Calbart v. Sauer ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 6, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ERNIE CALBART, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 12-1157
(D.C. No. 1:11-CV-01026-LTB-CBS)
DENVER SHERIFF CAPT. SAUER; (D. Colo.)
DENVER SHERIFF SANTANGELO;
DENVER SHERIFF PACHCO;
DENVER SHERIFF ESPINOZA,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before GORSUCH, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Ernie Calbart, Sr., appeals pro se from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants on his civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Background
Calbart’s claims related to events occurring on February 20 and 21, 2011,
while he was a pre-trial detainee at the Denver Detention Center. In his amended
complaint, he alleged that defendants, all of whom are Denver Deputy Sheriffs,
violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to protect
him from an attack by another inmate. Calbart alleged that he was threatened by two
other inmates on February 20. He reported the threat and received a grievance form,
which he submitted, asking to be moved to a cell in a different pod. The next day,
February 21, Calbart met with defendants with regard to the threat and he again asked
to be moved to a different pod. Defendant Santangelo referred him to the officer in
charge of moving inmates (who is not a defendant in this action). Calbart alleged
that defendants Espinoza and Pachco went off duty on February 21, without
informing the deputies who relieved them that the two inmates had threatened
Calbart. He alleged that his cell door was opened at 4:00 p.m. that day so he could
go to an appointment. The two inmates who had threatened him were in the pod, and
one of them attacked him.
In claim one of his amended complaint, Calbart alleged that defendants
violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights because they were aware that the two
inmates had threatened him. His second claim alleged that defendant Sauer violated
his Eighth Amendment rights because Sauer had the power to move him to a different
pod as soon as possible, but failed to do so after becoming aware of the threats.
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Defendants moved to dismiss Calbart’s amended complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“PLRA”). They
argued alternatively that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants
attached exhibits to their motion, and they noted that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion could be
treated as a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 if matters outside
of the pleading were presented to and considered by the court. Calbart did not object
that defendants’ motion referenced materials outside of the amended complaint.
Instead, he attached an affidavit and over thirty pages of exhibits to his response to
the motion.
A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (R&R) on defendants’
motion. He initially determined that the motion to dismiss should be converted into a
motion for summary judgment because the parties had relied on documents not
attached to or incorporated into the amended complaint. After reviewing the
evidence the parties submitted regarding Calbart’s grievances, the magistrate judge
concluded that Calbart failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as outlined in the
Denver Sheriff Department Inmate Handbook (“Inmate Handbook”). He also
determined that Calbart failed to establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim
because he did not allege more than a de minimus injury and there was no evidence
that his injury resulted from defendants’ deliberate indifference. The R&R therefore
recommended that defendants be granted summary judgment on Calbart’s claims.
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Calbart simultaneously filed objections to the R&R and a motion for
permission to file an amended complaint. In his objections, he contended that the
magistrate judge abused his discretion by treating defendant’s motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment without first notifying the parties. As to his
exhaustion of administrative remedies, Calbart argued that defendants had hindered
his access to grievance forms. He also maintained that defendants had filed in the
district court an exhibit purporting to be a copy of one of his grievance forms, but
that the handwriting on that exhibit was not his. And he claimed that he had sent
letters to the Division Chief and Director of Corrections, but defendants had not
produced his letters and he had never received a response to them. Finally, Calbart
argued that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that his Eighth Amendment
claim failed because he alleged only a de minimus injury.
The district court denied Calbart’s motion for permission of file an amended
complaint. After reviewing the R&R de novo, the district court approved it and
granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Calbart filed a timely notice of
appeal.
II. Discussion
Calbart argues on appeal that the district court (1) abused its discretion in
converting defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment;
(2) abused its discretion in granting defendants summary judgment on their
failure-to-exhaust defense without stating the bases for its decision; (3) erred in
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concluding that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (4) erred in
concluding his Eighth Amendment claim failed because he suffered only a
de minimus injury; and (5) abused its discretion in denying him leave to further
amend his amended complaint.
A. Conversion of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss into a
Motion for Summary Judgment
Calbart contends that he did not receive adequate notice before the magistrate
judge treated defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a summary judgment motion under
Rule 56. “We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to consider
evidence beyond the pleadings and convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment.” Marquez v. Cable One, Inc., 463 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir.
2006) (quotation omitted).
Before treating a motion to dismiss as a summary judgment motion, a district
court must give notice to the parties “to prevent unfair surprise.” Wheeler v.
Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259 (10th Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted). But we have held
there is no unfair surprise when a party submits material beyond the pleadings in
support of or in opposition to a motion to dismiss because the party’s actions “put[]
[him] on notice that the judge may treat the motion as a Rule 56 motion.” Id. at 260.
