United States v. Garcia ( 2018 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 12, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 18-2025
(D.C. No. 1:17-CR-02242-RJ-1)
LUCIANO GARCIA, (D. N.M.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before McHUGH, MORITZ, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Luciano Garcia appeals his 135-month sentence for possessing with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Exercising jurisdiction under
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Garcia was arrested in August 2017 after he and two associates attempted to sell
two pounds of methamphetamine to a confidential source who had been in contact with
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
the Drug Enforcement Administration. Garcia pled guilty and accepted responsibility for
his crime.
A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR) and
calculated a sentencing Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months. That range reflected a
total offense level of 33 (a base offense level of 34; a two-level firearm enhancement; and
a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility) and a category III criminal
history (based on convictions dating from 2002 for, among other things, drug trafficking,
heroin possession, and drug-paraphernalia possession). The probation officer further
stated that a “downward variance outside the advisory guideline range may be warranted”
based on a consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors1 and Garcia’s
traumatic upbringing, health issues, and drug dependency. R., Vol. II at 28.
In line with that recommendation, Garcia argued in his presentencing
memorandum that “[t]he factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7) support a variance
and a sentence of one hundred twenty . . . months.” Id., Vol. I at 19. He also objected to
the firearm enhancement, stating he was unaware that one of his co-defendants had
brought a gun to the transaction.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court first sustained Garcia’s objection to
the firearm enhancement, bringing the applicable sentencing range down to 135 to 168
1
Those factors include: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the
defendant’s history and characteristics; the need to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment; deterrence;
incapacitation; the need to provide training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment; the sentencing range and any pertinent policy statements; and the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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months. The district court next turned to the PSR, “find[ing] [it] accurate and correct,
with the exception of the [firearm enhancement].” Id., Vol. III at 10.
The court then heard arguments from counsel concerning a downward variance.
Defense counsel reiterated that Garcia had “a very difficult childhood,” suffered from “an
opiate addiction,” and that “most importantly of all the [§] 3553(a) factors, at least as a
concern to my client’s history and characteristics, my client suffers from very poor
health.” Id. at 12-14. Defense counsel then concluded:
So when you look at the arc of Mr. Garcia’s life from his childhood,
getting through high school, and getting involved in the criminal justice
system, it’s a striking story, but I don’t believe it’s a typical story. I believe
Mr. Garcia’s case does fall out of the heartland of cases, if we want to use
the old nomenclature of the Guidelines. But I guess the question for the
Court this morning is what is sufficient, but not greater than necessary.
Assuming we’re starting from the range of 135 to 168 months, I’d ask the
Court to vary downward to 120 months. That would be the statutory
minimum that my client’s facing. And I think under any metric, 120
months is a significant sentence. It’s far, far greater than any sentence my
client has ever received. It certainly has a significant deterrent value. It
significantly aids in the protection of the public and promotes respect for
the law. Any additional time beyond that 120 months really isn’t going to
appreciably promote any of the other goals of sentencing to justify that
additional time. Whether it’s 135, 168, or even the 210 months that [the
prosecutor] had advocated for in his writings.
Id. at 14-15.
The prosecutor responded by “recommen[ding] the high-end sentence of 168
months for all the reasons that were incorporated into the United States’ Sentencing
Memorandum.” Id. at 16. In that document, the government urged the Court to consider
the § 3553(a) factors. In particular, the prosecutor argued that Garcia was an experienced
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drug trafficker who had not been dissuaded from criminality by a prior three-year prison
sentence:
Defendant’s extensive criminal history and dangerous multiple-
pound-level drug trafficking in this case merit a very substantial sentence.
Defendant’s prior multiple-year sentence for trafficking less than two
ounces of crack cocaine has clearly done nothing to dissuade him from
escalating his criminal behavior beyond ounce-level trafficking to
multiple-pound level transactions. Defendant has shown by his continued
criminal conduct that he requires much more severe punishment to deter
future drug trafficking behavior.
In addition to escalating the size and monetary value of his drug
trafficking, Defendant has escalated his behavior to include counter-
espionage, security details (or “backup”), and firearms. Groups of
offenders, operating in the community using clandestine meetings,
defended by firearms, are exactly the sort of thing that disrupts the peace
and tranquility of local communities. For those reasons, the United States
respectfully submits that a sentence that would be sufficient to deter this
Defendant[’]s escalating pattern of criminal behavior, to safeguard the
community, and to promote respect for the law, would be a sentence at the
high end of his advisory guidelines[.]
