United States v. Guillermo Pena-Baez ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 30, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 09-3262
(D. Kansas)
v.
(D.C. Nos. 2:09-CV-02108-JWL and
2:06-CR-20175-JWL-1)
GUILLERMO PENA-BAEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY
Before LUCERO, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Proceeding pro se, Guillermo Pena-Baez seeks to appeal the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.
The matter is before this court on Pena-Baez’s request for a certificate of
appealability (“COA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (providing no appeal may be
taken from a “final order in a proceeding under section 2255” unless the movant
first obtains a COA). Because Pena-Baez has not “made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right,” this court denies his request for a COA and
dismisses this appeal. Id. § 2253(c)(2).
Pena-Baez pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to
distribute more than fifty grams of methamphetamine and aiding and abetting that
offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2. Pursuant to the terms of a
written plea agreement, Pena-Baez reserved the right to appeal the denial of a
motion to suppress evidence. However, he specifically waived the right to
directly appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. This court
affirmed the denial of Pena-Baez’s suppression motion. United States v. Pena-
Baez, 285 F. App’x 553, 558 (10th Cir. 2008).
Pena-Baez filed the instant § 2255 motion on March 4, 2009, raising three
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim alleging the district
court should have reviewed his presentence investigation report before accepting
his guilty plea. The Government filed a Motion to Enforce Defendant’s Waiver
of Collateral Attack and argued all four claims raised in Pena-Baez’s § 2255
motion fell within the waiver of appeal rights contained in the plea agreement.
The district court granted the Government’s motion with respect to Pena-Baez’s
claims his attorney was ineffective during the suppression hearing and on direct
appeal, and his claim the district court failed to review his presentence
investigation report. The court, however, concluded Pena-Baez’s ineffective
assistance claim relating to the negotiation of his plea agreement did not fall
within the rights he waived in the plea agreement. See United States v.
Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2001). The court denied relief on
that claim, concluding Pena-Baez’s conclusory allegations of ineffective
assistance were insufficient to overcome statements in the plea agreement and
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statements Pena-Baez made in open court during the plea proceedings that he was
knowingly and voluntarily entering into the plea agreement. See Lasiter v.
Thomas, 89 F.3d 699, 702-03 (10th Cir. 1996).
To be entitled to a COA, Pena-Baez must make “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make the
requisite showing, he must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003) (quotations omitted). In evaluating whether Pena-Baez has satisfied his
burden, this court undertakes “a preliminary, though not definitive, consideration
of the [legal] framework” applicable to each of his claims. Id. at 338. Although
Pena-Baez need not demonstrate his appeal will succeed to be entitled to a COA,
he must “prove something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of
mere good faith.” Id.Having undertaken a review of Pena-Baez’s application for a COA and
appellate filings, the district court’s order, and the entire record on appeal
pursuant to the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Miller-El, this court
concludes Pena-Baez is not entitled to a COA. Pena-Baez’s conclusory
allegations that his counsel erroneously informed him that he would receive a
sentence of life imprisonment if convicted by a jury, are contradicted by
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statements he made under oath during his plea colloquy and are insufficient to
support his ineffective assistance claim. Thus, the district court’s resolution of
Pena-Baez’s § 2255 motion is not reasonably subject to debate and the issues he
seeks to raise on appeal are not adequate to deserve further proceedings.
Accordingly, this court denies Pena-Baez’s request for a COA and dismisses this
appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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