David v. Sirius Computer Solutions, Inc. , 779 F.3d 1209 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 10, 2015
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
DIANE DAVID,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-1125
SIRIUS COMPUTER SOLUTIONS,
INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:11-CV-02030-RPM)
Danielle C. Jefferis (Darold W. Killmer, with her on the briefs), Killmer, Lane &
Newman, LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Ian S. Speir of Lewis Roca Rothgerber, LLP, Colorado Springs, Colorado (David
M. Hyams of Lewis Roca Rothgerber, LLP, Denver, Colorado, and William D.
Nelson of Lewis Roca Rothgerber, LLP, Colorado Springs, Colorado, with him on
the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.
Before TYMKOVICH, GORSUCH, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
Diane David sold computer equipment and she was good at it. She had a
lucrative nationwide client base. No surprise, then, that Sirius Computer
Solutions came knocking on her door, asking her to take a job selling its
equipment. The company promised Ms. David that she could continue to serve
her existing customers even after she went to work for Sirius. On this
understanding, Ms. David signed up. But soon enough Sirius backtracked,
refusing to allow Ms. David to conduct business with her outside clients. So Ms.
David sued, alleging that the company’s recruiting promises negligently
misrepresented the actual terms of employment — and that the company’s
misrepresentations took a toll on her both financially and emotionally. A jury
mostly agreed with Ms. David, returning a verdict for her on the negligent
misrepresentation claim and awarding damages of $231,665 in “economic losses
or injuries” but declining any damages for “noneconomic losses or injuries.”
After trial, Ms. David filed a motion under § 13-21-101 of the Colorado
Revised Statutes, which guarantees prejudgment interest “[i]n all actions brought
to recover damages for personal injuries.” Because the jury found Ms. David
suffered only economic losses, the district court seemed to assume she had
suffered no “personal injur[y]” and denied her motion for prejudgment interest.
And that’s the nub of the matter now before us. Ms. David argues that her suit
was brought to recover damages for a personal injury and that the district court
was wrong to equate personal injuries with noneconomic losses.
The statute’s plain language suggests Ms. David may have a point. It
focuses on whether the plaintiff “brought” an “action[]” to “recover damages for
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personal injuries.” And often enough in the law a “personal injury” is understood
to mean “[a]ny invasion of a personal right.” Black’s Law Dictionary 802 (Bryan
Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004). Indeed, in Colorado torts are classified as either
involving injuries to property or persons and “[a] tort which is not an injury to
property is” treated, by definition, as an injury to the person. Brooks v. Jackson,
813 P.2d 847, 848 (Colo. App. 1991) (quoting Mumford v. Wright, 55 P. 744, 746
(1898)). So the statute seems to focus our attention on the question whether the
plaintiff’s “action[]” was “brought” to recover “damages” for the invasion of a
right belonging to a person rather than for the violation of a property right. Very
much as happened here when Ms. David brought suit seeking damages for a
misrepresentation made to her, not for any damage to property personal or real.
Nothing in the statute’s terms seems to require an inquiry into the particular type
of compensatory damages (economic or noneconomic) the jury eventually awards.
And it’s surely the case that lawsuits aimed at vindicating “personal injuries” do
often wind up yielding “economic” damages. Take, for example, a defamatory
comment. Like a claim for misrepresentation it’s a personal injury under
Colorado law and yet it can, exactly as here, diminish a plaintiff’s earnings or
business prospects and so produce economic as well as noneconomic damages.
See id. at 848-49.
