Jones v. Heimgartner , 602 F. App'x 705 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 3, 2015
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CHARLES L. JONES,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 14-3197
v. (D.C. No. 5:12-CV-03055-SAC)
(D. Kan.)
JAMES HEIMGARTNER; DEREK
SCHMIDT,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner-Appellant Charles Jones, a Kansas state inmate appearing pro se,
seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) so that he may appeal the district
court’s denial of his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In order to obtain a COA,
Mr. Jones must make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The district court found that Mr. Jones’ petition
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
was time-barred. Thus, Mr. Jones must show “that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478
(2000). Because the district court resolved factual disputes against Mr. Jones as a
matter of law, we will grant a COA, reverse, and remand for further proceedings.
Background
Mr. Jones was convicted of first-degree murder on February 1, 2000 and
was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for 25 years.
Despite being 16 years old at the time the murder, Mr. Jones was tried as an adult.
Mr. Jones’ conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Jones, 47 P.3d 783
(Kan. 2002). On October 21, 2002, his petition for a writ of certiorari was
denied. Jones v. Kansas, 537 U.S. 980 (2002).
Mr. Jones subsequently initiated post-conviction relief proceedings in
Kansas state court. On July 9, 2004, Mr. Jones filed what appeared to be his first
motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507. The
state district court denied it as untimely, but the Kansas Court of Appeals
remanded for further proceedings. Jones v. State, 120 P.3d 381 (Kan. Ct. App.
2005) (table case). On remand, the state district court denied Mr. Jones’ petition
on the merits and that denial was affirmed. Jones v. State, 203 P.3d 739 (Kan.
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Ct. App. 2009) (table case).
Additionally, in June 2009, Mr. Jones filed a motion to correct illegal
sentence pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3504. That motion was summarily
denied by the state district court because the issues raised in the motion were
previously raised and decided. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed. State v.
Jones, 257 P.3d 268 (Kan. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
Finally, on February 24, 2012, Mr. Jones filed this federal habeas petition.
The district court, finding reason to believe Mr. Jones’ petition was untimely,
entered an order requiring Mr. Jones to show cause why his petition should not be
dismissed. 1 Rawle 238–45. The court ordered the state to file a response addressing
the timeliness issue. After receiving briefing on the issue from both parties, the
district court dismissed the petition as time-barred. Jones v. Heimgartner, No.
12–3055–SAC, 2014 WL 4132155 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2014).
Discussion
The primary issue addressed in the district court’s order is whether Mr.
Jones is entitled to the benefit of the “prison mailbox rule.” In short, the
timeliness issue turns on whether Mr. Jones’ February 2012 § 2254 motion relates
back to an earlier filing that occurred within the statute of limitations. Mr. Jones
contends that on March 28, 2003—a date within the limitations period of
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§ 2244(d)(1) 3—he handed the following pre-stamped documents to a corrections
officer for mailing via the prison mailing system: a § 2254 petition, a motion to
stay federal proceedings, and a Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507 petition for post-
conviction relief. 1 Rawle 81–83. Mr. Jones argues that this was sufficient to invoke
the prison mailbox rule and, by virtue of the March 28, 2003 filings, sufficient to
toll the limitations period. The district court, however, found no evidence that
Mr. Jones submitted a § 2254 petition in 2003 and therefore found that he had not
made the requisite showing to invoke the prison mailbox rule. Based on this
finding, the district court concluded that Mr. Jones’ February 2012 habeas
petition did not relate back to an earlier filing; rather, the court concluded that the
first time Mr. Jones sought post-conviction relief was when he filed a Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 60-1507 petition on July 9, 2004. Accordingly, the court determined that
Mr. Jones’ § 2254 petition was time-barred and did not warrant application of the
principle of equitable tolling.
To support his contention that he did in fact submit a § 2254 petition in
2003, Mr. Jones attached to his February 2012 § 2254 petition the following
exhibits: (1) a signed affidavit from Mr. Jones stating that on March 28, 2003 he
handed over for mailing via the prison mailing system a § 2254 petition and
motion to stay with prepaid first class postage; (2) a Form 9 official prison
3
Mr. Jones’ conviction became final on October 21, 2002. The district
court thus concluded that the one-year statute of limitations on Mr. Jones § 2254
petition ran “on or about October 22, 2003.” Jones, 2014 WL 4132155, at *1.
