Holden v. Geo Group Private Prison Cont. ( 2019 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 8, 2019
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JEFFREY ALLEN HOLDEN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 18-6156
(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-00479-F)
GEO GROUP PRIVATE PRISON (W.D. Okla.)
CONTRACTORS; HECTOR RIOS,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, MORITZ, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Jeffrey Allen Holden, an Oklahoma prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from
the district court’s dismissal of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the dismissal of Holden’s claims, but
we remand for the district court to clarify in its judgment that its dismissal of any
state-law claims Holden intended to assert was without prejudice.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
Holden has been incarcerated in the Oklahoma prison system for
approximately thirteen years, most recently at Lawton Correctional Facility (LCF).
LCF is operated by an entity called GEO Group under a contract with the state of
Oklahoma. Hector Rios is LCF’s Warden.
Holden is a drug addict. In May 2018, he sued GEO Group and Rios under
§ 1983, alleging that LCF refused to provide him drug treatment in violation of his
rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Oklahoma constitution. Holden’s
complaint also asserted that LCF was required, by its contract with the state, to
provide drug treatment and mental health services.
On initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the magistrate judge identified
several deficiencies in Holden’s complaint and provided him an opportunity to file an
amended complaint. Holden did not do so, instead filing an “Amendment to Claim
and Brief in Support” in which he attempted to clarify his claims. Considering both
the original complaint and the “Amendment to Claim,” the magistrate judge
recommended that the district court dismiss the federal claims for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted and, to the extent Holden had intended to
assert state-law claims, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.
Over Holden’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation, dismissed the federal claims, and declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any state-law claims that Holden had intended to assert.
2
DISCUSSION
We review de novo a § 1915A dismissal for failure to state a claim. Young v.
Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009). Because Holden proceeds pro se, we
construe his filings liberally, but we do not act as his advocate. Requena v. Roberts,
893 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019).
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8
announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. “A pleading that
offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid
of further factual enhancement.” Id. (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks
omitted). In addition to the text of Holden’s complaint and his “Amendment to
Claim,” we consider his exhibits in determining whether he stated a claim. See
Requena, 893 F.3d at 1205.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious
medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs may be “manifested . . . by prison guards . . . intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with . . .
treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-05 (footnote omitted). As Holden urges,
3
medical care includes psychological and psychiatric care. Riddle v. Mondragon,
83 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 1996).
Deliberate indifference has both an objective and a subjective component.
Requena, 893 F.3d at 1215. “First, [the inmate] must produce objective evidence that
the deprivation at issue was in fact sufficiently serious.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Second, under the subjective component, [the inmate] must allege
the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e. that the official
knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. (brackets
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Holden states that LCF does not offer drug treatment. Further, from his
pleadings and their attachments, it appears that no facility in the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections (ODOC) offers drug treatment to any prisoner until they
are within 2,000 days of release. Holden is approximately 5,500 days from release,
so he is not yet eligible for any drug treatment program in ODOC.
The magistrate judge assumed, without deciding, that the denial of drug
treatment may trigger constitutional protection. But because ODOC’s drug treatment
policy does make treatment available at some point, he recommended that Holden’s
Eighth Amendment claim be considered as challenging a delay in treatment, rather
than an outright denial of treatment. The district court adopted this recommendation,
and we agree. Although Holden emphatically maintains that LCF does not offer drug
treatment, the allegations indicate that Holden is precluded from drug treatment not
simply because he is at LCF, but because he is not currently eligible for drug
4
treatment at any ODOC facility. In light of ODOC’s policy allowing drug treatment
at some point in the future, Holden’s claim is more properly analyzed as a delay of
treatment rather than a denial of treatment.
“Where a prisoner claims that harm was caused by a delay in medical
treatment, he must show that the delay resulted in substantial harm in order to satisfy
the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test.” Al-Turki v. Robinson,
762 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We have
held that the substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap,
permanent loss, or considerable pain.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that an inmate
established objective harm by demonstrating unnecessary pain and a worsening in
condition). We have also stated, however, that “not every twinge of pain suffered as
the result of delay in medical care is actionable.” Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d
1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000).
The magistrate judge noted that “[Holden] alleges only that the delay in
substance abuse treatment has resulted in mental anguish, stress, anxiety,
hopelessness, depression, and ‘continual highs and lows of hope for relief to never
come to fruition.’” R. at 45 (quoting id. at 6). Accordingly, he concluded that
Holden “has not alleged facts from which to infer that Defendants’ inaction in
delaying his receipt of substance abuse treatment has resulted in substantial harm.”
Id. The district court adopted this analysis. On appeal, Holden again generally
5
identifies the types of harms the magistrate judge noted.1 We agree with the district
court that these allegations are insufficient to establish the substantial harm
requirement. See Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1203-04 (stating, in holding that plaintiffs who
sought specialized treatment for sex addiction failed to state an Eighth Amendment
claim, that “[v]ague allegations of eroded self-esteem, apathy, fear and feelings of
differentness, keeping a plaintiff in the ‘addictive cycle,’ do not amount to the basis
for a constitutional claim”).
Contrary to Holden’s allegations on appeal, the district court gave him the
benefit of liberal construction of his pleadings, considering both the allegations of the
“Amendment to Claim” as well as the allegations in the original complaint.
Moreover, regarding Holden’s assertion of failure to address his allegations of breach
of contract, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Holden’s state-law claims, leaving him free to pursue a breach of contract claim in
state court if he chooses to do so.2
We note, however, that the district court did not specify whether its dismissal
was with prejudice or without prejudice. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), that means the
dismissal was with prejudice. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents,
1
To the extent Holden’s opening brief may identify any additional harms,
they are asserted only conclusorily, without explanation or elaboration.
2
On appeal, Holden suggests that he is a third-party beneficiary who can
pursue a federal claim of breach of contract under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. But Holden did
not mention § 1981 in the district court. And to the extent that Holden alleges that
the district court should have identified a possible § 1981 claim through applying
liberal construction, we disagree. Section 1981 addresses race discrimination, and
Holden has failed to allege any facts regarding race discrimination.
6
492 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Because the district court in this case did not
specify the nature of its dismissal order, we must rely on background principles under
Rule 41(b), and they firmly instruct that ‘[u]nless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies,’ a district court’s dismissal will be treated as adjudicating the
merits of the action—and thus a dismissal with prejudice.”). Given that the district
court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims,
however, the dismissal of those claims should have been without prejudice. See Ball
v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir. 1995).
CONCLUSION
The district court’s judgment is affirmed, but we remand for the district court
to clarify in its judgment that its dismissal of any state-law claims is without
prejudice.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
7