Tending to confirm Ms. David’s understanding of the statutory text is the
fact the Colorado General Assembly has repeatedly demonstrated its ability and
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willingness to specify a more limited class of personal injuries or damages when
it wishes. In a nearby section, the legislature employed the term “physical
injury.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-124. In several statutory provisions it used the
phrase “bodily injury.” See, e.g., id. §§ 13-21-107, -117.5, -124. The General
Assembly has distinguished as well between “economic” and “noneconomic loss
or injury.” See id. § 13-21-102.5. Yet the statute before us makes use of none of
these distinctions. It does not limit prejudgment interest to cases involving
physical injuries, bodily injuries, or noneconomic damages. Instead, it permits
interest in any action brought seeking compensation for a personal injury without
any apparent consideration to the nature of the compensatory damages the jury
happens to award. In light of so many other narrower choices it made in so many
other related statutes, the General Assembly’s decision to use comparatively
broad language here seems to take on an even more deliberate hue. See, e.g.,
Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1357 n.5 (2012) (explaining
that when Congress uses “different language” in different parts of the same
statute, we normally “assume[] different meanings were intended” (quoting Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004)) (internal quotation mark
omitted)).
Another clue still points in the same direction. Ms. David’s interpretation
yields a comprehensive statutory structure providing prejudgment interest in tort
cases where compensatory damages are awarded. As we’ve seen, Colorado law
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distinguishes between personal and property torts. And under Ms. David’s
interpretation, § 13-21-101 provides for prejudgment interest in the former class
of cases while § 5-12-102 does so “[w]hen money or property has been
wrongfully withheld.” See, e.g., Ferrellgas, Inc. v. Yeiser, 247 P.3d 1022, 1028
(Colo. 2011). One can easily see, as well, why the law might permit prejudgment
interest in all such cases. Compensatory damages, whether of the economic or
noneconomic stripe, are designed to make the injured party whole. Prejudgment
interest shares this same function, seeking to ensure tort victims are compensated
for the loss associated with the delay in receiving payment occasioned by court
proceedings. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Starke, 797 P.2d 14, 19 (Colo. 1990).
Meanwhile, Sirius’s contrary interpretation introduces a peculiar gap in the
statutory scheme. Under its interpretation, prejudgment interest would be
available in most tort cases — but not for the narrow class of cases that involve
personal injuries resulting only in economic damages. Yet Sirius has offered no
evidence suggesting that’s a gap the General Assembly intended. To be sure, the
General Assembly has capped noneconomic damages, perhaps out of skepticism
that such things can be easily measured and perhaps worried that they may be
more easily exaggerated than economic losses. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102.5.
But Sirius cites no comparable evidence suggesting a lack of legislative solicitude
for prejudgment interest in cases involving economic damages or any reason at all
why the law should take that incongruous shape. In these circumstances it seems
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to us Ms. David’s interpretation has the better of it when it comes to taking in
“the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
Finally, precedent supports Ms. David’s position, or at least doesn’t compel
a different result. While the Colorado Supreme Court hasn’t squarely addressed
the issue we face, in Morris v. Goodwin, 185 P.3d 777 (Colo. 2008), the court
didn’t seem to have any problem applying § 13-21-101 to both economic and
noneconomic damages when all the damages stemmed from a personal injury. Id.
at 778, 780. Sirius says its contrary position finds support in Schuessler v.
Wolter, 310 P.3d 151 (Colo. App. 2012), and Antolovich v. Brown Group Retail,
Inc., 183 P.3d 582 (Colo. App. 2007). But we don’t see much help for the
company in those Colorado Court of Appeals decisions — neither of which is
binding on us in any event. The Schuessler court did decline to award
prejudgment interest under § 13-21-101. But that wasn’t surprising because the
damages there resulted from the defendant’s wrongful withholding of money or
property (insurance benefits) — just the sort of injury that calls for prejudgment
interest under § 5-12-102. See Schuessler, 310 P.3d at 157. In Antolovich, the
court noted that the plaintiff’s personal injury resulted from “intangible,
subjective, noneconomic losses, including inconvenience and loss of peace of
mind” and proceeded to deem prejudgment interest appropriate under § 13-21-
101. 183 P.3d at 611. All that, too, is entirely consistent with our decision today.
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After all, acknowledging that personal injuries can give rise to noneconomic
losses, as Antolovich did, does nothing to undermine the established fact that
personal injuries can also give rise to economic losses, see, e.g., Brooks, 813 P.2d
at 848-89.
The case is remanded for an award of prejudgment interest.
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