Here, because all parties had submitted evidence outside of the amended complaint,
the magistrate judge determined that additional notice was not required before
treating defendants’ motion as a motion for summary judgment. The district court
agreed and therefore granted defendants summary judgment.
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Calbart argues that this reasoning should not apply to a pro se litigant. He
cites Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 1985), in which we
reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. In that case the
district court held that the plaintiff’s unsworn evidence was insufficient to oppose
summary judgment and also denied him a continuance in order to file affidavits. See
id. at 1139, 1140. We noted that the plaintiff’s evidence would have precluded a
grant of summary judgment on his claims if it had been submitted in the proper form,
see id. at 1139, and we cautioned that “[d]istrict courts must take care to insure that
pro se litigants are provided with proper notice regarding the complex procedural
issues involved in summary judgment proceedings,” id. at 1140 (quotation omitted).
Jaxon is distinguishable from this case. While the plaintiff in Jaxon was
tripped up by a highly technical requirement for the presentation of admissible
evidence, Calbart acknowledges that Rule 12(d) plainly states if “matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment.” We have “repeatedly insisted that pro se parties
follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby
Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Here, defendants not only submitted evidence outside of the amended complaint with
their Rule 12(b)(6) motion, they also alerted Calbart to the possibility that the court
might treat the motion as seeking summary judgment. He responded in kind with his
own evidence in opposition to the motion, which the magistrate judge admitted and
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thoroughly considered in the R&R. Calbart has not shown an abuse of discretion by
the district court in converting defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment without additional notice to the parties.1
B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory under the PLRA and
“unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Thomas v. Parker, 609 F.3d 1114,
1117 (10th Cir. 2010). “Because the prison’s procedural requirements define the
steps necessary for exhaustion, an inmate may only exhaust by properly following all
of the steps laid out in the prison system’s grievance procedure.” Little v. Jones,
607 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “An inmate who begins the
grievance process but does not complete it is barred from pursuing a § 1983 claim
under PLRA for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The doctrine of
1
We decline to consider Calbart’s additional contention that the district court
abused its discretion by not permitting him to commence discovery before
responding to defendants’ converted summary judgment motion. Calbart did not
make that argument in his objections to the magistrate judge’s R&R, and as he is
aware, “the failure to make timely objection waives appellate review of both factual
and legal questions.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010)
(ellipsis omitted). Calbart contends that his argument about lack of notice—which he
did make in his objections—can be liberally read to include an argument about a lack
of opportunity for discovery. We note that the R&R advised Calbart that his
objections must be specific in order to preserve an issue for appellate review.
Accordingly, we will not expand our liberal construction of his pro se objections to
include an argument he plainly did not make. Nor does Calbart make any effort to
demonstrate that the interests of justice support an exception to our firm waiver rule.
See id.-7-
substantial compliance does not apply.” Thomas, 609 F.3d at 1118 (citation,
quotations, and brackets omitted).
Calbart first contends that the district court abused its discretion in granting
summary judgment in favor of defendants on their affirmative defense of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. He maintains that the magistrate judge did not
recommend that summary judgment be granted on that basis and that defendants
failed to object to that aspect of the R&R. Calbart asserts that the district court
therefore erred by granting summary judgment on that ground without stating its
reasons for doing so. Calbart’s argument has no merit because the magistrate judge
did find that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, albeit with the
qualifying statement that “the facts are not entirely clear as to exhaustion.” R. at 187.
In the next sentence the magistrate judge stated that “the court also concludes” that
Calbart failed to establish a triable fact issue concerning his § 1983 claims, id., thus
confirming that the R&R recommended two independent bases for granting summary
judgment in defendants’ favor. Therefore, by approving the R&R, the district court
adequately stated its reasons for granting summary judgment on defendants’
failure-to-exhaust defense.
Construing his pro se appellate briefs liberally, see de Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d
1279, 1283 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007), Calbart also appears to challenge the district court’s
conclusion that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. “We review
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de novo the district court’s finding of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”
Thomas, 609 F.3d at 1117 (quotation omitted).
The magistrate judge found that the Inmate Handbook specifies a multi-step
grievance procedure. At Step One, the inmate delivers a signed grievance form
detailing the date and time of the incident, the act or condition giving rise to the
grievance, and the remedy requested. At Step Two the inmate writes a sealed letter
to the Division Chief stating the specific grievance, the previous steps taken, and all
previous answers received. And at Step Three the inmate writes a personal letter to
the Director of Corrections. At each step, the Inmate Handbook states that the
recipient of the grievance form or letter will provide a written response within ten
working days, and the Director’s response at Step Three is considered the final
resolution.
