United States v. Johnson ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 1, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-6034
(D.C. No. 5:08-CR-00222-M-1)
DANIEL TIMOTHY JOHNSON, (W.D. Okla.)
a/k/a Timothy Barns,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Daniel Timothy Johnson entered a guilty plea to a one-count
Information charging him with copyright infringement, in violation of 17 U.S.C.
§ 506(a)(1). His plea agreement states that he “knowingly and voluntarily waives
his right to . . . [a]ppeal or collaterally challenge his guilty plea, sentence and
restitution imposed, and any other aspect of his conviction . . . .” Mot. to
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Enforce, Ex. 2 at 7-8. Nonetheless, Mr. Johnson has filed a notice of appeal. The
government has moved to enforce defendant’s appeal waiver under United States
v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). We grant the
motion and dismiss the appeal.
The district court determined that the amount of loss attributable to
Mr. Johnson was $553,859.10. That amount was used to determine Mr. Johnson’s
guideline range of 41-51 months. The district court sentenced Mr. Johnson to a
sentence within that range–46 months. The district court then ordered restitution
in the amount of $553,859.10, the same amount as the loss calculation.
Mr. Johnson now seeks to appeal the district court’s loss determination that
was used to calculate the length of his sentence and the amount of restitution
imposed. Under Hahn, we will enforce an appeal waiver if (1) “the disputed
appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights”; (2) “the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights”; and (3) “enforcing the
waiver would [not] result in a miscarriage of justice.” 359 F.3d at 1325.
Scope of the Waiver
Mr. Johnson’s appeal falls within the scope of his appellate waiver. In his
plea agreement, he agreed to waive his right to appeal his sentence and the
restitution imposed. See Mot. to Enforce, Ex. 2 at 7-8. The plea agreement
specifically states that Mr. Johnson waives his right to appeal “his sentence as
imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined.” Id. at
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8. Mr. Johnson points to language in the plea agreement that “the parties reserved
the right to advocate for, and present evidence relevant to, the amount of loss
attributable to defendant,” Resp. at 3. But the language identified by Mr. Johnson
relates to what the parties may raise to the Probation Office and the district court
during the sentencing process. Mot. to Enforce, Ex. 2 at 6. There is no language
in the plea agreement carving out an exception for Mr. Johnson to appeal from the
district court’s ultimate determination on the amount-of-loss issue. Because
Mr. Johnson’s appeal relates to the manner in which his sentence was determined
and the amount of restitution imposed, it falls within the scope of the waiver
contained in his plea agreement.
Knowing and Voluntary
Mr. Johnson does not expressly argue that his waiver was not knowing and
voluntary, but he does assert that “it is surely against public policy to allow a
defendant to waive errors of law at sentencing–particularly before he has even
been sentenced.” Id. at 4. This argument seems similar to the argument made by
the defendant in Hahn– that “a defendant can never knowingly and voluntarily
waive his appellate rights because he cannot possibly know in advance what
errors a district court might make in the process of arriving at an appropriate
sentence,” 359 F.3d at 1326. We rejected defendant’s argument in Hahn, and we
reject Mr. Johnson’s argument here. “[W]hen a defendant waives his right to
appeal, he does not know with specificity what claims of error, if any, he is
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foregoing,” but that does not render the waiver unknowing or involuntary. Id. at
1326-27; see also United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1169 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“A waiver of the right to appeal includes a waiver of the right to appeal difficult
or debatable legal issues–indeed, it includes a waiver of the right to appeal blatant
error.”).
Miscarriage of Justice
Finally, Mr. Johnson asserts that enforcing the appeal waiver would result
in a miscarriage of justice. Counsel for Mr. Johnson appears to argue that he may
have provided ineffective assistance to Mr. Johnson during the negotiation of the
appeal waiver and that therefore the waiver should not be enforced. While
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the appeal
waiver may render the waiver invalid, such a claim must be raised in a collateral
proceeding. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143-44 (10th Cir.
2005); Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 n.13.
Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to enforce the appeal
waiver and DISMISS the appeal.
Judge Briscoe dissents.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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