the defendant’s sentence to make it consistent with
criminal history category II.
Mem. Regarding Def.’s Mot. to Reduce Sent. at 4, R. Vol. 2 at 409. Furthermore,
the court stated, “[a]fter considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
the factors set forth in Paragraph 6 above, and the December 7, 2011 addendum to
the presentence investigation report, the Court determines that a sentence of 176
months is appropriate in this case.” Id. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Valdez argues that the “district court imposed an unreasonable sentence
when it committed procedural and substantive error during the resentencing
process.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. More specifically, he claims the court erred
when it held, as a matter of law, that it could not reduce Valdez’s sentence on
resentencing on the ground that his criminal history category overrepresented his
actual criminal history. Valdez argues that “the uniqueness of the 3553(a)
factors, the fact that Mr. Valdez’s criminal history calculation significantly over-
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represents the seriousness of his actual criminal history, and the need to avoid
inconsistency between Mr. Valdez’s original sentence and his new sentence”
mandate a sentence no greater than 157 months. Id.The issue of the district court’s authority to reduce Valdez’s sentence based
on criminal history is the sole issue in this appeal, and it is a legal question which
we review de novo. United States v. Williams, 575 F.3d 1075, 1076 (10th Cir.
2009) (“We review de novo the scope of a district court’s authority in a
proceeding under § 3582(c)(2).”).
After carefully considering the language of § 3582(c)(2), as well as the
relevant Guidelines provisions, we conclude that the district court correctly held
that it lacked authority to reduce Valdez’s sentence to a level below the amended
Guideline range based on the criminal history downward departure from category
III to category II made at Valdez’s original sentencing. Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), after a sentence has been imposed “a district court has the authority
to modify the sentence ‘in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission[,] . . . after considering the factors set
forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction
is consistent with” applicable Commission policy statements. Osborn, 679 F.3d at
1196 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)); see also Dillon v. United States, 130 S.
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Ct. 2683, 2687 (2010). We accordingly consider the applicable Commission
policy statements.
The policy statement governing § 3582(c)(2) proceedings is USSG
§1B1.10(b)(2)(B). By its current terms, it only permits a further reduction below
the minimum of an amended Guideline range to the extent the original term of
imprisonment was below the range then applicable “pursuant to a government
motion to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance.” USSG
§1B1.10(b)(2)(B). Thus, on its face, the applicable Commission policy statement
appears to prohibit a sentence reduction based on anything other than substantial
assistance. 2
Furthermore, the Commission policy statement provides that a court
proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) “shall substitute” the amended Guidelines range
for the initial range “and shall leave all other guideline application decisions
unaffected.” USSG §1B1.10(b)(1). Valdez suggests that the language relating to
leaving “all other guideline application decisions unaffected” actually supports
his view that his reduced criminal history category should be applied in the
§ 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction proceedings. As we explain more fully below,
the relevant Application Notes reject Valdez’s interpretation, because they make
it clear that the “guideline range” affected by a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding is the
2
Valdez has already received a reduction based upon his substantial
assistance. The issue in this case is whether he is entitled to a further reduction
based upon a criminal history category adjustment.
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range calculated before any departure or variance from the Guideline calculation.
See USSG §1B1.10, comment. (n.1(A)); see also Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2694
(“Because the aspects of his sentence that [defendant] seeks to correct were not
affected by the Commission’s amendment to §2D1.1, they are outside the scope of
the proceeding authorized by § 3582(c)(2), and the District Court properly
declined to address them.”).
The Application Notes for §1B1.10 reinforce this interpretation:
“[e]ligibility for consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is triggered only by
an amendment . . . that lowers the applicable guideline range (i.e., the guideline
range that corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category . . .
which is determined before consideration of any departure provision in the
Guidelines Manual or any variance.” USSG §1B1.10, comment. (n.1(A)).
Additionally, the Application Notes expressly state that “[s]ubsection (b)(2)(B)
. . . applies if the term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of
imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the
time of sentencing pursuant to a government motion to reflect the defendant’s
substantial assistance.” USSG §1B1.10, comment. (n.3). Thus, only “if” the term
of imprisonment was lowered pursuant to a substantial assistance motion may a
defendant seek a further reduction under USSG §1B1.10(b)(2)(B).
