Reyes v. Central New Mexico Community College , 410 F. App'x 134 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 31, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
PAUL KEITH REYES,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 10-2152
v. (D. New Mexico)
CENTRAL NEW MEXICO (D.C. No. 1:10-CV-00543-BB-RLP)
COMMUNITY COLLEGE; LT. KEAR;
B. RODGERS; A. JARAMILLO; F.
GALLEGOS; M. PERKINS; LEE
CARRILLO; K. TROUNGE,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
After examining Appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this court has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
adjudication of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Proceeding pro se, Appellant Paul Keith Reyes appeals the district court’s
dismissal of the claims raised in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint he filed on June 3,
2010. The claims arose from an incident at Central New Mexico Community
College (“CNMCC”). Reyes went to the CNMCC campus to investigate the
circumstances underlying his disenrollment. While on campus, Reyes got into an
argument with an employee in the financial aid office. He alleges defendants
Kear, Rodgers, Jaramillo, Gallegos, Perkins, and Trounge violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when they temporarily detained him on campus and questioned
him about the argument. Reyes’s complaint also contained a breach-of-contract
claim against CNMCC relating to its decision to disenroll him.
The district court concluded the claims against defendants Kear, Rodgers,
Jaramillo, Gallegos, Perkins, and Trounge should be dismissed with prejudice
because Reyes failed to state sufficient facts from which it could be concluded
these defendants violated his constitutional rights. By Reyes’s own admission,
the argument in the financial aid office became contentious and nearly escalated
to a physical altercation. The district court concluded that, under the conceded
circumstances, the temporary investigative detention was reasonable and Reyes
could not show a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 1 In addition to
1
Reyes’s challenge was confined to the fact of the detention. He made no
claim that the detention lasted longer than reasonably necessary to undertake the
investigation or that the scope exceeded the underlying purpose. See United
States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Generally, an
(continued...)
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concluding Reyes failed to state a claim for violation of his federal constitutional
rights, the district court also concluded Reyes stated no facts establishing federal
question or diversity jurisdiction over the breach-of-contract claim asserted
against CNMCC. Accordingly, the court refused to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over that claim and dismissed it without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3); Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding it is
common practice for a district court to dismiss state law claims that are “no
longer supplemental to any federal question claim”).
On appeal, Reyes challenges both the dismissal of his constitutional claim
and his breach-of-contract claim. This court conducts a de novo review of the
dismissal of Reyes’s Fourth Amendment claim. See Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of
Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999). The sua sponte dismissal of a pro se
complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) for failure to state a claim “is
appropriate only where it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail
on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his complaint
would be futile.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quotation omitted). Even construing Reyes’s complaint liberally and accepting
the allegations therein as true, Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir.
2002), it is clear from the record before this court that Reyes cannot prevail on
1
(...continued)
investigative detention must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.”).
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the facts alleged in his complaint and permitting him an opportunity to amend the
complaint would be futile. The district court, thus, did not err by dismissing
Reyes’s Fourth Amendment claim with prejudice.
The district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Reyes’s contract claim is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Nielander v. Bd of
County Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1172 (10th Cir. 2009). The applicable statute
clearly permits district courts to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction”
over state law claims if the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 1367(c). We have concluded the district court
properly dismissed Reyes’s Fourth Amendment claim. Although Reyes argues the
district court had original jurisdiction over his contract claim, we agree with the
district court that he has failed to allege any facts to support that assertion.
Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Reyes’s contract claim.
Having considered Reyes’s arguments, this court concludes his appeal is
“without merit in that it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Thompson
v. Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002). We, thus, dismiss the appeal as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). We deny Reyes’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and remind him of
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his responsibility for the immediate payment of any unpaid balance of the
appellate filing fee.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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