Powell v. Laborers Union 1271 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 14, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
GEORGE POWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 10-8087
(D.C. No. 2:09-CV-00285-NDF)
v.
LABORERS UNION #1271,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER
Before MATHESON, McKAY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on consideration of Appellant’s petition for
rehearing en banc. The panel has denied rehearing and no panel member has
called for a poll. The petition was transmitted to all of the judges of the court in
regular active service and none has requested a poll. The petition is therefore
denied.
The panel has, however, decided to amend the order and judgment in one
technical respect that does not alter its substance. A footnote has been added to
page five of the order and judgment explaining that, after the district court’s
decision, the provision in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 governing postponements of
summary judgment for purposes of discovery was moved, without substantive
change, from subsection (f) to subsection (d). A copy of the amended order and
judgment is attached and issued herewith.
Entered for the Court,
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 7, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
GEORGE POWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-8087
(D.C. No. 2:09-CV-00285-NDF)
LABORERS UNION #1271, (D. Wyo.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MATHESON, McKAY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff George Powell, an African-American, appeals from a district court
order granting summary judgment to defendant Laborers Union #127 in this
action alleging racially discriminatory employment-referral practices. Powell
challenges the district court’s ruling on both substantive and procedural grounds.
We affirm for the reasons that follow.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. THEORY OF THE CASE
The gravamen of this case is that on several occasions the Union passed
over Powell’s name on a hiring hall list it maintained under a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with companies using temporary labor, thereby
depriving him of employment opportunities. The Union explains it did so because
it had received “no-rehire” letters from the employers in question directing the
Union not to send Powell due to problems with his work. Powell insists the
Union’s action was, rather, attributable to race discrimination.
It is important to be clear about the nature of the alleged discrimination.
Unions have an affirmative duty to help ensure employers’ compliance with
non-discrimination directives and can thus be liable just for acquiescing in the
discriminatory acts of an employer. Romero v. Union Pac. R.R., 615 F.2d 1303,
1310-11 (10th Cir. 1980). But Powell disavows this indirect theory of liability,
which of course fails if discrimination by the employer cannot be proved. Rather,
he has alleged direct discrimination on the part of the Union in its handling of the
no-rehire letters, explaining that “[t]he issue was not whether the employers were
discriminatory, but whether the [Union] removed the plaintiff [from his position
in the hiring list] without questioning the no-rehire letters as to their legitimacy.”
Aplt. Brief at 16 n.4. Consistent with that charge, he stresses what he sees as
racially disparate treatment of no-rehire letters by the Union, comparing its
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capitulation in his case to its vigorous opposition to a no-rehire letter sent by an
employer regarding a white laborer.
In light of Powell’s theory of the case, then, whether the employers’
allegedly groundless no-rehire letters were racially motivated is not decisive; the
thrust of his claim is that the Union failed to investigate and challenge the letters
due to its own racial bias. Of course, the Union’s awareness of racial issues
behind an employer’s no-rehire letter could still potentially bolster Powell’s case
against the Union for its own bias on the direct discrimination theory he has
pursued, as other arguments he advances on appeal reflect.
II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
Powell’s complaint asserted claims under the discriminatory-referral
provision of Title VII, 28 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 1 Months
after the complaint was filed, the district court entered an initial pretrial order
specifying August 30, 2010, as the cut-off date for both discovery and dispositive
defense motions. On that date, the parties simultaneously filed two motions:
(1) Powell moved to extend the time for discovery to allow him to take
depositions of six witnesses to “learn what these witnesses may or may not say
under oath at trial,” Aplt. App. at 78; and (2) the Union moved for summary
1
The district court did not distinguish between these two provisions in its
analysis of the merits of the discrimination claims asserted thereunder, and
Powell does not even mention § 1981 on appeal. Hence we also will not address
the latter provision in any distinct manner here.
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judgment on all claims. Shortly thereafter, the district court granted Powell an
extension of discovery to obtain the requested depositions, but made it clear that
all other deadlines and settings specified in the initial pretrial order remained in
effect. Id. at 89-90. Powell responded to the motion for summary judgment,
without any indication that resolution of the matter should be postponed until he
obtained the depositions sought for trial preparation. He argued that he had both
direct evidence of discrimination, involving racial comments by the Union’s
business agent, James Hansen, and indirect evidence of discrimination, consisting
of a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework 2 and facts showing
that the Union’s racially neutral rationale for its action was pretextual.
