Al-Yousif v. Trani , 779 F.3d 1173 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 6, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
NAIF AL-YOUSIF,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
No. 14-1084
TRAVIS TRANI, Warden, Colorado State
Penitentiary; JOHN W. SUTHERS,
Attorney General of the State of
Colorado,
Respondents - Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-01742-RPM)
Ryan A. Crane, Assistant Attorney General (John W. Suthers, Attorney General, with
him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Respondents - Appellants.
Brett Daniel Lampiasi, Law Office of Brett Daniel Lampiasi, Hatfield, Massachusetts,
and Henry L. Solano, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Denver,
Colorado, (Steven M. Feder and Barry Boughman, Feder Law Firm, Denver, Colorado,
with them on the brief), for Petitioner - Appellee.
Before HARTZ, MATHESON, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted Defendant
Naif Al-Yousif’s application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Although the application was untimely filed, the district court granted equitable tolling
and proceeded to the merits. It ruled that the state-court decision was both contrary to
and an unreasonable application of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). The State of Colorado appealed. (It did not need to
obtain a certificate of appealability. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(3).) We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253 and reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts are largely undisputed. Defendant, a native of Saudi Arabia, moved to
the United States in 1996 to study English. He attended an English-language program for
14 months, advancing from no English comprehension or speaking ability to the ability to
carry on a basic conversation.
Defendant’s conviction was for the murder of Abdulaziz Al-Kohaji on January 10,
2001. See People v. Al-Yousif, 206 P.3d 824, 828 (Colo. App. 2006) (Al-Yousif II). The
victim flew to Denver that day and was driven from the airport to his apartment by
Defendant’s cousin (Mishal Al-Swaidy) and brother, who expected to see him later at
dinner. But Defendant picked the victim up at the apartment and drove him to the home
Defendant shared with Al-Swaidy and their roommate, Tariq Al-Dossary. Defendant left
the house to buy groceries. When he returned, the victim was tied to a chair. Al-Dossary
2
forced him to disclose his financial-account information and then strangled him to death
with a rope while Defendant and Al-Swaidy watched. The three men disposed of the
body in a dumpster. Defendant and Al-Dossary sold the victim’s car, cashed $1,000 of
the victim’s cashier’s checks, and withdrew $19,900 from his bank account. Al-Dossary
and Al-Swaidy fled to Saudi Arabia. Defendant initially fled to California but returned to
Colorado after speaking to his brother.
Detective Gene Guigli arrested Defendant when he returned. On the way to the
police station, Defendant said words to the effect of “I know all about it,” and appeared
eager to talk. People v. Al-Yousif, 49 P.3d 1165 (Colo. 2002) (Al-Yousif I) App. A (Order
on Mot. to Suppress Statements, People v. Al-Yousif, No. 01 CR 1861 (Dist. Ct. Colo.
Dec. 20, 2001) (Order to Suppress)), at 1178 (internal quotation marks omitted). Guigli
briefly advised Defendant of his rights and instructed him not to talk while being
transported.
At the station, Guigli and Detective Mike Martinez questioned Defendant while
being videotaped. After asking Defendant the spelling and pronunciation of his name and
his date of birth, address, and phone number, Martinez said, “[L]et me first advise you of
your rights. Okay?” Tr. of Interview at 3, Al-Yousif v. Trani, No. 1:12-cv-01742-RPM
(D. Colo. Nov. 16, 2002) (Doc. No. 19-2) (Tr.). He then read, without pausing, from a
printed form:
Martinez: Okay. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say
can be used as evidence against you in court.
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Al-Yousif: [Nods head]
Martinez: You have the right to talk to a lawyer before questioning and
have him present—
Al-Yousif: [Nods head]
Martinez: —during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be
appointed for you without cost to you before questioning.
Al-Yousif: [Nods head]
Id.; see Order to Suppress, 49 P.3d at 1180.
