Green v. Addison ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 29, 2015
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RANDALL TRAVIS GREEN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 14-5061
v. (D.C. No. 4:09-CV-00480-TCK-TLW)
(N.D. Okla.)
MIKE ADDISON, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, GORSUCH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Petitioner-appellant Randall Green requests a certificate of appealability
(COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Mr. Green seeks to challenge his convictions for sexual assault, arguing the
prosecution coerced false testimony from two of the victims. This court previously
reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief and remanded with instructions to
conduct an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the district court heard evidence and
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
again denied relief. We now deny Mr. Green’s request for a COA and dismiss the
appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2006, an Oklahoma jury convicted Mr. Green of ten felony offenses: three
counts of first-degree rape; two counts of forcible sodomy; one count each of first-
degree burglary, extortion, and kidnapping; and two counts of the lesser-included
offense of second-degree rape.1 He was sentenced to a total of seventy-three years in
prison.
Mr. Green was charged with sexually assaulting four individuals. Relevant to
this appeal, two of the victims, L.S. and J.C., testified at Mr. Green’s trial. They both
stated they were babysitting at the home of Christina Crawford when Mr. Green came
to Ms. Crawford’s house with a friend, Jeffrey Peppers. According to L.S. and J.C.,
Mr. Green took L.S. into a bedroom, where he raped her. Mr. Green later asked J.C.
to go into the garage with him. Once in the garage, Mr. Green forced J.C. to perform
oral sex and to have sexual intercourse with him. J.C. and Mr. Green then returned to
the living room, and Mr. Green and Mr. Peppers left the house ten minutes later. L.S.
and J.C. were each thirteen years old at the time of the assault.
Mr. Green was convicted of first-degree rape with respect to J.C. and L.S. On
direct appeal, the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals (OCCA) affirmed his
convictions and sentence. Mr. Green then filed a pro se application for post-
1
This recitation of the facts is drawn from our prior opinion in this case. See
Green v. Addison, 500 F. App’x 712, 713 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).
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conviction relief in the Oklahoma courts, arguing he was denied due process of law
by the prosecution’s knowing use of false and coerced testimony from J.C. and L.S.
In support of his petition, Mr. Green submitted a transcript of a conversation among
J.C., J.C.’s mother, and David Starkey, who was conducting an independent
investigation into official misconduct. Mr. Starkey recorded the conversation on
January 27, 2008, and the recording was later transcribed by a court reporter. J.C. and
her mother signed a notarized verification page, indicating they had reviewed the
transcript and confirming the contents as “true and correct.”
During the interview with Mr. Starkey, J.C. stated Mr. Green had not raped her
and that she was coerced into falsely testifying against him by the prosecution.
Specifically, J.C. alleged that Sgt. Wayne Stinnett, an investigator for the county
district attorney’s office, and Patrick Abitbol, an assistant district attorney, threatened
to throw her “in juvie” if she did not testify that Mr. Green had raped her. J.C. also
expressed her belief that L.S. had not been raped by Mr. Green. J.C. claimed L.S.
accused Mr. Green of rape in retaliation for his refusal to date her. J.C. also told
Mr. Starkey she thought L.S. had been pressured by the prosecution to make false
allegations against Mr. Green.
The Oklahoma post-conviction court denied Mr. Green relief without holding
an evidentiary hearing. The OCCA affirmed, holding the transcript “contains no
recantation of the victim’s original claims, nor does it constitute proof of [Mr.
Green’s] innocence.” Mr. Green then filed a petition for habeas corpus relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma,
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identifying seven grounds for relief and requesting an evidentiary hearing. The
district court dismissed Mr. Green’s petition in full and denied a COA. Mr. Green
appealed and requested a COA on the single issue of whether his convictions rested
on knowingly proffered perjured testimony. This court granted a COA, appointed
counsel, and received briefing from Mr. Green and the State.
We held Mr. Green had diligently pursued his claim when he filed a notarized
and signed transcript of J.C.’s conversation with Mr. Starkey. We further held Mr.
Green had established that his new evidence, if credible, would entitle him to habeas
corpus relief. We therefore remanded with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing
on the issue of whether Mr. Green’s convictions were based on perjured testimony
knowingly offered by the State.
On remand, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Green
presented three witnesses: himself, J.C., and J.C.’s mother. The State also presented
three witnesses: Sgt. Stinnett, Mr. Abitbol, and Jennifer Lynn Sanbrano-Hester, a
former assistant district attorney who had assisted Mr. Abitbol in prosecuting Mr.
Green. After hearing from all witnesses, the district court found that J.C.’s testimony
during the evidentiary hearing was not credible. The district court also entered a
specific finding that the testimony of the prosecutors and Sgt. Stinnett was more
credible than J.C.’s. As a result, it denied Mr. Green’s request for relief. He now
appeals and seeks a COA.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a
COA can issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this standard, Mr. Green
must show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” See Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where a
district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing
required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” Id.
