Yeager v. National Public Radio ( 2019 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 22, 2019
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
WILLIAM CONRAD YEAGER, II,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 18-3252
(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-04019-SAC-GEB)
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO; ANDREW (D. Kan.)
FLANAGAN; JACOB GANZ; ASHLEY
MESSENGER,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
William Conrad Yeager, II, appeals pro se from a district court order that
dismissed his defamation lawsuit against National Public Radio (“NPR”), NPR journalist
Andrew Flanagan, NPR reporter Jacob Ganz, and NPR attorney Ashley Messenger.
Exercising appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. BACKGROUND
According to the complaint, Mr. Yeager is “an artist, musician, filmmaker,
performance artist, activist and humanitarian” who resides in Kansas. R., Vol. I at 11.
On March 23, 2017, NPR published an article on its website written by Mr. Flanagan
titled, “The Most Expensive Record Never Sold, Discogs, Billy Yeager and the $18,000
Hoax that Almost Was.” Id. at 74. The article said Mr. Yeager had a penchant for
dubious promotional activities, such as pretending to be the son of Jimmy Hendrix and
attempting to sell his own album to himself on an internet auction site for $18,000. The
article described him as “a trickster-booster” and said “the story of Billy Yeager is one of
purposeless obfuscation,” R., Vol. I at 15. Id. at 32, 123.
The following day, NPR broadcast an interview between Mr. Flanagan and Mr.
Ganz on its “All Things Considered” program. Mr. Ganz referred to Mr. Yeager as a
“huckster” and a “charlatan,” id., and said Mr. Yeager was “far more interested in
infamy . . . and the chase of pulling the wool over people’s eyes” than he was in attaining
real fame, id. at 19.
The complaint alleged these and other false statements “obliterated [his] 40 year
career overnight.” Id. at 17. He contacted attorney Messenger and requested that NPR
remove the article and the interview from its website. She refused, but offered Mr.
Yeager the opportunity to respond in an NPR forum. He declined.
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In March 2018, Mr. Yeager filed a 93-page, pro se complaint against NPR, Mr.
Flanagan, Mr. Ganz, and Ms. Messenger. He pled multiple claims of defamation.1 The
complaint alleged that Mr. Flanagan’s “[a]rticle was nothing more than a bumptious
labyrinth of malicious statements and innuendos,” id. at 22, and that the “All Things
Considered” interview “was nothing more than an acrimonious prattling, slandering
Plaintiff, with an apparent agenda,” id. at 18. He complained that Ms. Messenger
“willingly allowed The Article to remain online” and was liable “as a cohort.” Id. at 42,
46. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court concluded the complaint failed to state a claim for relief. It
found Mr. Yeager was a limited purpose public figure and therefore was required to
allege that NPR published the statements about him with actual malice. See World Wide
Ass’n of Specialty Programs v. Pure, Inc., 450 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (defining actual malice as
publishing “with knowledge that [statement] was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false of not”); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)
(extending actual malice requirement to public figure libel plaintiffs); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (defining limited purpose public figure). The court
said he did not do so. It also determined that the statements were not actionable because
they were (a) based on the speaker’s subjective opinion, (b) not defamatory, or (c) so
1
The district court construed the allegations as also pleading a claim for false-
light invasion of privacy.
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vague as to be subject to multiple interpretations.2 Accordingly, the district court gave
Mr. Yeager the opportunity to file an amended complaint.
Mr. Yeager responded by submitting a 220-page proposed amended complaint,
which added a claim designated as “Tort of Outrage” based on NPR’s “wrongful
actions.” Id. at 599. The district court noted that it was “similar to [the] original
complaint and read[ ] something like a motion for reconsideration,” id. at 690. The court
concluded its prior analysis of Mr. Yeager’s claims applied to the proposed amended
complaint. As to the tort of outrage, the court concluded the amended complaint did not
allege extreme and outrageous conduct. Accordingly, the court denied leave to amend on
the basis of futility and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
II. DISCUSSION
“[W]e exercise de novo review when a court denies a request to amend on the
ground that amendment would be futile” and dismisses the complaint for failure to state a
claim. Nakkhumpun v. Taylor, 782 F.3d 1142, 1146 (10th Cir. 2015). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Mr. Yeager’s appellate briefs, even liberally construed, do not satisfy Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 28, which requires “a succinct, clear and accurate statement of the
2
The district court also concluded that Ms. Messenger was entitled to
dismissal on the additional ground that liability does not attach for refusing to retract
a defamatory statement.
4
arguments made in the body of the brief[ ] and . . . appellant’s contentions and the
reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the
appellant relies.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840-41
(10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The briefs offer little more than
generalized assertions of error, together with attacks on the appellees and their counsel.
Briefing of this nature can “disentitle [a pro se litigant] to review by this court.” Id. at
841.
Although Mr. Yeager may have preserved his argument as to whether he is a
limited public figure and whether Mr. Flanagan made the “purposeless obfuscation”
statement with actual malice, he does not address the court’s alternative grounds for
dismissal of the defamation claims. See also Aplt. Opening Br. at 5. “[W]here a district
court’s disposition rests on alternative and adequate grounds, a party who, in challenging
that disposition, only argues that one alternative is erroneous necessarily loses because
the second alternative stands as an independent and adequate basis, regardless of the
correctness of the first alternative.” Shook v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 543 F.3d 597, 613 n.7
(10th Cir. 2008).
Although Mr. Yeager mentions the district court’s alternative grounds to dismiss
regarding the “purposeful obfuscation” statement, he presents no argument against those
rulings. We “will not consider issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner,
unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation.” Armstrong v. Arcanum
Grp., Inc., 897 F.3d 1283, 1291 (10th Cir. 2018) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, Mr. Yeager cannot succeed on appeal.
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III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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