Martinez checked off each right as he read. See Order to Suppress, 49 P.3d at
1180. When asked if he understood, Defendant “nodded and mumbled something that
sound[ed] like an affirmative response.” Id. Martinez asked whether Defendant was
sure, and he responded yes. Martinez then turned the form to face Defendant and said:
“I need your signature here to show you were the person advised of your rights.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant signed his name. Martinez continued:
“[I]t says here, ‘Knowing my rights and knowing what I’m doing, I now wish to
voluntarily talk to you.’ To talk with us, I need your signature on that line.” Tr. at 4. He
pointed to the signature blank in the waiver portion of the form. See Order to Suppress,
49 P.3d at 1180. Defendant signed his name without asking any questions. See id.
Martinez twice asked whether any promises or threats had been made to Defendant to
4
have him make a statement. See id. Defendant responded “What statement?”1 Al-Yousif
I, 49 P.3d at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted). Guigli said that Martinez meant
that they “didn’t make any threats to hurt you or physically harm, or mentally harm you
to make this statement. It’s voluntary?” Tr. at 4. Defendant shook his head and said
“You didn’t.” Tr. at 5.
Nevertheless, when Guigli asked, “And you’re voluntarily going to talk to us
about what happened,” Defendant said that he would not speak to the detectives until the
victim’s uncle arrived. Id. Guigli responded, “You understand we have to talk first.”
Order to Suppress, 49 P.3d at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant
initially said, “We’ll talk,” Tr. at 5; but after Martinez said, “Tell us what happened to
[the victim],” id. at 8, Defendant repeated, “I don’t feel like talking until his uncle
comes,” Order to Suppress, 49 P.3d at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted). Guigli
said, “We can’t bring the uncle into this interview.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Defendant then answered questions with inculpatory statements that led to his
conviction. During the interview Defendant “stated that he was good friends with the
victim,” id., that he had spoken to the victim’s uncle and told him that he would explain
what happened when the uncle came to Colorado, and that in Saudi Arabia the victim’s
1
The Colorado trial court found that Defendant asked “What’s a statement?” Order to
Suppress, 49 P.3d at 1180 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Colorado Supreme
Court, which reviewed the videotape, found that he said “What statement?” Al-Yousif I,
49 P.3d at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5
parents would decide his punishment. Late in the interview, the detectives asked
Defendant whether he expected to go to prison. He said no and asked the detectives what
would happen if the victim’s uncle said to let Defendant go. A detective said: “You have
been here long enough. You know we have courts like across the street, that big
courthouse. That’s up to a judge and jury what happens to you. Do you understand
that?” Tr. at 78. The interview lasted 90 minutes before Defendant agreed to take the
detectives to the dumpster where he and the other men had disposed of the body.
When Defendant and the detectives returned to the station, Detective Martin Vigil
asked Defendant how long he had been in the United States, if Defendant had understood
him, and whether Defendant had understood everything in the earlier interview. He
responded affirmatively and said that although “he sometimes has a problem
understanding” he would ask for an explanation if he did not understand. Order to
Suppress, 49 P.3d at 1181. Vigil provided a third Miranda advisement, offering some
explanation or paraphrase after each right. Defendant then said that he wanted an
attorney, and the detectives ended the interview.
Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress the video of his police interrogation,
asserting that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. At the
suppression hearing, he called three witnesses who testified that he had not understood
his rights because of his cultural background and limited English proficiency. One
expert, Dr. Mohammed Amin Kohlwadia, testified that Defendant had poor English skills
compared to other Arabic-speaking students and that he found it more difficult to explain
6
legal concepts to him. Dr. Kholwadia also testified that “nodding . . . does not
necessarily mean that an Arab person understands everything but can mean that he wants
more explanation.” Id. He said that “some of the terms used in the advisement such as
‘right’ and ‘evidence’ could translate into two or three different meanings.” Al-Yousif I,
49 P.3d at 1171. And he related that there is no right not to speak to the police in Saudi
Arabia, and that when he reviewed the advisement form with Defendant the morning of
the hearing, Defendant understood the words but had difficulty with the concept of the
right to remain silent. The other two witnesses had taught Defendant English. They
testified that he would nod and say that he understood even when he did not understand
the full meaning of what was being said. One testified that Defendant had reached a
fifth-grade level of English reading and that comprehension of the Miranda advisement
requires a seventh-grade reading level for a native speaker. See Order to Suppress,
49 P.3d at 1181. Two friends testified that Defendant had limited English proficiency
and that they had assisted Defendant with forms in English.