Normally, under § 2254, a petitioner is entitled to federal habeas relief only if
the state court’s resolution of his claim “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
This “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings . . . demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537
U.S. 19, 24 (2002). Further, we presume a state court’s factual determinations are
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correct unless the petitioner rebuts that “presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
But these “deferential AEDPA standards of review do not apply if the state
court employed the wrong legal standard in deciding the merits of the federal issue.”
Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1170 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). When state courts apply the wrong legal standards, “federal courts resolve
the claim unconstrained by AEDPA deference—that is, we review de novo the state
court’s legal conclusions and resolution of mixed questions.” Trammell v. McKune,
485 F.3d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“The de novo standard also applies to our review of a federal district court’s legal
conclusions in a § 2254 action, though we review any factual findings it may have
made for clear error.” Id.
In the prior appeal in Mr. Green’s case, this court held the OCCA applied the
wrong legal standard to Mr. Green’s petition. Green v. Addison, 500 F. App’x 712,
716 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we held the deferential AEDPA standards
do not apply to Mr. Green’s claim. See id. Additionally, AEDPA’s deferential
standard does not apply “when a federal district court holds an evidentiary hearing
and considers new evidence that was not before the state court at the time it reached
its decision, even if the state court resolved the claim on the merits.” Tovar Mendoza
v. Hatch, 620 F.3d 1261, 1269 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that when a district court
relies on new evidence adduced at an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner’s claims are
subject to de novo review). Thus, in this case, we review the district court’s legal
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conclusions de novo and its factual determinations for clear error, unrestrained by
AEDPA.
B. Mr. Green Has Failed to Demonstrate the District Court’s Credibility
Determination Was Clearly Erroneous
We now turn our attention to Mr. Green’s request for a COA. Mr. Green
argues the district court clearly erred because it failed to consider the entire record
and because it prejudged J.C.’s credibility. Specifically, Mr. Green argues the district
court’s credibility determination was colored by its previous denial of Mr. Green’s
request for relief. Mr. Green further contends the district court failed to consider
evidence in the trial record that supports J.C.’s recantation at the evidentiary hearing,
as well as Mr. Green’s contention that J.C.’s trial testimony was coerced.
“[A] conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is
fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972) (“A new trial is required if the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable
likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.”). In our prior opinion in this case,
we identified three factors Mr. Green must prove to prevail,
The relevant inquiry in whether [Mr.] Green would be entitled to habeas
relief is whether (1) “the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the
prosecution’s case includes perjured testimony”; (2) “the prosecution
knew, or should have known, of the perjury”; and (3) “there is a
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony should have affected the
judgment of the jury.”
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Green v. Addison, 500 F. App’x 712, 720 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S.
at 103). Applying this test, the district court determined Mr. Green had failed to
establish the first two factors.
Mr. Green agrees the Agurs test is the proper legal framework, but contends
the district court clearly erred when it found that Sgt. Stinnett and Mr. Abitbol were
more credible than J.C. As Mr. Green acknowledges, a district court’s “determination
of witness credibility is reviewed for clear error, and we will not hold that testimony
is, as a matter of law, incredible unless it is unbelievable on its face, i.e., testimony as
to facts that the witness physically could not have possibly observed or events that
could not have occurred under the laws of nature.” United States v. Hoyle, 751 F.3d
1167, 1175 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
However, our deference to the district court’s credibility determination is not
limitless.
“When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of
witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial court's findings; for
only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that
bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.”
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). But because
“factors other than demeanor and inflection go into the decision whether or not to
believe a witness,” credibility determinations are still subject to appellate review. Id.
For example, “[d]ocuments or objective evidence may contradict the witness’[s]
story; or the story itself may be so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face
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that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it.” Id. Under such circumstances, we
“may well find clear error even in a finding purportedly based on a credibility
determination.” Id. (citations omitted). In contrast, where the finding of the trial court
is based on its “decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each
of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by
extrinsic evidence,” the Supreme Court has instructed, “that finding, if not internally
inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, while
the trial court’s credibility findings are not completely unassailable, in the absence of
extrinsic evidence contradicting one witness’s testimony, we will defer to the district
court’s choice to believe one witness over another.
In arguing we should hold the district court here clearly erred in its credibility
determination, Mr. Green relies on Ortega v. Duncan, 333 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2003).
