United States v. Henry ( 2017 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 3, 2017
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
No. 15-6181
TREMALE ODALE HENRY,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
Before PHILLIPS and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. *
This matter is before us on the Petition for Panel Rehearing filed by the
appellee. We also have a response from the appellant. Upon careful consideration
*
The Honorable Neil Gorsuch considered this appeal originally and
authored our opinion issued October 25, 2016. Judge Gorsuch did not, however,
participate in the issuance of this order on the appellee’s petition for panel
rehearing. The practice of this court permits the remaining two panel judges, if in
agreement, to act as a quorum in resolving the appellee’s petition for panel
rehearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); see also United States v. Wiles, 106 F.3d 1516,
1516, n* (10th Cir. 1997) (noting this court allows remaining panel judges to act
as a quorum to resolve an appeal); Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 35 F.3d
45, 48 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1082 (1995) (remaining two judges
of original three judge panel may decide petition for rehearing without third
judge).
of the petition and the response, the appellee’s request for panel rehearing is
granted, but solely for the purposes of adding the following footnote to the last
sentence of the opinion issued on October 25, 2016.
In a petition for panel rehearing filed after we issued our decision, the
government attempts yet another harmless error argument. Here the
government accepts that the district court erred in finding a second
independent probation violation at the (so-called) “guilt” phase of the
revocation proceedings without first engaging the Jones test. But it claims
this error was harmless because the district court would have been free
under United States v. Ruby, 706 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2013), to
consider hearsay evidence about any “bad acts” of any sort at the
“sentencing” phase of its revocation proceedings without addressing the
Jones test. However that may be, though, this particular argument never
found its way to us until the petition for panel rehearing so it has been
forfeited. United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1264 n.16 (10th Cir.
1999)). Further and even on its own terms, the argument doesn’t quite
satisfy. For even if the district court could have considered hearsay
evidence about the second assault at the “sentencing phase” without first
engaging the Jones test, that’s not what happened here. The district court
used the second assault to find a second independent supervised release
violation at the “guilt” phase of the revocation proceedings. And short of
speculation we just cannot be sure what impact the district court’s finding
of a second and independent probation violation at the “guilt” phase had on
its “sentencing” decision. Maybe in the district judge’s mind nothing
turned on whether the evidence surrounding the assault formally amounted
to a second, independent violation instead of just more “bad acts”; but
maybe it did. After all, district courts not infrequently cite the existence of
multiple, independent supervised release violations (not just the “bad acts”
underlying them) as factors influencing their sentencing decisions. See,
e.g., United States v. Fulton, 567 F. App’x 668, 673 (10th Cir. 2014);
United States v. Keller, 372 F. App’x 883, 889 (10th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Hooks, 368 F. App’x 885, 888 (10th Cir. 2010). Neither is
harmless error doctrine license for rank speculation. When it comes to the
loss of liberty, it is better to know on remand than guess on appeal.
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The Clerk of Court is directed to (1) add the foregoing footnote to the end
of the last sentence of our October 25, 2016 opinion; and (2) reissue that opinion
as of the date of this order.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
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