The trial court’s “impression from multiple reviews of [the videotaped
interrogation] [was] that defendant had a fair ability to converse with the detectives in
English.” Id. at 1180. It noted that Defendant “frequently respond[ed] ‘Huh?’ to
questions and had trouble with certain words [but] responded appropriately to most of the
questions posed to him.” Id. Nonetheless, the court concluded that, although Defendant
demonstrated the ability to engage in casual conversation, the State had failed to show
that Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. It therefore
7
suppressed his statements. On an interlocutory appeal by the State, the Colorado
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Defendant “did sufficiently understand his rights and
that the waiver was, therefore, valid.” Al-Yousif I, 49 P.3d at 1167. The videotaped
interrogation was admitted into evidence at Defendant’s trial, and a jury convicted him of
felony murder, robbery, accessory after the fact, concealing death, and theft by receiving.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.
On direct appeal the Colorado Court of Appeals vacated the conviction for theft by
receiving, merged the robbery and felony-murder convictions, and otherwise affirmed the
trial court. The Colorado Supreme Court initially granted certiorari but later denied it as
having been improvidently granted. The court then denied a petition for rehearing.
Defendant filed an unsuccessful motion for postconviction relief, and the Colorado
Supreme Court denied review.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Equitable Tolling
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), an
application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ordinarily must be filed within one year
after a state judgment becomes final either by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of time for seeking direct review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). But “[t]he
time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction [relief] is pending
shall not be counted.” Id. § 2244(d)(2). Equitable tolling may further extend the
limitations period “if [an applicant] shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights
8
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented
timely filing.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted). We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to grant or
deny equitable tolling. See Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir.
2001).
Defendant does not dispute on appeal that the application was untimely filed. The
Colorado Supreme Court denied his motion for rehearing on direct review on April 7,
2008. He then had 90 days (actually 91, because the 90th day was Sunday July 6) to
petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari; when that time expired
on July 7, 2008 (he failed to file a petition), the state judgment became final and the one-
year limitations period began. See Woodward v. Cline, 693 F.3d 1289, 1292 (10th Cir.
2012). Defendant was entitled to statutory tolling of the one-year limitations period
while his state postconviction proceedings were pending from April 14, 2009, to April 9,
2012, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), but 281 days had already elapsed between July 7,
2008, and April 13, 2009. The remaining 84 days of the limitations period then expired
on July 2, 2012. Defendant filed his habeas application three days late on July 5, 2012.
Defendant originally asserted in his § 2254 application that it was timely because
the Colorado Supreme Court had denied the motion for rehearing on direct appeal on
April 10, 2008, and therefore the limitations period began to run 90 days later on July 9,
2008. Using this date, only 278 days of the one-year limitations period would have
9
elapsed before he filed his state postconviction claims and the limitations period would
have expired on July 5, 2012, the date of filing.
The State responded that the application was untimely, saying that it appeared that
“Applicant may have miscalculated the date by relying on the trial court’s notation (in its
minute orders) for the date on which the Colorado Supreme Court denied his petition for
rehearing on direct appeal.” Answer at 14, Al-Yousif, No. 1:12-cv-01742 (Aug. 14, 2012)
(Doc. No. 11) (Answer). The State argued that the April 10 trial-court entry reflected the
date that the court was notified of the Supreme Court decision, not the date of the
decision itself. It attached several documents. One was the Supreme Court’s order,
which displays the date it was issued, April 7, 2008. Another was a document that it
described as “Data Access state trial court database, case 01CR1861,” Answer at 111; it
is a printout marked “confidential” that displays an April 10, 2008 entry stating “Order
Of Ct From The Colo Supreme Ct-petn For Rehearing-denied-,” Answer, Ex. 1 at 8 (Doc.