In Ortega, the defendant sought habeas corpus relief based on the recantation of a
witness who testified at trial that he saw the defendant shoot the victim. Id. at 103–
04. The defendant also provided evidence at the habeas proceeding from the
witness’s mother that failed to corroborate the witness’s trial testimony that he was
on his way to meet his mother when he witnessed the shooting, and that his mother
had visited the crime scene and had seen the bodies. 333 F.3d at 108. After an
evidentiary hearing, the district court found the witness’s recantation “was unworthy
of belief.” Id. at 106. It therefore held the defendant had failed to meet his burden of
“proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [the witness] was telling the truth”
when he testified at the habeas proceeding and denied relief. Id. The Second Circuit
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reversed, holding the district court had clearly erred in its credibility determination
by conflating the question of whether the witness perjured himself at trial with the
assessment of the witness’s credibility at the subsequent hearing. Id. Because the
defendant had identified specific evidence that called into question the truthfulness of
the witness’s trial testimony, the Second Circuit held the district court was required
to consider that evidence in addition to the credibility of the witness’s recantation
when assessing the truthfulness of the trial testimony.
Mr. Green relies on Ortega to argue the district court here was required to
consider all evidence supporting his claim that J.C. lied at trial, as well as the
credibility of her recantation, in assessing the truthfulness of her trial testimony. But
Mr. Green has not identified any documentary or testimonial evidence that factually
contradicts J.C.’s trial testimony. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. Instead,
Mr. Green’s arguments focus on inconsistencies in Sgt. Stinnett’s and Mr. Abitbol’s
testimony and attempt to explain similar inconsistencies in J.C.’s and Mr. Green’s
testimony.
For example, Mr. Green argues Sgt. Stinnett’s credibility was called into
question when he denied having any knowledge of Mr. Green prior to his
involvement in this case. In fact, Sgt. Stinnett had previously arrested Mr. Green on
burglary charges. Mr. Green argues this inconsistency shows Sgt. Stinnett’s
dishonesty. But, even assuming Sgt. Stinnett deliberately lied, this fact would not
show J.C.’s trial testimony was perjured. At best, it would call Sgt. Stinnett’s own
credibility into question. And the district court was entitled to weigh this
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inconsistency, which was brought to light during cross-examination at the evidentiary
hearing, against Sgt. Stinnett’s claim to have forgotten his prior arrest of Mr. Green.2
Mr. Green similarly attacks the district court’s assessment of Mr. Abitbol’s
credibility. The district court found it “extremely unlikely” that Mr. Abitbol would
coerce J.C. to testify falsely against Mr. Green when there were three other
complaining victims and Mr. Abitbol had decided to prosecute Mr. Green before
learning of J.C.’s allegations. According to Mr. Green, the district court clearly erred
because it overlooked “clear evidence in the record” that the cases involving the
other victims “were beset by troubling shortcomings.” But problems with the cases
involving the other three victims do not demonstrate J.C.’s trial testimony was
perjured. Nor do they demonstrate Mr. Abitbol knew or should have known J.C. was
lying, as Mr. Green is required to show under Agurs. See 427 U.S. at 103 (stating that
a petitioner must establish that “the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the
perjury”).
Finally, Mr. Green contends the district court’s evaluation of J.C.’s credibility
was fatally flawed because there were explanations for certain inconsistencies in
J.C.’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing. But weighing the import of those
inconsistencies is squarely within the district court’s purview. The district court
heard all the evidence, including J.C.’s trial testimony, her pretrial interviews, and
2
Mr. Green’s other arguments challenging Sgt. Stinnett’s testimony fail for
largely the same reasons. Although Mr. Green points to inconsistencies in Sgt.
Stinnett’s testimony and infers from those inconsistencies that Sgt. Stinnett lied at the
evidentiary hearing, the district court was free to draw other inferences. This
credibility determination was not clearly erroneous.
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her testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and determined that her recantation lacked
credibility.
Thus, unlike the defendant in Ortega, Mr. Green challenges only the district
court’s assessment of credibility issues, rather than its failure to consider extrinsic
evidence suggesting that J.C. perjured herself at trial.3 Although Mr. Green raised
questions about Sgt. Stinnett’s and Mr. Abitbol’s credibility and provided
explanations for the inconsistencies in J.C.’s and Mr. Green’s testimony, he failed to
identify extrinsic evidence undermining J.C.’s trial testimony. Nor has Mr. Green
demonstrated that Sgt. Stinnett’s and Mr. Abitbol’s story is “so internally
inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable factfinder would not credit
it.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. Because the trial court’s finding is based on a
“decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has
told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic
evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear
error.” Id.
3
Following oral argument, Mr. Green submitted a Rule 28(j) letter with
supplemental authority. We have reviewed this authority and conclude the legal
standard announced is consistent with our discussion of Anderson and Ortega.
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III. CONCLUSION
Mr. Green has failed to demonstrate that the district court’s credibility
determination was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Green’s request for
COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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