Id., Vol. I at 32-33.
The court then denied a variance and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the
applicable sentencing range, stating:
I’m not departing from the recommended sentence. Pursuant to the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which I have considered in an advisory
capacity, and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 United States Code
Section 3553(a), which I have considered in light of the original sentence
and I do find the Guideline range to be fair and reasonable, the following
sentence is imposed. Luciano Garcia is placed into custody in the U.S.
Bureau of Prisons to serve a term of imprisonment of 135 months.
Id., Vol. III at 17. The court concluded the hearing by addressing various administrative
matters, including the particular correctional facility where Garcia would serve his
sentence and the terms of supervised release. In doing so, the court directed that while in
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prison, Garcia should “get medical treatment,” undergo counseling for mental-health and
anger-management issues, and participate in a drug-treatment program. Id. at 17.
Further, because the court was “concerned about [Garcia’s] use of prescription
medication as set forth in [the] [PSR],” id. at 18, the court ordered that upon Garcia’s
release, he would be required to notify his probation officer of any prescription-
medication use. Despite being offered an opportunity for further comment, defense
counsel raised no further objections or concerns.
Garcia now appeals, arguing that his sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards of Review
We review sentences for reasonableness—“a two-step process comprising a
procedural and a substantive component.” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301,
1307 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Procedural reasonableness addresses whether the district court
incorrectly calculated or failed to calculate the Guidelines sentence, treated
the Guidelines as mandatory, failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors, relied
on clearly erroneous facts, or failed to adequately explain the sentence.
Substantive reasonableness review broadly looks to whether the district
court abused its discretion in weighing permissible § 3553(a) factors in
light of the totality of the circumstances.
United States v. Vigil, 696 F.3d 997, 1001-02 (10th Cir. 2012) (brackets, citation, and
internal quotation marks omitted).
“[W]hile a defendant need not object after pronouncement of sentence based on
substantive reasonableness,” United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir.
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2007), to preserve a procedural error at sentencing, he “must specifically object to the
district court’s procedure,” United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir.
2008). In the absence of a necessary objection, we will review only for plain error, which
requires “(1) error, (2) that is plain, [that] (3) affects substantial rights, and [that]
(4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
United States v. Wireman, 849 F.3d 956, 962 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see, e.g., id. at 961 (declining to apply de novo review where the defendant, like
Garcia, had “submitt[ed] [a] memorandum for a downward variance,” because “even if a
district court is fully apprised of a defendant’s arguments for a below-Guidelines
sentence, the defendant must still contemporaneously object in the district court to the
method by which the district court arrived at a sentence, including arguments that the
sentencing court failed to explain adequately the sentence imposed, if he or she hopes to
avoid plain error review on appeal of any alleged procedural flaw” (emphasis and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
II. Procedural Reasonableness
Garcia advances two procedural challenges to his sentence: (1) the district court
erroneously treated the Guidelines as mandatory; and (2) the district court inadequately
explained its sentence. Because Garcia failed to object after the district court announced
his sentence, we review only for plain error.
A. Guidelines—Advisory versus Mandatory
Garcia argues that the district court impermissibly treated the Guidelines as
mandatory by finding that the 135-to-168 month range was “fair and reasonable,” R.,
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Vol. III at 17. Granted, a district court commits error by applying a “presumption of
reasonableness to the advisory guidelines when sentencing.” United States v. Conlan,
500 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2007). But the district court here did no such thing.
Rather, the district court specifically justified its within-Guidelines sentence based on a
consideration of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the advisory nature of the
Guidelines.2 Because that dual consideration ultimately led the district court to find the
Guidelines sentence “fair and reasonable,” the court did not apply a presumption of
reasonableness.
Nevertheless, Garcia suggests that a reasonableness presumption is inherent in any
district court sentence not “arrived at . . . in a manner that is truly independent of the
Guidelines.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 11. That suggestion is simply untenable. As the
Supreme Court has explained, a Guidelines sentence is “the starting point and the initial
benchmark” against which a district court must “consider all of the § 3553(a) factors.”
