United States v. Suniga , 601 F. App'x 758 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                  FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            May 4, 2015
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                         No. 14-5141
    (D.C. Nos. 4:13-CV-00630-GKF-PJC and
    EVERETT LEE SUNIGA,                                  4:10-CR-00086-GKF-2)
    (N.D. Okla.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    _________________________________
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
    _________________________________
    Before KELLY, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Everett Suniga, a federal prisoner appearing pro se,1 seeks a certificate of
    appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255
    motion. We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.
    App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    1
    Because Suniga is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See
    Hall v. Bellmon, 
    935 F.2d 1106
    , 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
    I
    Suniga pled guilty to a methamphetamine-related charge, and his sentence was
    affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. Suniga, 467 F. App’x 798, 799 (10th Cir.
    2012) (unpublished). As part of his plea agreement, Suniga waived the right to
    collaterally attack his sentence, except by way of an ineffective assistance claim that
    challenged the validity of the plea or the waiver agreement. Suniga subsequently
    submitted a § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence that alleged, among other things,
    ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process. The district court
    determined that Suniga’s claims were barred by his waiver, and that, even were they
    not barred, Suniga failed to show that either the plea or the waiver was invalid. It
    denied a COA.
    II
    We will grant a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
    the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a
    showing, Suniga must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
    for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
    manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
    proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000) (quotation omitted).
    “A plea agreement waiver of postconviction rights does not waive the right to
    bring a § 2255 petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims challenging
    the validity of the plea or the waiver.” United States v. Cockerham, 
    237 F.3d 1179
    ,
    -2-
    1187 (10th Cir. 2001). Even if we assume that Suniga’s claims fall within the
    Cockerham exception, they fail to meet the requirements for relief.
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984), establishes that Suniga’s
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim can only succeed if his counsel’s performance
    fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and he suffered prejudice as a
    result. 
    Id. at 687-88,
    694. Suniga offers no factual allegations indicating that his
    counsel’s performance in securing a plea agreement was objectively unreasonable or
    that there was a reasonable probability that the government or the court would have
    accepted any alternative proposal. See United States v. Boone, 
    62 F.3d 323
    , 327
    (10th Cir. 1995) (“Without any showing that . . . such plea would have been
    acceptable to the court, or that the resulting sentence would have been different than
    that imposed . . . all that the Defendant urges is speculation.”). He additionally
    claims the district court should have scheduled an evidentiary hearing, but we see no
    basis for concluding that such a hearing would have advanced his argument. Cf.
    United States v. Moya, 
    676 F.3d 1211
    , 1214 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Given the conclusory
    nature of Defendant’s allegations, the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing
    was not an abuse of discretion.”).
    -3-
    III
    We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. Suniga’s motion to proceed in
    forma pauperis is GRANTED.
    Entered for the Court
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    -4-