In opposition to the defendants’ motion, Calbart presented evidence of
numerous grievances he had submitted, but the magistrate judge found that only three
potentially related to his claims in the amended complaint. In grievance number
10 94020, Calbart described the events on February 20, 2011, when two inmates
threatened him. The relief he requested was to be moved to a cell in a different pod.
The grievance form notes that Calbart received a response on February 21 indicating
that no cells were available in the other pod. The magistrate found there was no
evidence that Calbart satisfied Steps Two or Three with respect to this grievance.
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Calbart submitted grievance number 10 94021 on February 22, 2011. After
referencing grievance number 10 94020, he stated further that a deputy sheriff (who
is not a defendant in this action) opened his cell door, and one of the inmates who
had threatened him walked over and attacked him. Calbart asserted in grievance
number 10 94021 that he was defending himself and following the rules. The relief
he requested was to be moved back to a cell in his former pod and that all charges
against him be dropped. Calbart stated in an affidavit that he did not receive a
response to grievance number 10 94021. He also presented a letter that he wrote to
Chief Diggans on March 14, 2011, appealing this grievance. But the magistrate
judge found that he failed to satisfy Step Three by writing a letter to the Director of
Corrections.
Finally, Calbart submitted grievance number 10 94330 on February 25, 2011,
which he characterized as an appeal of grievance number 10 94020. But the remedy
he sought in grievance number 10 94330 was to obtain access to a video tape of his
attack by the other inmate. The grievance form notes that a response was provided
the same day, indicating where Calbart could submit his request for the video tape.
Although Calbart’s March 14 letter also referenced grievance number 10 94330, the
magistrate judge construed it as appealing only grievance number 10 94021. Calbart
sent a letter to Director Wilson on April 1, 2011, reiterating his claim that he had
been attacked after putting defendants on notice of the other inmates’ threats. But he
referred only to grievance number 10 94330 and complained about the lack of a
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response to his request for a video tape of the attack. After reviewing all of the
evidence submitted by the parties, the magistrate judge concluded that Calbart failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Calbart contends that the administrative remedies were unavailable to him
because defendants interfered with his ability to access the necessary grievance
forms; therefore, the exhaustion requirement is inapplicable. See Little, 607 F.3d at
1250 (holding “PLRA only requires the exhaustion of ‘available’ administrative
remedies”). But Calbart’s contention is belied by the numerous grievance forms in
the record. Moreover, the magistrate judge found that he failed to satisfy Steps Two
and Three of the grievance process, which do not require the use of a grievance form.
Calbart argues further that he did satisfy those steps. But in support of this assertion
he points generally to his affidavit and the exhibits he submitted in response to
defendants’ motion. He therefore fails to address the magistrate judge’s reasons for
concluding that the letters he sent were insufficient to fully exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to any of the potentially relevant grievances.
Finally, Calbart claims that the exhibit defendants submitted in the district
court, purporting to be grievance number 10 94020, is not a true and accurate copy of
that grievance form. He asserts that defendants’ exhibit was handwritten by someone
other than him. In examining defendant’s exhibit, see R. at 64, as compared to
Calbart’s exhibit that he claims is a true copy of his grievance number 10 94020, see
id. at 134, there do appear to be differences in the handwriting and in some of the
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words written in the sections filled out by the inmate. But the substance of those
sections in the two documents is identical, and Calbart fails to explain how the
discrepancies he identifies could establish that he satisfied Steps Two and Three of
the grievance process by sending appropriate letters to the Division Chief and the
Director of Corrections.
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendants based on Calbart’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Accordingly, we need not address his contentions regarding the court’s alternative
ground for granting defendants summary judgment.
C. Denial of Motion to Amend Complaint
Calbart argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for permission to file a further amended complaint. His proposed amended
complaint would have added factual allegations regarding the nature of his injury, as
well as a claim that defendants “acted with a whimsical and cavalier attitude about
[the other inmates’ threats].” Id. at 233. In denying leave to amend, the district court
stated that “Plaintiff is not entitled to a second bite of the apple so as to dispute the
[R&R] at this late date.” Id. at 245. Calbart contends that the district court should
have granted his motion because his proposed amendments stated a claim for relief
and because he had not been given notice of the conversion of defendants’ motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. We have already addressed the latter
contention. And because Calbart’s proffered amended complaint would not cure his
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failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, he has not demonstrated that the
district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend. See Ketchum v. Cruz,
961 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of
motion to amend where amendment would be futile).
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. We GRANT Calbart’s
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but remind him of his continuing
obligation to make partial payments until the filing fee is paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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