United States v. De La Torre , 543 F. App'x 827 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 1, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 12-7084
(D.C. No. 6:12-CR-00007-JHP-1)
LEE MARTIN DE LA TORRE, a/k/a (E.D. Okla.)
Lee Harlan De La Torre,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, MATHESON, Circuit Judges, and BLACKBURN **, District
Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Lee Martin De La Torre entered a conditional plea of
guilty to possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5845, &
5871, and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised
release. He now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. Our jurisdiction
arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
The Honorable Robert E. Blackburn, U.S. District Court Judge, District
of Colorado, sitting by designation.
Background
On September 27, 2011, a coalition of officers from the Oklahoma Drug
Task Force and the Tulsa Police Department executed a search warrant on a
residence in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. The warrant sought evidence in an
investigation unrelated to Mr. De La Torre. Investigator Elizabeth Crockett
(“investigator”) was present during the search; Mr. De La Torre was also present.
During the search, officers discovered a bag with white powdery residue in
a bedroom. The residue field tested positive for methamphetamine. Later that
day, the officers obtained a search warrant based upon probable cause of
possession and consumption of methamphetamine. The affidavit authored by the
investigator listed a litany of items allegedly related to the crime of possession,
ranging from the apparent (“paraphernalia”) to the peripheral (“foreign travel
schedules”), and this was incorporated into the warrant. 1 Rawle 32, 35.
Approximately one hour after the issuance of the warrant, the investigator
returned to the residence and served the warrant on Mr. De La Torre. In the same
bedroom in which the first bag was found, officers discovered another bag with
white powdery residue and various articles of drug paraphernalia. Additionally,
officers discovered three improvised explosive devices—one labeled “F*** YOU
BOOM”—along with fireworks in a bedroom closet.
Mr. De La Torre moved to suppress evidence of the explosive devices,
arguing that the second search violated the Fourth Amendment. That motion was
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referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended denial because, although the
investigator “mismatched” the offense of possession with items authorized for
seizure in both the affidavit and warrant, the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule supplanted the warrant’s overbreadth. Id. at 45-46. The district
court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation. 1 Rawle 69.
Discussion
On appeal, Mr. De La Torre argues that suppression was warranted because
the second search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity
requirement. 1 The government disagrees but also relies on the good-fath
exception.
The Fourth Amendment provides that no warrant shall issue unless it
“particularly describ[es] the . . . things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Generally, the remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment is exclusion of
evidence unconstitutionally seized. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037,
1042 (10th Cir. 2009). However, the exclusionary rule is a judicially created
remedy, not a constitutional mandate. Id. The sole purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter police misconduct, and evidence obtained under a warrant should
1
In his motion to suppress, Mr. De La Torre also argued that the warrant
was not supported by probable cause. 1 Rawle 14. On appeal, Mr. De La Torre’s
particularity argument subsumes his probable cause argument. Aplt. Br. 21-22.
This appeal is resolved solely by considering the good-faith exception as it
applies to the particularity of the warrant.
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be suppressed only in the “unusual case” in which that purpose will be furthered.
United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 863 (10th Cir. 2005). Under United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 (1984), where officers obtain and execute in
“objective good faith” a search warrant issued by a “detached and neutral
magistrate,” there is nothing to deter. United States v. Nolan, 199 F.3d 1180,
1184 (10th Cir. 1999). Courts have the discretion to decide a case under Leon’s
good-faith exception rather than on the merits. Leon, 468 U.S. at 924-25.
Several of our cases have done so. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d
1225, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1206 n.8
(10th Cir. 1998); cf. United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 2009)
(Baldock, J., concurring). We review the applicability of the good-faith exception
de novo. Nolan, 199 F.3d at 1184.
Mr. De La Torre argues that the warrant that led to the discovery of the
explosives was so deficient that the executing officers could not reasonably
presume it to be valid. Aplt. Br. 29-30. He further argues that the warrant lacked
guidelines and references to specific crimes that would allow the officers to
distinguish between what evidence was and was not to be seized. Id. Finally, he
contends that the executing officers should have known that by “omitting the
affidavit’s description of an isolated possession of methamphetamine residue” the
warrant allowed a search that was limitless in scope. Id. at 31.
