Thompson v. Larned State Hospital , 597 F. App'x 548 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 3, 2015
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DAVID ALLEN THOMPSON, SR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 14-3103
v.
(D.C. No. 5-13-CV-03134-SAC)
LARNED STATE HOSPITAL, COLENE
HOLMBURG, and DEBRA (D. Kansas)
COLGLAZIER,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, LUCERO and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth
Circuit Rule 32.1.
Appellant David Allen Thompson, Sr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, in which he alleged prosecutors
violated his constitutional rights by issuing a subpoena duces tecum for certain medical
records. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Thompson is currently incarcerated in a state correctional facility in
Sacramento, California, as he was when he filed his complaint in this matter. In October
and November 2011, the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office submitted a
subpoena duces tecum to the custodian of records at the Larned, Kansas, State Hospital
requesting “all records that indicate when Mr. Thompson was admitted to your facility,
why he was admitted to your facility, when he left your facility, and why he left your
facility.” The subpoena indicated the requested records were necessary for the
prosecution of Mr. Thompson in a criminal matter. Through his appointed California
counsel, Mr. Thompson moved to quash the subpoenas. He argued the requested records,
which discussed his treatment at a psychiatric facility, were confidential and were
protected by California privacy laws and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The California trial court held an in camera hearing and, after reviewing the medical
records, determined that 5 of the 153 pages produced by the Larned State Hospital could
be released to the prosecution. The released portion of the record did not discuss
Mr. Thompson’s psychiatric treatment or condition.
Mr. Thompson thereafter filed his complaint in this matter. He alleged that the
release of his confidential medical/psychological records to the Sacramento County
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District Attorney’s Office violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and that,
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he is entitled to $250,000 in damages. Mr. Thompson also
requested that the court order the Larned State Hospital to release all his records to him
and to issue an injunction preventing the hospital from possessing any copies of the
records. The district court issued an order to show cause why Mr. Thompson’s action
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. Specifically, the district
court explained that it found no legal authority supporting the imposition of civil liability
on government officials who issue or respond to facially valid subpoenas duces tecum.
Instead, the court explained that the proper vehicle for relief is a motion to quash, which
Mr. Thompson had already successfully utilized. Mr. Thompson did not respond to the
order to show cause; accordingly, the district court dismissed the case and entered a
separate judgment.
Mr. Thompson filed both a notice of appeal and a motion to reconsider. The
district court denied the motion to reconsider, and Mr. Thompson did not file a new or
amended notice of appeal. The scope of our review is therefore limited to the dismissal
order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Thompson argues the district court erred in dismissing his § 1983
action. He claims that the release of his medical records to the Sacramento County
District Attorney’s office violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, Article I of the California Constitution, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in the California Rules of Evidence, and the Federal
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and its
corresponding administrative regulations. We review a district court’s dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim de novo and ask “whether it is plausible that plaintiff
is entitled to relief.” Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067, 1068 (10th Cir. 2009).
Because Mr. Thompson is appearing pro se, “we construe his pleadings and papers
liberally.” Id. Nevertheless, Mr. Thompson “must follow the same rules of procedure that
govern other litigants.” See Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992).
Therefore, we will consider only the arguments Mr. Thompson raised in the district court,
see Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 940 (10th Cir. 2004), which were limited to alleged
Fourth Amendment violations.1
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We note that Mr. Thompson moved to amend his complaint—well after the
district court issued its dismissal order—to include his HIPAA and California
constitutional claims. Although the district court acknowledged Mr. Thompson’s
proposed amended complaint in its order denying his motion to reconsider,
Mr. Thompson did not file a new or amended notice of appeal after the district court
denied reconsideration. Our review is therefore limited to the district court’s dismissal
order and the arguments presented in the original complaint, which were limited to
Fourth Amendment claims. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Breeden v. ABF Freight
Sys., Inc., 115 F.3d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a party must file a new or
amended notice of appeal to appeal an order on a postjudgment motion).
Moreover, even had Mr. Thompson preserved his HIPAA and California claims,
they would likely fail as a matter of law. As we have previously explained, “HIPAA does
not create a private right of action for alleged disclosures of confidential medical
information.” Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010). Although
we have not squarely addressed alleged HIPAA violations in the context of a § 1983
action, at least two of our sister circuits have and have ruled that HIPAA violations
cannot be remedied through a § 1983 action. See Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th
Cir. 2010) (dismissing a § 1983 claim “because HIPAA does not create a private right of
action”); Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). Mr. Thompson’s
state law claims likewise fail because Ҥ 1983 affords a remedy for violations of federal
law and does not provide a basis for redressing violations of state law.” D.L. v. Unified
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As to his Fourth Amendment claim, Mr. Thompson contends that his right to be
free from governmental intrusion was violated when the Larned State Hospital released a
portion of his medical records to the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office.
Apart from bald citations to U.S. Supreme Court cases addressing the Fourth Amendment
in contexts entirely different than this one, Mr. Thompson directs us to no legal authority
supporting his allegations. Contrary to Mr. Thompson’s claims, in the context of an
administrative subpoena, the Fourth Amendment requires “only that a subpoena ‘be
sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that
compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.’” Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 916
(10th Cir. 2007) (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967)). In this case,
Mr. Thompson succeeded, through his motion to quash, in limiting the scope of the
subpoena to just five pages of his medical record, none of which discussed
Mr. Thompson’s psychiatric treatment or condition. The pages accessed contained only
that information relevant to the Sacramento District Attorney’s prosecution against
Mr. Thompson. Given this factual scenario, we cannot conclude that Mr. Thompson has
pled sufficient facts that would entitle him to relief.
Sch. Dist. No. 497, 596 F.3d 768, 776 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Thompson’s § 1983 action for
failure to state a claim for relief. We GRANT Mr. Thompson’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis, but remind him of his obligation to make partial payments until the
district court and appellate filing fees are paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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