The district court granted the Union’s motion for summary judgment. The
court held that the few isolated and fairly innocuous comments Powell cited as
direct evidence of discrimination did not demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on
the point and that Powell had failed to create a triable issue of pretext with
respect to the Union’s legitimate justification for not referring him to employers
that had sent no-rehire letters.
2
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Procedural Objection to Summary Judgment
Powell contends it was improper for the district court to grant the Union’s
summary judgment motion before he had taken the depositions for which he had
been allowed an extension of the discovery deadline. But he never raised this
objection in the proceedings below, where he responded to the summary judgment
motion on the merits with evidence already in his possession without seeking a
postponement of the proceedings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) 3 to gather and
present additional evidence in opposition to the motion. Our case law makes it
clear that the failure to comply with Rule 56(f) and provide the district court an
opportunity to consider a purported need for further discovery precludes a party
from objecting to the grant of summary judgment on this basis:
Because [the
plaintiff] failed to file an affidavit under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f)
explaining “why facts precluding summary judgment cannot be
presented,” which is the proper procedure by which to request further
discovery prior to the court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion,
he has waived the argument that the grant of summary judgment
should be set aside for lack of sufficient discovery. Trask v. Franco,
446 F.3d 1036, 1042 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Rule 56(f)
states that “[i]f a party opposing the [summary judgment] motion
shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts
3
The controlling provision was set out in Rule 56(f) at the time summary
judgment was decided in this case. We note that it was subsequently moved to
Rule 56(d) when a new provision was added as Rule 56(f), effective December 1,
2010. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Advisory Committee Note for 2010
Amendments.
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essential to justify its opposition,” the court may deny the motion,
order a continuance for additional discovery to be undertaken, or
issue any other order that is appropriate. But “[w]here a party
opposing summary judgment ... fails to take advantage of the shelter
provided by Rule 56(f) by filing an affidavit, there is no abuse of
discretion in granting summary judgment if it is otherwise
appropriate.” Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790
F.2d 828, 832-33 (10th Cir. 1986). Because [the plaintiff] did not file
an affidavit, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in granting
summary judgment based on the record before him.
Campfield v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 1111, 1124-25 (10th Cir.
2008). And while a party’s pro se status would not excuse such an omission, see
Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1310 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
469 (2010), it is all the more appropriate to enforce our rule here, as Powell had
counsel to assess the need for and value of the additional discovery in question.
B. Substantive Challenge to Summary Judgment
On appeal, Powell contends he submitted sufficient evidence of pretext to
undercut the Union’s racially neutral explanation for not referring him to work
with the employers who had submitted no-rehire letters. 4 Before discussing the
substance of this evidence, we need to address a dispute over the formal adequacy
of a particular item. Powell relies primarily on two sources for his version of the
4
Powell has re-framed the presentation of his evidence somewhat, no longer
sharply distinguishing between direct evidence of Union racial animus and
indirect evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework. He now argues all of
his evidence as supporting pretext within the latter framework. As this change in
approach does not alter significantly our dispositive analysis or affect the result,
we need not worry over its strict propriety.
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relevant facts: his affidavit and the deposition of a co-worker, Rod Pafford. The
Union points out that the affidavit is not signed or notarized, and insists it should
not be considered. But the Union did not make this objection below, when the
obvious technical oversight could have been corrected, 5 nor did the district court
exclude the affidavit on this basis. We therefore consider it with the other
evidence bearing on pretext. See McBeth v. Himes, 598 F.3d 708, 725 n.7
(10th Cir. 2010). Of course, we need consider only averments that are themselves
admissible; those based on hearsay, for example, are not properly within our
purview. See Johnson v. Weld County, 594 F.3d 1202, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2010).
In that respect, we will not penalize the Union for failing to advance hearsay
objections to specific statements in the affidavit, as the district court’s quick
ruling on the motion for summary judgment, in which it specifically allowed for
“neither oral argument nor a reply brief,” App. at 165, did not afford the Union an
opportunity to review the affidavit and develop such particularized objections.
See generally Hopkins v. Okla. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 150 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.5
(10th Cir. 1998).
5
Indeed, Powell submitted a signed and notarized version after judgment,
but the district court refused to admit it into the record. Without appealing that
post-judgment ruling, Powell filed a motion in this court to supplement the
appellate record with the revised affidavit. Because, as explained above, we
consider the original affidavit, we deny the motion to supplement as moot.