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document purporting to establish that a corrections officer verified Mr. Jones had
submitted for mailing his “2254 legal mail”; (3) a signed affidavit by the
corrections officer stating that it was the facility policy for Mr. Jones to hand the
corrections officer his § 2254 petition for mailing, rather than mailing it himself;
and (4) copies of the handwritten § 2254 petition and motion to stay that were
purportedly handed to the corrections officer on March 28, 2003.
The district court rejected Mr. Jones’ argument that he had taken action
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. It concluded:
While an inmate’s personal declaration may be sufficient to invoke
the prison mailbox rule when filing was delayed due to circumstances
beyond the inmate’s control[,] it is not sufficient standing alone to
establish that a pleading to initiate a case that never reached the court
was in fact surrendered for mailing. When the alleged initial
pleading never reached the court, the petitioner must provide some
substantiation beyond his personal declaration.
Jones, 2014 WL 4132155, at *5 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion,
the district court relied on the following facts: there are no court records
indicating that a § 2254 petition or motion to stay was ever received; there is no
evidence in the correctional facility mail log showing that a § 2254 petition or
motion to stay was ever sent; in the almost nine years between his apparent filings
Mr. Jones never inquired about the status of his petition or motion, not even
following-up to receive a case number, and; “nothing about the hand-written
petition and stay motion exhibited by Mr. Jones establishes that these papers were
actually created, signed, submitted for mailing, actually mailed, or filed in March
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2003.” Id. Similarly, the district court found that neither the Form 9 prison
document nor the correctional officer’s affidavit established that Mr. Jones
handed over a § 2254 petition and motion to stay in March 2003. The district
court also concluded that Mr. Jones failed to establish circumstances warranting
application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. Id. at 7–8.
In Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1165–1166 (10th Cir. 2005), we held
that an inmate may prove compliance with the mailbox rule with a declaration
stating the date the pleading was delivered to prison officials and that first-class
postage was prepaid. The district court appears to have imposed an additional
requirement: that the pleading actually reach the court. Moreover, other cases
considering this issue have recognized the factual nature of the inquiry even given
non-receipt. See, e.g., United States v. McNeill, 523 F. App’x 979 (4th Cir.
2013) (unpublished); Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2012); Stoot v.
Cain, 570 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2009); Allen v. Culliver, 471 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir.
2006) (per curiam); Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001).
The State has responded that (1) the district court did not impose an
additional requirement—that the pleading actually reach the court—on the prison
mailbox rule, or (2) Price is distinguishable and not directly applicable because it
did not deal with a “missing” pleading. Regardless, the State argues that the
district court merely elaborated on the evidentiary threshold required when a
pleading does not reach the court. Citing Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d at 1011, the
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State argues that in such circumstances a petitioner must provide not only a sworn
declaration concerning the facts justifying the mailbox rule, but also some other
corroborating evidence. According to the State, no other evidence (other than Mr.
Jones’ assertions) supports his claim that he attempted to file his petition. Aplee.
Memo Br. at 3. We disagree.
In Ray, the Seventh Circuit stated that “other corroborating evidence” may
be “documentary (for example, copies of the filing, postmarked envelope, or other
correspondence) . . . . [or] testimonial.” Id. (emphasis added). Mr. Jones
attached to his most recent § 2254 motion (1) a signed affidavit that he hand-
delivered both state and federal motions for post-conviction relief, and (2)
documents purporting to be copies of the handwritten § 2254 petition and motion
to stay that were allegedly handed to the corrections officer on March 28, 2003.
The evidence submitted created fact questions which must be resolved by
the district court. While it is true that Mr. Jones’ failure to follow up on the
status of his March 2003 habeas petition “weighs heavily against application of
the equitable mailbox rule,” Jones, 2014 WL 4132155, at *6; see, e.g., Stoot, 570
F.3d at 672; Culliver, 471 F.3d at 1198; Huizar, 273 F.3d at 1223, other facts
could be resolved in Mr. Jones’ favor. Thus, the district court*s procedural ruling
is clearly debatable, and we are persuaded that the appropriate course is to grant a
COA, reverse, and remand for the taking of evidence. See Hinzo v. Tapia, 378 F.
App’x. 857, 859 (10th Cir. 2010); York v. Galetka, 314 F.3d 522, 528 (10th Cir.
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2003). We express no opinion on the merits of the procedural issue, or the
underlying claims.
We GRANT Mr. Jones IFP status, GRANT a COA, and REMAND for
further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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