No. 11-1). According to the State, “[t]he trial court . . . apparently did not become aware
of the denial until April 10, 2008—the date reflected in its minute orders.” Answer at 14.
In reply, Defendant argued that the application was timely and attached the
document he relied on for the date of April 10, 2008. The document has the heading
“Integrated Colorado Online Network (ICON).” Ex. 1 to Supp. Amend. at 1, Al-Yousif,
No. 1:12-cv-01742 (Nov. 26, 2012) (Doc. No. 19-1) (Ex. 1). It appears to contain the
same information as the document the State attached to its brief but in a different format
and not marked confidential. It includes an entry that states:
10
4/10/2008 Order
OF CT FROM THE COLO SUPREME CT-PETN FOR REHEARING-
DENIED-
Ex. 1 at 19.
In a district-court motion requesting oral argument, Defendant continued to assert
that the application was timely “based on the official record, [but] to the extent the Court
is inclined to entertain the State’s contention that [the] application should be barred as
untimely, [Defendant] should be afforded the opportunity to detail the circumstances that
would support . . . equitable tolling.” See Mot. for Hr’g/Oral Arg. on all Non-
Evidentiary-Dependent Dispositive Claims Presented in Pet. for Habeas Relief at 6,
Al-Yousif, No. 1:12-cv-01742 (Jan. 31, 2013) (Doc. No. 25). The State responded that it
relied on the Colorado Supreme Court order itself and that the relevant information was
contained in “public records available through the trial court clerk.” Resp. to Applicant’s
Mot. for a Hr’g at 3, Al-Yousif, No. 1:12-cv-01742 (Feb. 4, 2013) (Doc. No. 26). It
argued that Defendant’s motion did not “suggest any basis on which [equitable tolling]
would apply, and [the State was] aware of none.” Id. Defendant replied that he “relied
on the Register of Actions given to him by the state court and maintained in the [ICON]
system,” referring to the exhibit he had attached to his reply in support of his application.
Reply in Support of Mot. for Oral Arg. at 2‒3, Al-Yousif, No. 1:12-cv-01742 (Feb. 15,
2013) (Doc. No. 28). He argued that he was entitled to rely on the document because the
Register of Actions is an official state-court record under Colorado Chief Judicial
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Directive 5-01 and “memorializes every trial court filing and appellate court action.” Id.
at 3.
At a hearing in district court, Defendant argued that “the bottom line is that an arm
of the Government made a mistake in putting this date of the judgment—I’m sorry—the
July 7th judgment into the ICON . . . system, which is a public system and . . . becomes a
certified court document,” Oral Args. of Tr. of Proceedings at 6, Al-Yousif, No. 1:12-cv-
01742 (Oct. 21, 2013) (Doc. No. 43), and that he “was clearly justified in relying on the
register of actions that was . . . given to him by the State,” id. at 8. The district court
applied equitable tolling, without permitting the State to argue in response or make a
record. Its later order stated that Defendant relied on the date the trial court recorded the
order on the Registry of Actions, which “[t]he State maintains . . . exclusively, and . . . is
the only public notice of the entry of court orders.” Aplt. App. at 13–14. The order noted
that “[t]here [was] no reference to an April 7, 2008 Supreme Court order in the system,”
id. at 12, and determined that “counsel reasonably relied on that public record in
calculating the days remaining in the AEDPA limitations period,” id. at 14. The court
concluded that “[t]he inaccurate recording of the date of the Colorado Supreme Court’s
order denying rehearing was an extraordinary circumstance beyond counsel’s control.”
Id. at 13.
