Mojsilovic v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Board of Regents , 841 F.3d 1129 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS November 17, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
DANIJELA MOJSILOVIC;
ALEKSANDAR MOJSILOVIC,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 15-6151
STATE OF OKLAHOMA EX REL. THE
BOARD OF REGENTS FOR THE
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
PURE PROTEIN LLC; WILLIAM
HILDEBRAND,
Defendants.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 5:14-CV-00886-R)
_________________________________
Submitted on the briefs:*
George S. Freedman and Sarah Rowe Clutts, Lester, Spencer Fane, LLP, Edmond,
Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Gus H. Buthman and Gauri D. Nautiyal, Office of Legal Counsel, University of
Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma; Clyde A. Muchmore and Evan G. E. Vincent, Crowe &
Dunlevy, A Professional Corporation, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-
Appellee.
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, McKAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
Danijela and Aleksandar Mojsilovic appeal the dismissal of their damages
claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA),
18 U.S.C. § 1595, which provides a civil remedy for victims of forced labor. The
Mojsilovics claim the University of Oklahoma, through one of its agents, forced them
to work by threatening their immigration status, but the district court concluded the
University was entitled to sovereign immunity. We exercise jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the district court’s judgment.
I
The Mojsilovics are Serbian scientists recruited and hired by the University of
Oklahoma to serve as research assistants at the University’s Health Sciences Center.
In that capacity, Aleksandar was hired to conduct DNA sequencing and tissue typing
for research and clinical studies; Danijela was hired to make transfectants and tissue
cultures. The Mojsilovics were retained by the University through the H-1B visa
program, and they were supervised by Dr. William Hildebrand, the director of the
medical research laboratory at the Health Sciences Center. Dr. Hildebrand also owns
2
a biotechnology company called Pure Protein, which, through a contractual
arrangement, shares the University’s facilities to perform similar work.
According to the Mojsilovics, shortly after they were hired, Dr. Hildebrand
demanded that they also work for Pure Protein. He allegedly required them to work
longer hours than permitted by their visa applications, without pay, and threatened to
have their visas revoked if they objected. Dr. Hildebrand became verbally abusive at
times, and because he was authorized to make hiring and firing decisions, the
Mojsilovics claimed they feared he would take action against their immigration status
if they did not comply with his demands.
The Mojsilovics eventually filed suit, naming the University, Dr. Hildebrand,
and Pure Protein as defendants. In a four-count complaint, they claimed violations of
the TVPRA’s forced labor provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1589, the TVPRA’s human
trafficking provision, id. § 1590, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (permitting employees to recover for unpaid overtime), and the Oklahoma
Protection of Labor Act (OPLA), Okla. Stat. tit. 40, § 165.9 (permitting employees to
recover for unpaid wages). All claims were premised on Dr. Hildebrand’s threats to
have the Mojsilovics deported if they refused to perform additional work for Pure
Protein without pay. They sought damages under the TVPRA’s civil remedy
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1595, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, liquidated
and compensatory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.
Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss, which the district court granted
in part and denied in part with respect to Dr. Hildebrand and Pure Protein; those
3
rulings are not implicated in this appeal.1 For its part, the University argued (among
other things) that as a state entity, it was entitled to sovereign immunity. In response,
the Mojsilovics conceded that sovereign immunity barred their FLSA and OPLA
claims. But they argued that sovereign immunity posed no bar to their TVPRA
claims because the statute was enacted under Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment
authority to abolish involuntary servitude. According to the Mojsilovics, the States
surrendered sovereign immunity for claims of involuntary servitude by ratifying the
Thirteenth Amendment. And in any event, they argued, the statutory language of the
TVPRA expressly abrogates sovereign immunity for “[w]hoever” engages in
prohibited conduct, thus manifesting a clear intent to abrogate sovereign immunity of
the States. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595. The district court rejected these arguments and
dismissed the Mojsilovics’ claims. This appeal followed.2
II
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal based on sovereign immunity.
Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013). “A foundational
premise of the federal system is that States, as sovereigns, are immune from suits for
damages, save as they elect to waive that defense.” Coleman v. Court of Appeals of
Md., ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1333 (2012). A well-established exception to
1
The surviving claims against Dr. Hildebrand and Pure Protein remain
pending in the district court, which certified its order dismissing the claims against
the University as a final, appealable judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
2
The Mojsilovics appeal only the dismissal of their forced labor claim under
the TVPRA, not the disposition of their FLSA, OPLA, or human trafficking claims.
See Aplt. Br. at 4 n.1.
4
this principle, however, is that Congress may abrogate the States’ immunity. Id.
“[T]o determine whether Congress has abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity, we
ask two questions: first, whether Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate the immunity, and second, whether Congress has acted pursuant to a valid
exercise of power.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)
(citation, brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
In answering the first question—whether Congress intended to abrogate state
sovereign immunity—we employ a “simple but stringent test: Congress may
abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only
by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A general authorization for suit is insufficient to abrogate the States’
sovereign immunity. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985),
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a), as recognized in Lane v. Pena,
518 U.S. 187, 198 (1996); accord Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,
786 n.4 (1991) (“The fact that Congress grants jurisdiction to hear a claim does not
suffice to show Congress has abrogated all defenses to that claim.”).
For example, in Coleman, the Court concluded Congress made “unmistakably
clear” its intent to abrogate the States’ immunity by specifying in the language of the
relevant statute that any “public agency” could be sued, defining that term to include
“both the government of a State or political subdivision thereof and any agency of a
State, or a political subdivision of a State.” 132 S. Ct. at 1333 (ellipsis and internal
5
quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in Seminole Tribe, the Court found
“unmistakably clear” evidence that Congress intended to abrogate the States’
immunity because “the State” was identified as the appropriate defendant in a lawsuit
brought under the statute at issue. 517 U.S. at 56-57.