We disagree. Even if a warrant is facially invalid, the reviewing court
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“must also review the text of the warrant and the circumstances of the search to
ascertain whether the agents might have reasonably presumed it to be valid.”
United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 607 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations
and brackets omitted). In this case, both the warrant and affidavit provide
guidance in that they limit the myriad items listed to those “constitut[ing]
evidence of” one crime: “Possession and Consumption of . . . Methamphetamine.”
1 Rawle 35 (search warrant); 1 Rawle 32 (affidavit). Moreover, the same officer,
Investigator Crockett, obtained and executed the warrant suggesting good-faith
reliance that the warrant authorized seizure of evidence for which probable cause
had been established earlier that day.
A. Text of the Warrant
In United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2009), we addressed a
similar situation. In Otero, the search warrant authorized the seizure of items in
two different sections: (1) “ITEMS TO BE SEIZED,” and (2) “COMPUTER
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED.” Id. at 1129-30. The first section carefully “limit[ed]
the search to evidence of specific crimes” of which the defendant was suspected,
namely mail and credit card theft. Id. at 1132. In contrast, the section regarding
computer items had “no limiting instruction whatsoever.” Id. This second
section purported to allow seizure of “[a]ny and all” information contained in the
defendant’s computer and made no effort to incorporate the limitations set out in
the first section. Id. at 1132-33. This court held that the second section
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authorized a “wide-ranging search” of the defendant’s computer and was therefore
invalid. Id. at 1133.
However, this overbreadth did not necessitate suppression of evidence
obtained from the defendant’s computer given Leon’s good-faith exception. Id.
Despite the second section’s unlimited language, “one can see how a reasonable
officer might have thought that the limitations in the first portion of [the warrant]
would be read to also apply to the second portion.” Id. at 1134. The officer who
searched the computer therefore “understood his search as being limited to
evidence of mail and credit card theft.” Id. Given this understanding, the
warrant’s overbreadth did not constitute a “flagrant or deliberate violation of
rights” that the exclusionary rule served to deter. Id. (quoting Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009)).
Here, the facts are similar. Although the warrant incorporated the
affidavit’s boilerplate language (allowing seizure of evidence related to any
conceivable drug crime), the warrant’s preamble, setting forth probable cause,
authorized the seizure of evidence of only one crime—“Possession and
Consumption of . . . Methamphetamine.” 1 Rawle 35. One can easily see how a
reasonable officer could conclude that the authorized search, though purporting to
extend to an exhaustive array of items, was limited to the only offense described.
Id. So understood, the breadth of the items listed would not necessarily lead a
reasonable officer to conclude that the warrant authorized an impermissible
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“general” search.
B. Circumstances of the Search
The circumstances surrounding the second search, including the
investigator’s participation in obtaining and executing the warrant, also suggest
good faith. Good faith is indicated where “the officers executing the warrant
were involved in the investigation throughout, and one of them wrote the affidavit
to support the application.” Otero, 563 F.3d at 1135 (citing Riccardi, 405 F.3d at
864).
Here, the investigator was present for the original discovery and authored
the affidavit stating probable cause that Mr. De La Torre continued in unlawful
possession of methamphetamine. 1 Rawle 32-33. The investigator returned to the
residence an hour later to execute the search. Although the warrant omitted a
reference to the discovery of the original bag with methamphetamine residue, the
affidavit did describe that discovery. We conclude that reasonable officers in this
situation would have reason to believe the warrant was valid, consider themselves
authorized to search only for evidence of the crime for which they had probable
cause, and would seize only those items that they believed the warrant and plain-
view doctrine authorized. 2
2
Mr. De La Torre does not challenge the magistrate’s conclusion that “the
nature of the immediate danger posed by the explosive devices certainly justified
their seizure.” 1 Rawle 47.
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AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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