We beg to differ with the district court. “Equitable tolling is a rare remedy to be
applied in unusual circumstances . . . .” Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 929 (10th Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An inmate bears a strong burden to show
12
specific facts to support his claim of extraordinary circumstances and due diligence.” Id.
at 928 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
In our view, Defendant failed to satisfy his burden. The gist of his argument is
that the State misled his attorney because the entry in ICON was incorrect. But that is not
at all clear. The ICON entries appear to be taken from the trial-court record, and trial
courts ordinarily enter the date when something happens at that court. For example, the
entry at issue gives the date for “Order of Ct from the Colo Supreme Ct,” Ex. 1 at 19
(emphasis added, full capitalization omitted), not “Order of Ct by the Colo Supreme Ct.”
An entry for January 14, 2002, illustrates the point. It states: “Supreme Ct Ordr of Ct:
Motn for Ext of Time to File Rec on Interlocutory Appeal - Grtd to and Including Jan 15
2002 by the Ct 01-10-02.” Ex. 1 at 7 (full capitalization omitted). This certainly appears
to state that the January 14 entry reflects the receipt by the trial court of a Supreme Court
order dated January 10. And the published Supreme Court decision of July 1, 2002,
reversing the suppression of Defendant’s confession, see Al-Yousif I, 49 P.3d at 1165, is
reflected in a July 3, 2002 entry in ICON, Ex. 1 at 8. Although there may be some
ambiguity about what the ICON dates mean, Defendant presented no evidence regarding
what, if anything, his attorney asked when he obtained the document, and what, if any,
explanation was provided. And the district court refused to hear any proffer or argument
by the State, which may have clarified the matter.
Moreover, Defendant put on no evidence to demonstrate that he had to resort to,
and rely on, ICON to determine the filing date of the state supreme court’s decision
13
denying rehearing. In particular, why could he not have obtained a copy of the decision
from prior defense counsel or from the Colorado Supreme Court itself? We also note that
the correct date of the decision appears on Westlaw, Al-Yousif v. People, No. 07SC36,
2007 WL 1395329 (Colo. May 14, 2007), cert. denied as improvidently granted (Mar. 7,
2008), rehearing denied (Apr. 7, 2008) (follow “History” hyperlink), and the decision
itself appears on Lexis, Al-Yousif v. Colorado, No. 07SC36, 2008 Colo. LEXIS 351, at *1
(Colo. Apr. 7, 2008). In short, Defendant did not establish the requisites for equitable
tolling, and the district court abused its discretion in applying too lenient a standard for
such tolling.
B. Miranda
In any event, Defendant loses on the merits of his Miranda claim. Although the
federal district court ruled in Defendant’s favor, that court’s decision is not entitled to any
deference. “We review the district court’s legal analysis of the state court decision de
novo.” Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 825 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In contrast, we owe great deference to the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court
denying Defendant’s Miranda claim. Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant
habeas relief to a state prisoner with respect to a claim rejected on the merits in state
court unless the state-court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
14
light of the evidence presented” in state court, id. § 2254(d)(2). Clearly established law
consists of “the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of
the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,
660–61 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). A state-court decision is contrary to
clearly established law if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law” or “the state court confronts facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at [an
opposite] result.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).
“It is settled that a federal habeas court may overturn a state court’s application of
federal law only if it is so erroneous that there is no possibility fair-minded jurists could
disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court’s precedents.”
Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary
conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
Although Ҥ 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation
of claims already rejected in state proceedings,” id., it “reflects the view that habeas
corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a
substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal,” id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Further, state-court findings of fact are entitled to great deference. Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1),
15
In a proceeding by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a
factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The
applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness
by clear and convincing evidence.
“The presumption of correctness also applies to factual findings made by a state court of
review based on the trial record.” Morgan v. Hardy, 662 F.3d 790, 797–98 (7th Cir.
2011) (citing pre-AEDPA decision in Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546–47 (1981)); see
Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 678–81 (3d Cir. 2006) (same).
