McWilliams v. Schoeneman ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 11 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PAUL McWILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 96-1371
v.
(D.C. No. 95-S-2353)
(D. Colo.)
CARMEN SCHOENEMAN, JOHN DOE #1,
JOHN DOE #2,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Paul McWilliams, an inmate in the custody of the Colorado Department of
Corrections at the time he initiated this lawsuit, appeals from the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Carmen Schoeneman and John
Does #1 and #2 on his civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
On appeal, Mr. McWilliams contends the defendants violated his First,
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by opening and reading his mail.
He also asserts the district court erred by not granting him a jury trial on his
claims, and by denying his motion for discovery.
We review the district court's discovery ruling for an abuse of discretion.
GWN Petroleum Corp. v. OK-Tex Oil & Gas, Inc., 998 F.2d 853, 858 (10th Cir.
1993). On appeal, Mr. McWilliams presents no facts, argument or law showing
the district court's ruling to have been an abuse of discretion. He simply states in
conclusory fashion that the district court's denial of his motion limited his ability
to present his case. Although we construe pro se pleadings liberally, Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), that leniency does not entitle pro se
litigants to review of conclusory assertions of district court error. See Drake v.
Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Despite the liberal
construction afforded pro se pleadings, the court will not construct arguments or
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theories for the plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues.");
Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1986) (district court properly
dismissed action because pro se litigant's allegations were conclusory and
unsupported by underlying facts). Accordingly, because Mr. McWilliams presents
no arguments showing the district court's denial of his motion for discovery was
an abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court's ruling. See Murrell v.
Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (perfunctory complaints that fail
to frame and develop an issue are insufficient to invoke appellate review).
Our standard of review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is
de novo. Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996). "'Summary
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50
F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995)).
The magistrate judge who reviewed Mr. McWilliams' claims recommended
the district court grant the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The
magistrate judge reasoned that, because Mr. McWilliams' mail was not "legal
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mail," the Defendants were authorized to open and read it. Further, the magistrate
judge found the Defendants were authorized to seize the letter at issue because it
threatened the security of the prison facility. Accordingly, the magistrate judge
concluded the Defendants did not violate Mr. McWilliams' rights to freedom of
speech, privacy or due process. After review of the record, we affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the Defendants for substantially the reasons
stated in the magistrate judge's recommendation, a copy of which we attach
hereto. Further, because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Defendants, Mr. McWilliams had no right to present his claims to a jury. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (authorizing the grant of summary judgment).
We AFFIRM the district court's holding.
Entered for the Court
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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