Calbart v. Denver Sheriff Department , 505 F. App'x 703 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 10, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ERNIE CALBART,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v. No. 12-1156
(D.C. No. 1:10-CV-01385-LTB-CBS)
THE DENVER SHERIFF (D. Colo.)
DEPARTMENT; DEPUTY SHERIFF
WISE; DEPUTY SHERIFF BURKE,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before GORSUCH, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Ernie Calbart appeals pro se from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants on his civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Calbart alleged in his third amended complaint that he suffered from a
disability related to pain in both of his knees. While he was a pre-trial detainee at the
Denver County Jail, a doctor issued a medical restriction on April 13, 2010,
prescribing a bottom tier cell and a bottom bunk for Calbart. He alleged that he
informed defendants Wise and Burke of the medical restriction and his inability to
climb stairs, but Wise assigned him to a second-floor cell on April 23. Calbart
claimed that he fell down the stairs on May 1, 2010, and his resulting injuries require
him to use a wheelchair.
The district court construed Calbart’s third amended complaint as bringing a
claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and a claim against
defendants Wise and Burke in their individual capacities for violating his rights under
the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. Only the latter claim against Wise is at issue
in this appeal.1
Defendants moved for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). They
argued, inter alia, that Wise was entitled to qualified immunity on Calbart’s civil
rights claim. Calbart responded and the district court referred the motion to a
magistrate judge for a report and recommendation (“R&R”). The magistrate judge
analyzed Calbart’s claim under the Eighth Amendment standard for unconstitutional
1
The district court granted summary judgment on Calbart’s ADA claim after he
conceded it was moot and voluntarily withdrew it. The court dismissed without
prejudice all claims against defendant Burke under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) because
Burke was not served with the complaint. Calbart does not challenge either of these
rulings on appeal.
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conditions of confinement. See Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“Although the Due Process Clause governs a pretrial detainee’s claim of
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the Eighth Amendment standard provides
the benchmark for such claims.” (citation omitted)). “To prevail on a ‘conditions of
confinement’ claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must establish that
(1) the condition complained of is sufficiently serious to implicate constitutional
protection, and (2) prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to inmate health
or safety.” Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations
omitted). Because Wise asserted the defense of qualified immunity, Calbart bore
“a heavy two-part burden [to] show (1) that the defendant’s actions violated a
constitutional right, and (2) that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at
the time of the conduct at issue.” Id. at 1030 (quotation, ellipsis, and brackets
omitted).
The magistrate judge concluded that Calbart failed to show that Wise’s actions
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Therefore, Wise was entitled to qualified
immunity, and the R&R recommended a grant of summary judgment in favor of Wise
on Calbart’s civil rights claim. Calbart filed timely objections to the R&R and the
district court reviewed it de novo. The court concluded the R&R was correct and
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Calbart filed a timely notice of
appeal.
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In the argument section of his pro se appeal brief, Calbart states only “see page
(2).” Aplt. Br. at 3. The only text on page 2 of his brief that could be construed as
“argument” is the following statement: “Defendant was deliberate[ly] indiffere[nt] to
Mr. Calbart[’s] disabilities[] and safety by housing him on 2nd floor 2 flights of
stairs.” Id. at 2. Calbart provides no further argument, no citation to the record, and
he cites a single case that is inapposite to his Eighth Amendment claim. See id. at 4
(citing Koehn v. Indian Hills Cmty. Coll., 371 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming
summary judgment on claim alleging wrongful discharge in violation of First
Amendment)).
“Although a pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to
a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, this court has
repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow the same rules of procedure that govern
other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840
(10th Cir. 2005) (citation, quotations, and brackets omitted). “Under [Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure] 28, which applies equally to pro se litigants, a brief must
contain more than a generalized assertion of error . . . .” Id. at 841 (quotations and
ellipsis omitted). Thus, perfunctory allegations of error that fail to frame and
develop an issue are insufficient to invoke appellate review. Murrell v. Shalala,
43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994).
This court provides pro se litigants with a form to guide them in presenting
their appellate issues and arguments. When properly completed, we accept this form
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in lieu of a formal brief. And while “we make some allowances for the pro se
plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority, . . . the court cannot take on the
responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and
searching the record.” Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840 (citation, quotation, and brackets
omitted). Calbart submitted his brief using the pro se form, but even liberally
construed, his brief is “wholly inadequate to preserve issues for review,” and we
decline to exercise our discretion to “delve for substance” in it in order to consider
his appeal. Id.The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Calbart’s motion for leave
to proceed on appeal without prepayment of the filing fee is DENIED, and he is
ordered to immediately remit to the court the unpaid balance of the filing fee.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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