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that when the trial court suppressed
Defendant’s statements, it “required a deeper appreciation of the implications and
consequences of a waiver than does [Colorado] case law.” Al-Yousif I, 49 P.3d at 1167.
The court reviewed de novo “the question of whether the defendant sufficiently
understood his rights to waive them.” Id. It stated the applicable standard: “[C]ourts
apply a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test . . . holding waivers valid ‘only if the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and
the requisite level of comprehension’ on behalf of the suspect.” Id. at 1168–69 (quoting
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (further internal quotation marks omitted)).
In performing this task, said the court, “[t]he courts must necessarily examine the
objective circumstances surrounding the waiver in an effort to determine the suspect’s
level of understanding.” Id. at 1169. “Based upon [its] review, including a thorough
review of the videotaped interview with [Defendant],” the Colorado Supreme Court
16
concluded “that [Defendant] did sufficiently understand his rights and that the waiver
was, therefore, valid.” Id. at 1167. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court.
The court “[found] support in the record for the trial court’s determination that
[Defendant] had English abilities adequate for casual conversation.” Id. at 1170. It
acknowledged “that when the detectives spoke in lengthy sentences, the defendant was
more apt to become confused, especially when those sentences were spoken rapidly.” Id.
at 1171. “The Miranda warnings,” however, “were given in unbroken, quickly read, but
short sentences.” Id. The court observed that Defendant “ask[ed] the detectives for
clarification when he did not understand a question or a certain word [but] asked no
questions during the reading of the Miranda warnings.” Id. at 1172. “Based upon [its]
review of the taped interviews,” the court decided that Defendant “evidenced a sufficient
level of understanding to permit reliance upon his waiver of Miranda rights.” Id.
The court said that it was not necessary that a waiver be “knowing and intelligent
in the sense that the tactical error of that decision was . . . perceived,” because “it is not in
the sense of shrewdness that Miranda speaks of intelligent waiver.” Id. at 1169 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[t]he defendant need not understand every
consequence of his decision to waive.” Id. In particular:
[A] defendant’s alienage and unfamiliarity with the American legal system
should be [considered]. However, the significance of these factors will be
limited to determining whether a defendant knew and understood the
warnings that were read to him. The fact that a defendant’s alien status
may have prevented him from understanding the full, tactical significance
of his decision to confess will not invalidate his waiver.
17
Id. at 1169–70 (internal quotation marks omitted). Or, as the court later summed up:
Whether a defendant had the cultural background to understand the origin
or purpose of constitutional rights, or the tactical implications of waiving
them, is not at issue. A particular defendant’s length of time in the country,
education, religion, background, age, and intelligence certainly bear on his
depth of understanding. But the relevance of those factors in the totality
analysis here is limited to the simple question of whether the defendant
grasped three precepts: (1) he did not have to talk, (2) he could have an
attorney present, and (3) if he did talk, his statements could be used against
him.
Id. at 1172. In the court’s view, Dr. Kholwadia’s testimony did not “dispel the
conclusion that [Defendant] had the necessary level of rudimentary understanding.” Id.
It said that “[it] look[s] to whether the defendant minimally understood that he did not
have to talk to the police, that he could request a lawyer, and that, if he spoke, what he
said could be used against him to obtain a conviction.” Id. It concluded, “Measuring that
legal standard against the trial court’s findings of historical fact, and our own review of
the videotape, we determine that [Defendant’s] waiver of his Miranda rights was
sufficiently knowing and intelligent to pass constitutional muster.” Id.
The court was not persuaded that Defendant’s request for a lawyer after the second
Miranda warning at the police station was “evidence that he did not understand his right
to do so after the first advisement.” Id. After all, there was an important intervening
event. Defendant “took the officers to the dumpster where the body had been located
[and] may well have absorbed the extent to which he had implicated himself and began
having second thoughts.” Id.