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007). Indeed, “[f]ederal [district] courts
understand that they must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant
2
When the district court referenced the “Sentencing Reform Act,” rather than the
Guidelines themselves, as being advisory, the court clearly misspoke. The Sentencing
Reform Act established the Sentencing Commission and directed it to promulgate
sentencing guidelines. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1989). The
Supreme Court later rendered those guidelines advisory by invalidating certain provisions
of the Sentencing Reform Act. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
Despite the district court’s imprecise statement, the court clearly understood that it wasn’t
required to issue a sentence within the guideline range.
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of them throughout the sentencing process.” Molina-Martinez v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Explanation of the Sentence
Next, Garcia complains that the district court “failed to address [his] principal
sentencing argument that a variance was warranted to offset an upbringing and its
consequences that were outside of his control.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 15. This complaint
appears to have two components—a failure to acknowledge that “a variance was
possible” and a “fail[ure] to explain why . . . a non-frivolous argument for a downward
variance” was denied. Id. at 17, 18. As we explain below, both components lack merit.
We turn to the record to determine whether the district court acknowledged the
possibility of a variance from the Guidelines range. During the sentencing hearing, the
district court expressly entertained arguments concerning Garcia’s request for a variance,
and the court specifically denied the request, explaining that it had considered the
§ 3553(a) factors and found that a sentence within the Guidelines range was fair and
reasonable. Further, when addressing the terms of Garcia’s incarceration and supervised
release, the district court referenced his poor health and drug addiction—conditions that
Garcia had asserted in support of a variance. Quite simply, the record on appeal belies
Garcia’s assertion that the district court “utter[ly] fail[ed] to consider [his variance]
argument,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 13.
As for the cursory nature of the denial, we note that where, as here, “a district
court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, the court must provide only a general
statement of its reasons, and need not explicitly refer to either the § 3553(a) factors or
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respond to every argument for leniency that it rejects in arriving at a reasonable
sentence.” United States v. Lente, 647 F.3d 1021, 1034 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In particular, “[t]he sentencing court . . . is not required to
consider individually each factor listed in § 3553(a), nor is it required to recite any magic
words to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors.” United
States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 808 (10th Cir. 2010).
In this regard, we find our decision in United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d
1196 (10th Cir. 2007) instructive. There, the district court denied the defendant’s request
for a variance without “specifically address[ing] the [§] 3553(a) arguments [he] pursued
in his [sentencing] brief or at oral argument.” Id. at 1199. Instead, the district court
merely
stated that it had reviewed the [PSR’s] factual findings[;] considered the
guideline applications, and the factors set forth in . . . [§] 3553(a)(1)
through (7); [and] . . . noted that the defendant reentered the United States
subsequent to being convicted of an aggravated felony, and its belief that
the sentence advised by the Guidelines was reasonable.
Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant didn’t object to the
district court’s cursory explanation. On appeal, we reviewed for plain error and found
“no error at all,” given that a district court need not “specific[ally] expla[in] . . . a
sentence falling within the Guidelines range.” Id. at 1199, 1201.
Here, as in Ruiz-Terrazas, the district court indicated that it had reviewed the PSR,
considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and found the Guidelines range to be
reasonable. While “a more detailed sentencing explanation” might have been desirable,
id. at 1202, it wasn’t required. See Wireman, 849 F.3d at 958-59 (observing that “if the
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defendant’s sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range, the district court may
satisfy its obligation to explain its reasons for rejecting the defendant’s arguments for a
below-Guidelines sentence by entertaining the defendant’s arguments, and then somehow
indicating that it did not rest on the guidelines alone, but considered whether the
guideline sentence actually conforms, in the circumstances, to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
statutory factors” (brackets, citation, emphasis, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Garcia’s reliance on United States v. Rose, 185 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 1999), is
misplaced. Rose involved “the district court[’s] fail[ure] to state on the record its reason
for imposing consecutive sentences.” Id. at 1112 (emphasis added). Rose didn’t address
the explanation necessary for imposing a within-Guidelines sentence. That distinction is
critical, because different levels of specificity are required for explaining sentences that
fall within the Guidelines range versus sentences that fall outside that range. See Ruiz-
Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1199-1200 (observing that within-Guidelines sentences require
“only a general statement” of reasons, whereas sentences outside the Guidelines require
“reasons . . . stated with specificity” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)).3
3
Garcia also claims that United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2007),
and United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2006), require a more
detailed sentencing explanation whenever a defendant requests a downward variance.
