United States v. Pena-Ramirez , 468 F. App'x 888 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT May 29, 2012
___________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 11-1517
JUAN PENA-RAMIREZ, (D.C. No. 1:11-CR-00105-JLK-1)
(D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
____________________________________
Before ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judge.**
____________________________________
Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 50
grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A)(viii) & 846. This offense carries a statutory minimum of 120 months.
Id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). For sentencing purposes, the district court calculated
Defendant’s base offense level as 32. The district court added two levels because
Defendant used a firearm during the offense and another two levels because Defendant
attempted to obstruct justice, resulting in an offense level of 36. The district court
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the parties’ briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
subtracted three levels based on Defendant’s acceptance of responsibility. The district
court denied the Government’s 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) motion for a variance below the
statutory minimum, but granted the Government’s motion for a downward departure of
four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (2011).1 This resulted in a final offense level of
29. Based on a criminal history category of I, the applicable Guidelines range for an
offense level of 29 is 87 to 108 months. Without the departure under § 5K1.1, the
offense level would have been 33, with an applicable range of 135 to 168 months. Before
imposing Defendant’s sentence, the district court considered the 3553(a) factors and
noted Defendant’s “perseverant disregard for the law,” “the several drug transactions . . .
[when the] defendant [was] armed with lethal weapons . . . including automatic and
semiautomatic firearms,” and “[the defendant’s] anti-social mindset utterly lacking in
moral awareness.” Rec. vol. 2, at 28. The court further noted Defendant showed “no
suggestion of remorse, only regret for getting caught,” and that his “prospects for
recidivistic behavior are nearly certain” based on his “repeated drug sales, repeated
1
Our circuit’s nomenclature regarding “departure” and “variance” has at times
been inconsistent. We have clarified, however, that
when a court reaches a sentence above or below the recommended
Guidelines range through application of Chapters Four or Five of the
Sentencing Guidelines, the resulting increase or decrease is referred to as a
‘departure.’ When a court enhances or detracts from the recommended
range through application of § 3553(a) factors, however, the increase or
decrease is called a ‘variance.’
United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1101 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) overruled in
part on other grounds by Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008). A decision to
impose a sentence below the statutory minimum is also properly labeled a “variance.”
Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1245–46 n. 12 (2011).
-2-
illegal entries, and indifference to the truth . . . .” Id. at 28, 29. Based on these factors,
the district court sentenced Defendant to the statutory minimum of 120 months. On
appeal, Defendant argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Exercising
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, we affirm.
I.
Defendant only challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We
review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “A district court
abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical,
or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir.
2009) (internal quotations omitted). “Substantive reasonableness involves whether the
length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1169
(10th Cir. 2007). As we stated in Conlan,
[A] district court’s job is not to impose a reasonable sentence. Rather, a
district court’s mandate is to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
Reasonableness is the appellate standard of review in judging whether a
district court has accomplished its task.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
We first clarify the appropriate calculation of the Guidelines range. Both the
district court and the parties mistakenly identified the applicable Guidelines range as
87 to 108 months. They failed to account for the effect of the statutory minimum on the
Guidelines. “Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the
-3-
maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence
shall be the guideline sentence.” U.S.S.G § 5G1.1(b) (emphasis added). The Guidelines’
commentary provides further clarity: “If the applicable guideline range is 41–51 months
and there is a statutorily required minimum sentence of 60 months, the sentence required
by the guidelines under subsection (b) is 60 months; a sentence of more than 60 months
would be a guideline departure.” § 5G1.1 cmt. Therefore, the applicable range for
Defendant was not 87 to 108 months, but 120 months. We now address Defendant’s
arguments in light of the applicable Guidelines range.
A.
Defendant first argues the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence when it
“refused to downward depart . . . without any reference to the defendant’s substantial
assistance” and “wholly ignored his cooperation with and assistance to the
Government . . . .” Aplt. Br. at 12, 13. That is, he appears to argue the district court
failed to account for his substantial assistance because it denied the Government’s motion
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). We address in turn the district court’s decisions with respect
to the Government’s motions under § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e).
As noted, the Guidelines range was not 87 to 108 months after the court granted
the § 5K1.1 motion. A motion under § 5K1.1 does not authorize a district court to depart
downward from a statutory minimum because a 5K1.1 departure can only affect the
Guidelines range. Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 127 (1996). Because the
correct calculation of the Guidelines range after the § 5K1.1 departure was the same as
the statutory minimum, by operation of § 5G1.1(b), the district court imposed the lowest
-4-
sentence allowed by the Guidelines. Furthermore, Defendant did in fact receive a lower
sentence as a result of his substantial assistance. The § 5K1.1 departure decreased
Defendant’s applicable range from 135–168 months to the statutory minimum of 120
months. Therefore, the court did consider Defendant’s substantial assistance when it
granted the § 5K1.1 departure and imposed the statutory minimum. Defendant’s
argument to the contrary is demonstrably false.