Valdez further argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which provides the
sentencing factors to be considered when a court imposes a sentence, supports his
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entitlement to a criminal history reduction upon resentencing. We disagree,
because a sentence reduction proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) does not provide a
new plenary sentencing opportunity. Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2694 (stating that
Ҥ 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a resentencing. Instead, it permits a sentence
reduction within the narrow bounds established by the Commission.”); United
States v. McGee, 615 F.3d 1287, 1293 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that the Court in
Dillon “made clear that proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) are neither sentencing nor
resentencing proceedings”) (further quotation omitted). There is therefore no
obligation to re-examine all of those sentencing factors in the same manner as a
court does in an initial sentencing proceeding. 3
Finally, the sparse case law on this issue supports our view. In United
States v. Glover, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 2814303 (11th Cir. July 11, 2012), the
court stated, “[a]fter Amendment 759, . . . a district court may lower a
defendant’s sentence below the amended guidelines range only if the original
sentence was below the original guidelines range because the defendant provided
substantial assistance to the government.” Id. at *4 (emphasis added); accord,
3
In particular, Valdez alleges that the failure to grant him a criminal history
reduction in his § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction proceeding violates § 3553(a)
because it allows there to be a disparity in applicable criminal history category
between his original sentence and his newer sentence. While § 3553(a)
disapproves of sentencing disparities, those prohibited disparities are between
different defendants in similar situations; the disfavored disparities are not
between an original sentence and a later reduced sentence for the same defendant.
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United States v. Anderson, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 3023497, at *3 (8th Cir.
July 25, 2012) (noting that the Commission policy statement “limit[ed] reductions
below the amended guideline range to an amount comparable to an earlier
reduction for substantial assistance”); United States v. Anderson, 2012 WL
2673106, at *2 (7th Cir. July 6, 2012) (unpublished) (stating that a defendant
“whose original sentence was below the new Guideline range is eligible for relief
only if his original sentence was based on a downward departure based on
substantial assistance to the government”) (emphasis added).
In United States v. Penn, 2012 WL 3017865 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2012), the
defendant made the identical argument as Valdez makes in this case: defendant
“argues that the appropriate amended advisory guideline [pursuant to an 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) proceeding] should also include a reduction in his criminal
history category from V to IV, to reflect the fact that at [his original] sentencing
we stated that criminal history category IV was likely more reflective of
[defendant’s] actual criminal history.” Id. at *2. The court squarely rejected this
argument:
Prior to the recent Amendments to the section 1B1.10, its
Commentary, and Application Notes, it was permissible for a court
who had varied or departed at the original sentencing upon imposing
a retroactive reduction to a defendant’s sentence to reduce the
sentence in the same proportion as the court varied or departed. That
avenue is now foreclosed except in the cases of substantial
assistance.
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Id. at *8 (emphasis added); accord, United States v. Flemming, 2012 WL 33019(E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2012).
Furthermore, courts have made it clear that, consistent with the language of
Application Note 1(A), the relevant Guideline range eligible for reduction under
an amended Guideline is the range determined before any departure provision,
such as a criminal history category reduction, in the Guidelines. See, e.g., United
States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 183 (2d Cir. 2011) (recognizing that the
November 1, 2011, amendment to §1B1.10 “prescribe[s] the precise construction
of applicable guideline range” . . . [to be] the pre-departure range from the initial
sentencing); United States v. Hinds, 2012 WL 73191, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 10,
2012) (noting that “the Commission clarified that the applicable guideline range
referred to in §1B1.10 is the guideline range determined before consideration of
any departure or variance”).
In short, it is clear as a matter of law that the district court correctly held
that, except for a reduction for substantial assistance, it lacked the authority to
depart further from the amended Guideline on the ground that Valdez had
received a criminal history category reduction in his original sentencing
proceeding.
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CONCLUSION
We accordingly affirm the district court’s decision denying Valdez any
further sentence reduction, and AFFIRM the sentence as revised.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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