Parkhurst v. Lampert , 339 F. App'x 855 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 16, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
DERRICK R. PARKHURST, and all
other persons who are now or may be
similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 08-8069
(D.C. No. 2:07-CV-00279-CAB)
v. (D. Wyo.)
ROBERT O. LAMPERT, individually
and in his official capacity as
Wyoming Department of Corrections
State Penitentiary Warden; MICHAEL
MURPHY, individually and in his
official capacity as Wyoming
Department of Corrections Director,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Derrick R. Parkhurst, a prisoner in the custody of the Wyoming Department
of Corrections (WDOC) appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s entry
of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in part.
I
The facts are mostly undisputed. Mr. Parkhurst is the chairman of the
Wyoming Prisoners’ Association (WPA), an unincorporated, nonprofit association
registered with the Wyoming Secretary of State. He also is an official of the
Wyoming chapter of the Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants
(WY-CURE). He combined the newsletters of the WPA and the WY-CURE to
form what he calls the WPA Law Review and CURE Newsletter, which concerns
matters of interest to Wyoming state prisoners. In June 2006, Mr. Parkhurst
placed 693 copies of the newsletter in one FedEx box addressed to the Wyoming
State Penitentiary (WSP). The newsletters were individually addressed to specific
prisoners, allegedly including each prisoner’s WDOC correctional facility
number. Officials at the WSP refused to deliver the newsletters allegedly based
on Wyoming Policy and Procedure (WPP) #5.401(IV)(C)(1)(k), which, at the
time, provided in relevant part that non-privileged mail may be rejected if it
“[c]ontains material not intended for the addressee; but rather material intended
for other parties.” R., Doc. 14-4, Ex. A at 5. Defendants claim the box of
newsletters was returned to its sender, but according to Mr. Parkhurst, the box
-2-
was returned to a FedEx office, not to him. WSP officials did deliver several
copies of the newsletter that Mr. Parkhurst sent individually via United States
mail, including one copy he sent to himself.
Dissatisfied with the nondelivery of the 693 newsletters, Mr. Parkhurst
filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming defendants in their official and
individual capacities. 1 He claimed that the refusal to deliver the newsletters
violated his right to free expression under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution and his right to freedom of speech and the press under the
Wyoming Constitution. He sought an order prohibiting defendants from refusing
to deliver the newsletter in the future, and damages for the cost of reproducing
and reissuing the newsletter. He also sought class status for all WDOC prisoners
who were deprived of their right to receive the newsletter.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on a number of grounds:
Mr. Parkhurst’s claims as a publisher of the newsletter were moot due to passage
of a revised mail policy effective March 31, 2007; Mr. Parkhurst lacked standing
as a subscriber of the newsletter because he received a properly addressed and
mailed copy of the newsletter; defendants were immune from official-capacity
claims for damages under the Eleventh Amendment; and defendants were entitled
to qualified immunity against individual-capacity claims for damages.
1
Defendant Robert Lampert is the director of the WDOC, and defendant
Michael Murphy was the WSP warden at the time.
-3-
Defendants also opposed class certification. The district court granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds of mootness, lack of
standing, and qualified immunity, and denied as moot the motion for class
certification. Mr. Parkhurst has appealed. 2
II
When a case is decided on summary judgment, we review the district
court’s decision “de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district
court.” Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs.,
165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). “[W]e view the evidence and draw
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Id. Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “An issue is ‘genuine’ if there is
sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the
2
The district court ruled that to the extent Mr. Parkhurst claimed injury as a
recipient of the newsletter, he lacked standing because he received a copy. But as
Mr. Parkhurst admitted in his summary-judgment response, he sought relief only
as the publisher of the newsletter, and he has not pursued relief as a subscriber on
appeal. Therefore, we need not give further consideration to the court’s ruling on
standing. The court did not rule on defendants’ assertion of Eleventh Amendment
immunity, apparently based on Mr. Parkhurst’s concession that he was not
seeking damages against defendants in their official capacities. Thus, we do not
consider Eleventh Amendment immunity. Our review is confined to mootness,
whether there was a constitutional violation, and whether defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity.