Regarding the district court’s denial of the Government’s 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
motion, a district court has discretion whether to grant or deny a motion under § 3553(e).
United States v. Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 746 (10th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1577–78 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court did not
err when it granted a § 5K1.1 motion but denied a § 3553(e) motion). The district court
could have denied both of the Government’s motions. United States v. Ollson, 413 F.3d
1119, 1120 (10th Cir. 2005); Horn, 946 F.2d at 746. Yet, the district court took
Defendant’s substantial assistance into account by granting the Government’s motion for
a downward departure pursuant to § 5K1.1. The court simply chose, in its discretion, not
to vary below the statutory minimum pursuant to § 3553(e), but instead to impose the
statutory minimum. That a district court granted a requested § 5K1.1 departure and
denied a requested § 3553(e) variance does not show a sentence is unreasonable.
In reviewing the reasonableness of Defendant’s sentence, we must consider the
grounds for a requested departure or variance. See United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 444
F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2006). Defendant argues his sentence is unreasonable in light
-5-
of his substantial assistance to the Government. The Government’s motion for a
downward variance pursuant to § 3553(e) said:
While the government believes the information provided by the defendant
during his proffer interview was complete and truthful, agents were not
able to pursue many of the avenues of investigation provided by the
defendant, as he had alerted others of the federal investigation after
initially meeting with agents at the Jefferson County Jail but prior to his
formal proffer interview.
Rec. vol. 1, at 58 (emphasis added). Although the record does not reflect the district
court’s reasoning for denying the Government’s § 3553(e) motion, the district court could
have easily considered the extent of Defendant’s assistance in denying the Government’s
motion for a variance below the Guidelines. Such consideration was proper and does not
result in a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.
B.
Defendant’s second argument is that “any . . . factors [in § 3553(a)] the trial court
relied on in calculating his sentence should have been weighed against those factors in
the defendant’s favor, i.e., acceptance of responsibility and substantial assistance.” Aplt.
Br. at 13. As best we can tell, Defendant is arguing that his substantial assistance and his
acceptance of responsibility should have been included in the district court’s balancing of
the § 3553(a) factors. Section 3553(a) lists exclusive factors to be considered in imposing
a sentence, none of which expressly or impliedly reference “substantial assistance” or
“acceptance of responsibility.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Furthermore, Tenth Circuit
precedent reflects separate analyses for a variance under § 3553(e) and determining an
appropriate sentence under § 3553(a). See, e.g., United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275,
-6-
1286–87 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing different analytical steps for a § 3553(e) variance
and a § 3553(a) variance). The record shows the district court properly considered the §
3553(e) motion separate from the § 3553(a) factors. Even if the district court could
consider Defendant’s substantial assistance and acceptance of responsibility as part of the
§ 3553(a) factors, § 3553(a) does not authorize a district court to vary below the statutory
minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (providing authority to depart from the statutory
minimum under only § 3553(e) and (f)); see also United States v. Altamirano-Quintero,
511 F.3d 1087, 1089–90 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting the defendant had “two means available
to him to avoid” a mandatory minimum sentence through § 3553(e) and (f)); United
States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2004) (“These two narrow exceptions [in
§ 3553(e) and (f)] are the only authority a district court has to depart below a mandatory
minimum sentence . . . .”). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
applying separate analyses for a variance under § 3553(a) and a variance under § 3553(e).
Reasonableness of a sentence focuses on the district court’s consideration of the
factors in § 3553(a). Conlan, 500 F.3d at 1169. The district court considered the 3553(a)
factors in citing Defendant’s “perseverant disregard for the law,” “the several drug
transactions . . . [when the] defendant [was] armed with lethal weapons . . . including
automatic and semiautomatic firearms,” “[the defendant’s] anti-social mindset utterly
lacking in moral awareness,” that Defendant showed “no suggestion of remorse, only
regret for getting caught,” and that his “prospects for recidivistic behavior are nearly
certain” based on his “repeated drug sales, repeated illegal entries, and indifference to the
truth . . . .” Rec. vol. 2, at 28, 29. Based on these § 3553(a) factors, the district court was
-7-
justified in imposing the statutory minimum sentence. Accordingly, Defendant’s
sentence was substantively reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
United States Circuit Judge
-8-