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The district court held that Powell had made out a prima facie case of
discrimination, which in the present context consisted of showing: “(1) [he] was
a member of a group protected by Title VII; (2) [he] was qualified and requested
referral for a job for which the union was referring applicants; (3) despite [his]
qualifications, [he] was not referred; and (4) after [his] nonreferral, the union
continued to refer applicants with [his] qualifications for available positions.”
Mills v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 634 F.2d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 1981); see also
Fischer v. Forestwood Co., 525 F.3d 972, 982-83 (10th Cir. 2008) (setting out
substantially similar prima facie case in ordinary failure-to-hire context). That
shifted to the Union the burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory
justification for its actions. Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1211.
The Union articulated and substantiated a justification for not referring
Powell for work with P.S. Cook, L.L.C., Gregory Piping Systems Inc., and
Western Refractory Construction, Inc.: all had sent no-rehire letters requesting
that he not be referred to their work sites due to problems associated with work
performance, attendance, tardiness, and insubordination. Aplt. App. at 52-53; 67;
72. Under the CBA, each employer is the judge of a Union member’s
qualification for work, id. at 51-52, and these letters regarding Powell left him
ineligible for work with the complaining companies, id. at 53. The Union’s
Business Manager, James Hansen, noted how unusual Powell’s situation was, in
that it was uncommon for a worker to have even one such letter in his file. Id. at
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54. The combination of the CBA and the no-rehire letters established a
legitimate, racially neutral basis for the Union’s actions. That shifted the burden
back to Powell to show that the Union’s stated justification was merely a pretext
for unlawful discrimination. Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1211. And on this critical
point, the district court held that Powell failed to demonstrate a triable issue of
fact.
Powell attempts to do so through essentially three different means. At
certain points, he appears to take issue with the employers’ criticism of his work
performance. For example, he insists the no-rehire letter from P.S. Cook, which
complained that he had worked only seven hours in a three-day period of
twelve-hour shifts, overstated the nonattendance issue, in that it had only been a
two-day period, some other laborers worked only eight-hour shifts in that period,
and he had asked the foreman for the time off to attend to personal matters. This
line of argument is a non-starter; it is a commonplace in employment law that the
employer’s perception of employee performance controls the pretext inquiry and
can justify termination even if mistaken, see, e, g, Kendrick v. Penske Transp.
Servs., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing cases), and here that
principle is uniquely bolstered by the CBA provision requiring the Union to defer
to the employers’ independent judgment. Even if the no-rehire letters were
groundless (which was not shown here), Powell offered no evidence to prove the
Union would have known that. On the contrary, the three separate no-rehire
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letters would have been mutually corroborative as to the unsatisfactory nature of
his work performance.
Second, Powell argues that Union efforts to contest a no-rehire request
received for a white member, John Fulk, demonstrate that its capitulation in his
case was racially biased. 6 But it is undisputed that Union business manager
Hansen did contact the company that sent Powell’s first no-rehire letter, to
attempt to persuade it to allow Powell to return to work once he addressed the
issues that led to the letter. See Aplt. App. at 53-54. While this proved
unsuccessful due (in the employer’s view) to Powell’s refusal to take
responsibility for his work issues, id. at 54, it is the Union’s effort and not the
employer’s response that is material here. And though it does not appear that
Hansen opposed the two subsequent no-rehire letters for Powell, there is also no
evidence that the Union opposed successive no-rehire letters for Fulk or anyone
else, leaving Powell without the similarly-situated comparator necessary to make
out a case for disparate treatment by the Union. See McGowan v. City of Eufala,
472 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that to show discrimination through
6
The only evidence of this is a conclusory paragraph in Powell’s affidavit,
which states that Fulk had at some unspecified time been charged with driving
under the influence while smoking marijuana, but does not say whether the
charges were enforced or dismissed, or what Fulk’s response to the incident had
been (nor does it indicate Powell’s direct personal knowledge of the matter).
Aplt. App. at 110.
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comparison with other employee, plaintiff “must establish [he] was similarly
situated to [the comparator] in all relevant respects,” including work history).
Finally, Powell argues that racial comments by some employers for whom
he had worked (including Larry Gregory of Gregory Piping Systems), and
Hansen’s reaction to those comments, raised a triable issue of discriminatory
animus behind the Union’s actions. The district court discounted the employers’
comments as hearsay and held that Hansen’s own statements were too isolated
and innocuous to demonstrate a racial bias.