But this court distinguished both of those cases in Ruiz-Terrazas while pointing out
that the salient feature guiding a sentencing court’s explanation is whether the court
imposes a within-Guidelines sentence. See Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1200 (noting
that in Hall the sentencing court “depart[ed] by more than 30% from [the] Guidelines
range”); id. at 1202-03 (noting that “the problem in Sanchez-Juarez was that (i) there
was no indication by the district court that it had considered the [§] 3553(a) factors,
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We acknowledge that the PSR stated that a downward variance from the
Guidelines range might be warranted. But a PSR isn’t binding on the district court.
United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 1990). Indeed, “[t]he [PSR]
explains the basis for the Probation Office’s calculations and sets out the sentencing
options under the applicable statutes and Guidelines.” Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at
1342. Garcia doesn’t cite, and we haven’t independently found, any authority requiring a
more detailed sentencing explanation when the district court declines to follow a PSR’s
suggestion.
In any event, even if the district court erred by not providing a more detailed
explanation for Garcia’s sentence, the remaining plain-error requirements are beyond his
reach. First, given the similar sentencing explanation approved in Ruiz-Terrazas, we
can’t say that any error the district court might have committed in this case was plain.
See United States v. Wolfname, 835 F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that
“[a]n error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current, well-settled law” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Second, even if there was error, and that error was plain, Garcia’s substantial
rights wouldn’t have been affected, because there is no “reasonable probability that, but
for the error claimed, the result of the [sentencing] proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, despite “the
perceived inadequacy of the district court’s recitation of its reasons, the district court’s
and (ii) we were otherwise unable ourselves to discern a clear explanation of the
sentence in the record” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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sentencing decision was amply supported by evidence the government proffered at
sentencing.” United States v. Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 2009).
Contrary to defense counsel’s sentencing-hearing assertion that a variance down to 120
months would have “deterrent value” and “aid[ ] in the protection of the public,” R., Vol.
III at 14, the government in its sentencing memorandum noted that (1) Garcia had an
extensive criminal history; (2) Garcia’s prior prison sentence for drug trafficking had no
deterrent effect; and (3) Garcia had in this case employed tactics of a dangerous drug
trafficker. While defense counsel stressed Garcia’s health problems and difficult
childhood as reasons for a variance, we can’t say that, but for the district court’s claimed
error in cursorily explaining the need for a within-Guidelines sentence, Garcia’s sentence
would have been any different. Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d at 1295; see, e.g., Ruiz-
Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1203 (concluding that district court’s failure to provide a more
detailed explanation of its reasons for denying a downward variance “did not affect [the
defendant’s] substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings,” given evidence supporting the within-Guidelines sentence).
Garcia has not shown reversible error in the district court’s explanation of his
sentence.
III. Substantive Reasonableness
Garcia next asserts a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.
Substantive review of a sentence focuses on “whether the length of the sentence is
reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a),” United States v. Craig, 808 F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal
12
quotation marks omitted). Yet in asserting this challenge, Garcia continues to attack his
sentence as inadequately explained—a challenge we reject above.
Nevertheless, Garcia also argues that “nothing in the record shows why 135
months is the least punishment possible to achieve the goals of sentencing.” Aplt.
Opening Br. at 28. That argument, however, misapprehends the nature of substantive-
reasonableness review. On appeal, we presume that Garcia’s “within-guidelines sentence
is . . . reasonable.” United States v. Harry, 816 F.3d 1268, 1284 (10th Cir. 2016). He
bears “the burden of rebutting the presumption,” id., by “showing that the § 3553(a)
factors justify a lower sentence,” United States v. Haley, 529 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir.
2008).
Regarding the § 3553(a) factors, Garcia mentions “the traumatic impact of his
upbringing,” his need for “addiction and mental health treatment,” and his “getting a high
school diploma despite the adversities,” as well as the “mitigating evidence” and “the
context within which the offense took place.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 28. But Garcia
notably fails to recognize the existence of other compelling circumstances justifying a
longer sentence, including Garcia’s history of criminality, his failure to be deterred by a
prior prison sentence, and his use of experienced drug-trafficking tactics. On this record,
Garcia fails to rebut the presumption that his within guideline sentence was substantively
reasonable. See United States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910, 915 (10th Cir. 2018) (“We will
reverse only if the sentence imposed was arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly
unreasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm Garcia’s sentence.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
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