By contrast, the TVPRA identifies as a criminal defendant in a forced labor
case “[w]hoever” engages in prohibited conduct:
(a) Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a
person by any one of, or by any combination of, the following means--
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of
physical restraint to that person or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or
another person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the
person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or
services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or
physical restraint,
shall be punished as provided in subsection (d).
(b) Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of
value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in the
providing or obtaining of labor or services . . . knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or
obtaining of labor or services by any of such means, shall be punished
as provided in subsection (d).
18 U.S.C. § 1589 (emphasis added). Similarly, the TVPRA’s civil remedy provision
establishes a private cause of action against a “perpetrator” or “whoever” violates the
TVPRA:
6
An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a
civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits,
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a
venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in
an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the
United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
Id. § 1595(a) (emphasis added). But the terms “perpetrator” and “whoever” are not
defined by the statute, and standing alone, these broad terms signal no intent to
abrogate sovereign immunity—certainly not an “unmistakably clear” congressional
intent to do so. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 245-46 (concluding that statutory
language creating liability for “any recipient” of federal assistance was not
unmistakably clear intent to abrogate sovereign immunity); see also Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 631-32 (1999)
(observing that previously undefined statutory language creating liability for
“whoever” violated patent laws failed to abrogate sovereign immunity).
Nevertheless, the Mojsilovics contend there need not be an unmistakably clear
statement of legislative intent because Congress enacted the TVPRA pursuant to its
Thirteenth Amendment authority to eradicate slavery and involuntary servitude.3 The
Mojsilovics argue that the States surrendered sovereign immunity by ratifying the
Thirteenth Amendment, which confers upon Congress plenary authority to abolish
involuntary servitude, and as a consequence, there is no sovereign immunity for
Congress to abrogate. See Aplt. Br. at 24 (“[T]he abrogation of sovereign immunity
3
The Thirteenth Amendment provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary
servitude . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
7
thus occurs within the Thirteenth Amendment itself, and it is therefore not necessary
for Congress to further state its intent to abrogate the States’ immunity.”).
But the Mojsilovics’ premise is incorrect: The TVPRA was not enacted under
the Thirteenth Amendment; it was enacted under Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-264(I), at 14 (2003) (“[T]he Committee finds the
authority for [the TVPRA] in article I, section 8 of the Constitution.”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a) (proscribing sex trafficking “in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce”); see also Francisco v. Susano, 525 F. App’x 828, 834 n.8 (10th Cir.
2013) (noting that predecessor statute to TVPRA was enacted under Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers); Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.4 (9th Cir.
2011) (same). This source of congressional authority is significant because
“Congress may not abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I
power over commerce.” Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727
(2003); see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 (“The Eleventh Amendment restricts
the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”). Thus, even if Congress
had intended to abrogate sovereign immunity in the TVPRA, it had no authority to do
so under the Commerce Clause.
The Mojsilovics’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. To support their
assertion that the TVPRA was enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment, they cite
congressional findings for the TVPRA’s predecessor statute reflecting the evils of
human trafficking. See Pub. Law 106-386 §§ 102(b)(1), (12), (21) & (22), 114 Stat.
8
1464 (2000). Section 102(b)(1) states that “[t]rafficking in persons is a modern form
of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today.” Section 102(b)(12)
actually supports our conclusion that the TVPRA was enacted under the Commerce
Clause, indicating that “[t]rafficking in persons substantially affects interstate and
foreign commerce.” Section 102(b)(21) states that “[t]rafficking of persons is an evil
requiring concerted and vigorous action.” And section 102(b)(22) states that the
Declaration of Independence recognizes the “right to be free from slavery and
involuntary servitude” as inalienable rights. But none of these findings demonstrate
the TVPRA was enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment.4
The Mojsilovics also contend there need not always be a clear statement of
congressional intent to abrogate sovereign immunity, as the Supreme Court endorsed
in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). Katz analyzed
congressional power under the Bankruptcy Clause to subordinate State sovereign
immunity in bankruptcy proceedings. See id. at 362. In that unique context, the
Court explained, bankruptcy jurisdiction is “principally in rem” and as a consequence
does not usually “interfere with state sovereignty even when States’ interests are
affected.” Id. at 369-70. Yet, to the extent ancillary bankruptcy orders do implicate
sovereign immunity, the evolution of the Bankruptcy Clause indicates the States
4
In their reply brief, the Mojsilovics cite a non-binding district court decision,
see John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2007),
and an unpublished magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, see United States
v. Garcia, No. 02-CR-110S-01, 2003 WL 22938040 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003)
(unpublished), both suggesting the TVPRA was enacted under the Thirteenth
Amendment. These decisions provide little or no supporting analysis, however, and
we find neither decision authoritative.
9
agreed in ratifying the Constitution not to assert their immunity in bankruptcy
proceedings. Id. at 364-70, 378.
Analogizing to Katz, the Mojsilovics contend the States ceded sovereign
immunity by ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment. But as we have already discussed,
the TVPRA was enacted under the Commerce Clause, which provides no
congressional authority for abrogation. Thus, absent a valid source of constitutional
authority to abrogate sovereign immunity and an unmistakably clear statement of
congressional intent to do so, the district court correctly dismissed the Mojsilovics’
TVPRA claim.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
10