18
Defendant complains that “the Colorado Supreme Court reduced [the Miranda]
protections to . . . ‘whether the defendant minimally understood that he did not have to
talk to the police, that he could request a lawyer, and that, if he spoke, what he said could
be used against him to obtain a conviction.’” Aplee. Br. at 33. He contends that clearly
established law requires more than a “minimal understanding.” Id. at 34 (internal
quotation marks omitted). But the Colorado Supreme Court recited the correct standard
twice before inserting the word “minimally.” In context, the phrase “minimally
understood” meant only that the defendant must understand no more than the following
“three precepts: (1) he did not have to talk, (2) he could have an attorney present, and (3)
if he did talk, his statements could be used against him.” Al-Yousif I, 49 P.3d at 1172. A
federal court should not “needlessly create internal inconsistency in the [state-court]
opinion” where the state court elsewhere “recite[s] the correct . . . standard.” Holland v.
Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 654–55 (2004) (per curiam).
Defendant also contends that the Colorado Supreme Court failed to consider
“critical factors in the constitutionally mandated totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.”
Aplee. Br. at 24. He asserts that clearly established law “required the Colorado Supreme
Court . . . to consider ‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,
including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” Id. at 30 (quoting
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374–75 (1979) (emphasis omitted)). He says that
the Colorado Supreme Court “fail[ed] to weigh the extent to which [his] difficulties with
English and his cultural background may have inhibited his ability to knowingly and
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intelligently waive his Miranda rights under the totality of the circumstances,” id. at 32,
“ignore[d] the ‘cursory’ nature of the advisement and the context of the exchange
between [Defendant] and his interrogators,” id. at 40, and “refus[ed] to weigh the
differences between the first ‘cursory’ Miranda advisement and the second properly
delivered Miranda advisement by Detective Vigil,” id. at 44.
As an initial matter, we note that Defendant is relying on decisions of our circuit
and other lower federal courts weighing a defendant’s language difficulties, cultural
background, and familiarity with the criminal-justice system as factors to consider under
the totality of the circumstances. But “[o]f course, AEDPA permits habeas relief only if
a state court’s decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law’ as determined by [the Supreme] Court, not by the courts of
appeals.” Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 6 (2014) (per curiam). Defendant also cites
Supreme Court cases that address waivers of rights other than those protected by
Miranda. But “Supreme Court holdings—the exclusive touchstone for clearly
established federal law—must be construed narrowly and consist only of something akin
to on-point holdings.” House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1015 (10th Cir. 2008). And
because the Supreme Court has stated the relevant Miranda requirements in general
terms, the Colorado Supreme Court had considerable “leeway . . . in reaching [the]
outcome[].” Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664.
In any event, contrary to Defendant’s assertions, the Colorado Supreme Court did
consider the surrounding circumstances. The court discussed Defendant’s English
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proficiency at length, referencing the videotaped interview and the witness testimony. It
explicitly stated that Defendant’s cultural background was relevant to whether Defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. It also considered the
circumstances of the exchange between the officers and Defendant, discussing the “rapid
reading of the rights . . . and the fact that the position of the form did not allow
[Defendant] to read along.” Al-Yousif I, 49 P.3d at 1170. The court noted Defendant’s
different responses to the two stationhouse advisements and determined that intervening
events may have led to the difference. See id. at 1172.
Finally, Defendant argues that the Colorado Supreme Court’s finding that he
understood his Miranda rights is not entitled to the presumption of correctness under
§ 2254(e). But we have held that whether a defendant understood his Miranda rights is a
question of fact entitled to deference under AEDPA. See Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222,
1231 (10th Cir. 2000). We must defer to that finding unless Defendant presented clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. See id. Defendant did not do so.
Defendant believes that the record demonstrates that he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his Miranda rights. Two trial judges—one state, one federal—agreed
with him. But the highest state court did not. Because we review that court’s decision
with great deference under AEDPA, we cannot grant the relief Defendant seeks.
III. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the district court’s grant of habeas relief.
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