Laidley v. City and County of Denver , 477 F. App'x 522 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 25, 2012
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
NATHAN ANDREW LAIDLEY, on
his own behalf and on behalf of a class
of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 11-1339
v.
(D.C. No. 1:10-CV-03140-WDM-
BNB)
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, a
(D. Colo.)
Colorado municipal corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, GORSUCH, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
After citing Nathan Laidley for driving without a license, a Denver police
officer arranged to have his car towed in accord with Section 54-811 of the city’s
municipal code. Although Mr. Laidley doesn’t know what happened to his car, he
claims he never received it back and presumes it was forfeited. He notes that at
the time of his traffic stop Section 54-813(c) of the municipal code (since
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
repealed) required the owners of certain impounded vehicles to pay a $2,500 bond
or face the prospect of having them auctioned off with the city keeping the
proceeds.
Eventually Mr. Laidley brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against
Denver, arguing that the city violated his Fourth Amendment rights by towing his
car and his Fourteenth Amendment rights by forfeiting it. At summary judgment,
the district court held that the towing of Mr. Laidley’s car was a valid Fourth
Amendment seizure under the “community caretaking” doctrine but declined to
assess whether a Fourteenth Amendment violation occurred after the
impoundment. It declined to do so because, it said, Mr. Laidley had not provided
sufficient evidence that his car was, in fact, auctioned off.
We agree with the district court’s analysis of Mr. Laidley’s Fourth
Amendment claim. Under the community caretaking doctrine, police officers may
“seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public
safety and convenience.” See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69
(1976). It follows that officers, at least sometimes, will be justified in towing
cars after citing someone for driving without a license. After all, a cited driver
can’t expect to continue to drive his car without a license, and often it will be
unreasonable to leave the car at the site of the traffic stop. Of course, there may
be some situations in which towing won’t qualify as a reasonable seizure under
the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 353-54 (7th
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Cir. 1996) (holding that the community caretaking doctrine doesn’t apply where
the owner can “provide for the speedy and efficient removal of the car.”). But
Mr. Laidley nowhere argues or provides any evidence suggesting that the towing
of his car was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances in his case.
Instead, he claims that the officers involved weren’t motivated by
community caretaking concerns and that they instead towed his car for the
purpose of forfeiting it and securing auction proceeds for the city. Opening Br. at
19; Reply Br. at 2. But this is insufficient to establish a Fourth Amendment
violation. “An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of
the individual officer’s state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify the action. The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant.”
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (quotation and alteration
omitted). Mr. Laidley’s failure to argue that the towing of his car was not
objectively justified under the community caretaking doctrine (whatever any
officer’s actual motivations happened to be) unavoidably spells the end to his
Fourth Amendment claim.
That leaves us with Mr. Laidley’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process challenge to the forfeiture of his car under Section 54-813(c). Mr.
Laidley objects to the district court’s conclusion that he failed to produce
evidence his car was auctioned off. He notes that his complaint alleged that
Denver police “convert[ed]” his car and he argues that this should have been
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enough. Alternatively, he claims, he should have been permitted at least the
chance to amend his complaint to add further factual detail.
But even assuming Mr. Laidley is right and the district court erred in
faulting him for failing to supply more evidence that his car was auctioned off,
we must still affirm on a separate ground fully briefed before the district court.
We must because, even accepting Mr. Laidley’s allegation that his car was
forfeited, he has still failed to state a claim as a matter of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
As his counsel clarified at oral argument, Mr. Laidley is not challenging
Section 54-813(c) as invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, he argues
that we should hold the forfeiture ordinance invalid as a matter of state law and
then proceed to hold that the officers’ decision to enforce what (later) turned out
to be an invalid ordinance under state law violated his federal substantive due
process rights. To prevail on this theory, a theory challenging executive action,
Mr. Laidley must demonstrate that the forfeiture of his car “shocks the
conscience.” See Dias v. City & County of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1182 (10th
Cir. 2009) (distinguishing between executive and legislative actions for the
purpose of substantive due process analysis); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 847 & n.8 (1998).
And this he has failed to do. As best we can discern, Mr. Laidley proceeds
on the assumption that the enforcement of a municipal ordinance invalid under
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state law (though not yet held to be so) must automatically and necessarily
constitute a conscience-shocking violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J. at 6 (“Some Fourteenth
Amendment [cases] . . . require that a court’s conscience be ‘shocked’ before a
substantive due process claim will be permitted. Assuming the requirement
applies . . . it is met - where the Complaint alleges a scheme by the City to snatch
and forfeit citizens’ cars without legal authority [under state law] to do so.”). But
that assumption is simply in error. Even clear violations of state law do not
automatically or necessarily rise to the level of substantive due process violations.
A great deal more is required. As the Supreme Court has explained, substantive
due process is not “a font of tort law” supplanting or duplicating state law but is
reserved for “patently egregious” conduct. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848, 850 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Rector v. City & County of Denver, 348 F.3d
935, 947-48 (10th Cir. 2003) (allegation that a municipal ordinance violates state
law, “[e]ven if true,” does not automatically “amount to a violation of federal due
process protections”). And Mr. Laidley has not shown that the facts of his case,
even if they amount to a violation of state law, meet the Constitution’s much
higher standard.
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Affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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