Insofar as the employers’ comments were reported in Powell’s affidavit, the
district court was correct to treat them as hearsay, in that Powell was repeating
what he had heard second-hand from co-worker Rod Pafford, who witnessed the
comments being made. But Pafford also directly testified to the matter in his
deposition, so a hearsay problem would exist only if the comments were offered
for the truth of the matter asserted therein. Since the comments were relevant for
the racial attitudes they revealed and not for the truth of any factual assertions,
they were not hearsay. See, e.g., Talley v. Bravo Pitino Rest., Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241,
1249 (6th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Bartlett v.
Gates, 09-3823, 2010 WL 4723786 at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010) (unpub.);
Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1423 (7th Cir. 1986), abrogated
on other grounds as recognized in Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312
(7th Cir. 1989).
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They were, however, of very limited significance, given that it is Hansen’s
alleged racial bias we are concerned with, not that of the third parties. Two of the
instances were remote in time, occurring some three years before the events
giving rise to this suit. And in both of those cases, where an employer had used a
racial slur or stereotype in referring to Powell’s laziness (itself a legitimate
concern for an employer) and Pafford relayed the remarks to Hansen, Hansen did
not adopt or approve the slur but told Pafford that Powell’s issues were not
Pafford’s concern (there is no evidence that Powell himself ever complained to
Hansen about the incidents). See Aplt. App. at 132-36. 7
The third incident, involving Gregory Piping Systems, is more directly
related to the operative events in this case, but it is the least indicative of racial
animus. Larry Gregory removed Powell from a work site and sent a no-rehire
letter to the Union after Powell had left a $40,000 Bobcat vehicle running in the
field and, later, was not working where Gregory felt he was supposed to be
working. See Aplt. App. at 113-14, 137-40. None of that reflects racial bias
against Powell (who also stated that Gregory had requested him for work many
7
As to one of the incidents, Powell’s affidavit adds that Hansen told Pafford
“that he wasn’t going to jeopardize the contract with [the employer] over some
minor ‘racial shit.’” Aplt. App. at 111. This is patent hearsay, purportedly
spoken not to Powell but related second-hand to Powell by Pafford. Similarly
inadmissible is Powell’s statement that the foreman on the P.S. Cook job told
Powell that Hansen had asked him to write a letter to “keep [Powell] out” of
employment with P.S. Cook, id. at 113.
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times, id. at 114). Even Pafford, who was at the site, conceded that leaving
equipment running is “not the best thing to do,” id. at 138, and that Gregory was
“kind of right” about Powell not being where he was supposed to be “because we
couldn’t find [him],” id. at 139. Gregory did, however, characterize these
legitimate criticisms as “acting black on me.” Id. at 138. Because the criticisms
were factually grounded, Pafford did not initially report the incident, but he did
eventually tell Hansen about it. See id. at 139-40. According to Pafford, Hansen
told him to just “worry about yourself” and “quit hanging out with [Powell],” who
“was not doing good, going to get in trouble or something to that effect.” Id.
While Gregory’s gratuitous comment about “acting black” was inappropriate, he
had legitimate grounds for the no-rehire request honored by Hansen in accordance
with the CBA. In sum, none of the incidents involving racially tinged comments
by employers were sufficient to raise a triable issue of bias by the Union in its
compliance with the no-rehire letters underlying this case.
Two last, underdeveloped arguments by Powell may be dismissed with little
comment. In his statement of facts, Powell insinuates, with no supporting citation
to the record, that the no-rehire letters “seemed to be prepared, not by the
employers, but by the union, since [Powell] and his counsel found draft letters in
his union file after obtaining discovery,” Aplt. Br. at 11, and then only returns to
the point near the end of his brief to ask rhetorical questions: “Why were there
drafts of the no-rehire letters found in the personnel file of the plaintiff? What
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inference is to be derived from this circumstance? Did the [Union] prepare the
letters for use by the employers?” Id. at 23-24. This is simply not adequate
appellate argument, either factually or legally, and we decline to pursue the
matter. See, e.g., Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994);
Brownlee v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 15 F.3d 976, 977 (10th Cir. 1994).
Similarly, Powell’s passing criticism of the Union for its delay in telling him
about the no-rehire letters, with no legal authority or developed argument to
demonstrate what this has to do with his allegation of racial discrimination, is
insufficient to require further discussion.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Appellant’s motion to
supplement the record is DENIED as moot.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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