Johnson v. Allbaugh ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                                      FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                             November 9, 2018
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TYRONE L. JOHNSON,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    v.                                                           No. 18-5068
    (D.C. No. 4:18-CV-00275-JHP-FHM)
    JOE M. ALLBAUGH,                                             (N.D. Okla.)
    Respondent - Appellee.
    _________________________________
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
    _________________________________
    Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, MATHESON and BACHARACH,
    Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Tyrone L. Johnson seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district
    court’s dismissal of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     habeas application for lack of jurisdiction. We
    deny a COA and dismiss this appeal.
    Johnson is an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se. After a jury trial, he
    was convicted in 1993 of four counts of first-degree felony murder and sentenced to four
    consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Following an
    unsuccessful direct appeal, Johnson filed a § 2254 application in 1999. The district court
    *
    This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
    res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
    consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    granted Johnson’s motion to voluntarily dismiss that application without prejudice.
    Johnson filed another § 2254 application in 2012. The district court dismissed that
    application as time-barred. This court denied a COA.
    In 2018, Johnson filed his third-in-time § 2254 application. The district court held
    that this latest filing was successive and unauthorized, and dismissed it for lack of
    jurisdiction. Johnson now seeks to appeal the district court’s judgment. He must obtain a
    COA to pursue an appeal. See Montez v. McKinna, 
    208 F.3d 862
    , 866-67 (10th Cir.
    2000) (holding a state prisoner must obtain a COA to appeal a final order in a habeas
    corpus proceeding); cf. United States v. Harper, 
    545 F.3d 1230
    , 1233 (10th Cir. 2008)
    (holding a federal prisoner must obtain a COA to appeal a district court’s dismissal of an
    unauthorized second or successive motion under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     for lack of
    jurisdiction).
    Because the district court’s ruling rested on procedural grounds, Johnson must
    show both “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
    valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
    debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
    McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000) (emphasis added). We liberally construe Johnson’s
    pro se application for a COA. See Hall v. Scott, 
    292 F.3d 1264
    , 1266 (10th Cir. 2002).
    2
    Johnson does not dispute that he intended to challenge his 1993 felony murder
    convictions in his latest § 2254 application. His previous habeas application, filed in
    2012, was dismissed as time-barred. That disposition counted as a decision on the merits.
    See In re Rains, 
    659 F.3d 1274
    , 1275 (10th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).1 Because his latest
    § 2254 application attempted to assert or reassert a federal basis for relief from the same
    underlying conviction, the district court concluded that it was successive and
    unauthorized and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. See Spitznas v. Boone, 
    464 F.3d 1213
    , 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2006); In re Cline, 
    531 F.3d 1249
    , 1251 (10th Cir. 2008)
    (per curiam) (“A district court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of a second
    or successive . . . § 2254 claim until this court has granted the required authorization.”).
    Johnson’s assertion that his underlying constitutional claims are meritorious, deserve
    review, and are debatable by jurists of reason does not show that the district court’s
    procedural ruling—its dismissal of his application as successive and unauthorized—is
    debatable.
    1
    Johnson argues that his 2012 application was improperly dismissed as
    time-barred, but we previously denied his request for a COA on that issue. Moreover, an
    assertion that the district court should have reached the merits of his claims in that
    application, rather than dismissing them as time-barred, does not establish that his latest
    application is not successive.
    3
    Because Johnson has not shown that jurists of reason would debate whether the
    district court’s procedural ruling was correct, we deny a COA and dismiss this appeal.2
    Entered for the Court
    ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
    2
    In his combined opening brief and request for a COA, Johnson appears to ask
    this court to grant him authorization to file a successive habeas application. But because
    he does not address the statutory requirements for authorization, we decline to construe
    his filing as a request for authorization, which requires a different showing than a request
    for a COA. Johnson may separately file a motion for authorization, which will be
    granted only if he is able to demonstrate that he has new claims that rely on (1) “a new
    rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
    Court, that was previously unavailable,” or (2) a factual predicate that “could not have
    been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence” and that, “if proven
    and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear
    and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
    have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (b)(2)(A)-(B).
    4