Walker v. Chater ( 1997 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FEB 19 1997
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    MARIE A. WALKER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                 No. 96-5134
    (D.C. No. 95-C-354-M)
    SHIRLEY S. CHATER,                                  (N.D. Okla)
    Commissioner, Social Security
    Administration, *
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
    Before TACHA, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
    *
    Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and
    Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of
    Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text we continue to refer to the
    Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying
    decision.
    **
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Claimant Marie A. Walker appeals from the order of the district court
    which affirmed the final decision of the Secretary of the Social Security
    Administration denying her request for disability benefits. The sole issue
    presented for our review is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the ALJ
    erred in failing to obtain a consultative examination to ascertain the current state
    of claimant’s vision loss.
    Our jurisdiction arises under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . In reviewing the
    Secretary’s decision, we determine whether the factual findings are supported by
    substantial evidence and whether the Secretary applied the correct legal standards.
    See Miller v. Chater, 
    99 F.3d 972
    , 975-76 (10th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence
    is “adequate relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a
    conclusion.” Kepler v. Chater, 
    68 F.3d 387
    , 388-89 (10th Cir. 1995). We do not
    reweigh the evidence or substitute our discretion for that of the Secretary. Kelley
    v. Chater, 
    62 F.3d 335
    , 337 (10th Cir. 1995).
    Claimant’s application, filed March 4, 1993, was denied initially and on
    reconsideration. At the administrative hearing conducted on July 20, 1994 by the
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    Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Claimant testified that she could not work
    because of impaired eyesight, severe problems with her feet, and arthritic pain
    and weakness in her hands. She stated that she could not see well out of either
    eye and that the right eye “had an infection in it [in 1992] and it was iritis,” 1
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 171, and the “left eye has gotten blurred pretty bad
    since I had the iritis,” 
    id.
     Her testimony was that she could not see well enough
    to clean and cook, read a newspaper, or watch television.
    However, the objective medical evidence does not support claimant’s
    testimony as to the extent of her visual impairment. 2 Claimant was treated for
    acute iritis from May 29, 1992 to December 14, 1992. The last report of Dr.
    Joe D. Cope, her treating optometrist, dated May 11, 1993, stated that claimant
    1
    We note, as did the district court, that no evidence in the record links the
    iritis with claimant’s degenerative diabetic condition. Iritis is “an inflammation
    of the iris.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 802 (25th ed. 1990). Claimant’s
    medical records also use the term “uveitis,” which is an “inflammation of the
    uveal tract: iris, ciliary body and choroid.” Id. at 1678.
    2
    On appeal, claimant challenges only the ALJ’s findings concerning her
    visual impairment, although she describes additional impairments. We note that
    the objective medical evidence does not bear out her testimony on the extent of
    these impairments, either. At the hearing, claimant stated that she could only lift
    2 to 3 pounds. The records reflect that her symptoms of weakness and pain in her
    hands were diagnosed and treated as probable osteoarthritis. However, X-rays
    failed to show evidence of fracture, dislocation or significant degenerative
    change. As to the foot problems that allegedly prevented her from standing more
    than 35 minutes or walking more than one-half a block, she was treated by a
    podiatrist in February and March of 1994 for a plantar ulcer on her left foot. The
    records indicate that the prognosis was “Very good with Orthotics and Orthopedic
    Shoes.” Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 139.
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    was “doing quite niecly [sic] now” and that her vision had stabilized at 20/100 in
    her right eye and 20/25 in her left eye, although the condition had a tendency to
    recur. Id. at 91. Dr. Cope opined that claimant’s performance would be limited
    by the decrease in binocularity, but that she should be able to perform certain
    tasks well so long as her left eye retained its visual acuity. Id. On November 4,
    1993, Dr. Steve P. Sanders, claimant’s treating physician, assessed her eye
    problems and noted that the iritis was stable. Id. at 101. Claimant herself told
    Dr. Sanders in November 1992 that her vision had “almost completely cleared
    up,” id. at 111, and in April 1993 that, although she still had difficulties with
    vision in her right eye, it appeared to be “improving all the time,” id. at 104.
    The ALJ credited the objective medical evidence on claimant’s visual
    acuity, along with claimant’s earlier statements to Dr. Sanders, and discounted the
    subjective statements made at the hearing. He found that, although claimant’s
    residual functional capacity to perform the full range of sedentary and light work
    of an unskilled nature was reduced by a lack of close binocular vision, she could
    still perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. The ALJ
    denied benefits at step five of the five-part sequential evaluation process for
    determining disability. See Williams v. Bowen, 
    844 F.2d 748
    , 750-52 (10th Cir.
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    1988) (discussing the five steps). This decision was upheld by the Appeals
    Council and the district court. 3
    The record supports the ALJ’s evaluation of claimant’s visual capacity.
    Both the objective medical evidence and claimant’s own reports to her medical
    providers indicate that she had sufficient vision to perform basic work activities.
    The only evidence to the contrary is claimant’s testimony, which the ALJ
    disbelieved. “Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder
    of fact.” Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 
    898 F.2d 774
    , 777 (10th
    Cir. 1990). 4
    Contrary to claimant’s contentions, the ALJ was not required to order a
    consultative examination regarding the current extent of her visual impairment.
    The ALJ has broad latitude in ordering a consultative examination. 
    Id. at 778
    . A
    consultative examination is required only if the record establishes that such an
    examination is necessary to enable the ALJ to make the disability decision. See
    Turner v. Califano, 
    563 F.2d 669
    , 671 (5th Cir. 1977).
    3
    The parties consented to disposition of this case by the magistrate judge.
    See 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c)(3).
    4
    Claimant asserts that the ALJ improperly assessed her credibility and
    discounted her testimony because the ALJ failed to link her conclusions to the
    evidence. The assertion is not well taken. The ALJ considered the relevant
    factors and properly identified the evidence on which he relied in reaching his
    conclusions. See Kepler v. Chater, 
    68 F.3d at 391
     (requiring express findings on
    an credibility determination, with reference to relevant evidence).
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    In this case, the record on the nature and severity of claimant’s vision loss
    was adequate for the disability decision. It contained medical reports on the
    status of her condition not only from the twelve months prior to the application
    date of March 4, 1993, but also from Dr. Cope as of May 1993 and Dr. Sanders as
    of November 1993. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1512
    (d) (requiring a medical history for
    at least the twelve months preceding the date of the application); see also
    Kendrick v. Shalala, 
    998 F.2d 455
    , 456-57 (7th Cir. 1993) (commenting on the
    difficulty of having a “complete” record as “one may always obtain another
    medical examination, seek the views of one more consultant, wait six months to
    see whether the claimant’s condition changes, and so on.”). Claimant’s testimony
    that the vision in her left eye had blurred since she had iritis does not change our
    analysis. We find no error in the ALJ’s not obtaining a consultative examination.
    We have carefully reviewed the record and have considered claimant’s
    arguments in light of the record. We conclude that substantial evidence supports
    the determination that claimant was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
    Security Act. Therefore, the judgment of the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    David M. Ebel
    Circuit Judge
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