-4-
issue either way[,]” and “[a]n issue of fact is ‘material’ if under the substantive
law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim.” Thom v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003). We construe Mr. Parkhurst’s
pro se pleadings and court papers liberally but without acting as his advocate.
See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
III
We first address the district court’s ruling that Mr. Parkhurst’s claims as
publisher of the newsletter were mooted by the passage of a revised mail policy.
The district court based its mootness ruling on the new mail policy that took
effect on March 31, 2007, nearly one year after the conduct at issue here.
Mr. Parkhurst notes that the new policy contains a materially identical provision
regarding the rejection of mail intended for “other parties.” 3 In a supplemental
brief on this issue, defendants conceded that the revised policy does not render
the case moot. We accept that concession, as our review of the revised mail
policy does not permit us to say “with assurance that there is no reasonable
expectation that the alleged violation will recur,” which is one part of the test for
mootness when voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct is at issue,
3
Mr. Parkhurst also makes the contrary assertion that whether defendants
violated the mail policy is “completely irrelevant” to his claims except as to
damages. Aplt. Br. at 5 & n.7. We disagree.
-5-
Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quotation and alteration
omitted). We therefore reverse the district court’s mootness ruling. 4
IV
Having conceded the case is not moot, defendants argue that we can affirm
on all claims on the ground that there was no constitutional violation. As part of
its qualified-immunity analysis, which applies only to individual-capacity claims
for damages, see Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1043 (10th Cir. 2006), the
district court determined that there was no constitutional violation based on Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977). Before
turning to damages and the qualified-immunity issue, we examine Jones in the
context of Mr. Parkhurst’s official-capacity claims for injunctive relief.
In Jones, the Union mailed packets of its publications in bulk to several
prisoners for redistribution to other prisoners. Prison officials refused to deliver
them on the ground that they were sent in bulk, although officials delivered bulk
mailings sent by Alcoholics Anonymous and the Jaycees. In concluding that the
prohibition on bulk mailing did not violate the prisoners’ First Amendment rights
to free speech or association (the Union had raised only an equal protection
challenge to the regulation, see id. at 130 n.7), the Court said:
4
The district court’s mootness ruling necessarily was limited to
Mr. Parkhurst’s request for prospective injunctive relief from defendants in their
official capacities, as passage of the revised policy cannot moot his
individual-capacity claims insofar as he seeks damages for defendants’ past
conduct. We will address the damages claims in Section V below.
-6-
An examination of the potential restrictions on speech or association
that have been imposed by the regulations under challenge,
demonstrates that the restrictions imposed are reasonable, and are
consistent with the inmates’ status as prisoners and with the
legitimate operational considerations of the institution. To begin
with, First Amendment speech rights are barely implicated in this
case. Mail rights are not themselves implicated; the only question
respecting the mail is that of bulk mailings. The advantages of bulk
mailings to inmates by the Union are those of cheaper rates and
convenience. While the District Court relied on the cheaper bulk
mailing rates in finding an equal protection violation, it is clear that
losing these cost advantages does not fundamentally implicate free
speech values. Since other avenues of outside informational flow by
the Union remain available, the prohibition of bulk mailing,
reasonable in the absence of First Amendment considerations,
remains reasonable.
Id. at 130-31 (footnotes, citation, and emphasis omitted). In a footnote to this
analysis, the Court quoted from the prison director’s affidavit, which indicated
that the mail regulation at issue prohibited prisoners from receiving packets of
material for redistribution but not publications sent to them directly by the
publisher. Id. at 131 n.8.
Jones is not sufficiently on point to support the conclusion that defendants’
conduct was not unconstitutional. In Jones, the Court appeared to touch on the
Union’s First Amendment rights under the ban on bulk mailing when discussing
lost cost advantages, but the Union asserted no such rights under the First
Amendment; the Court was discussing the prisoners’ First Amendment rights to
receive mail sent in bulk. In the present case, Mr. Parkhurst asserted his First
Amendment right as the publisher of the newsletters, not as a prisoner-recipient.
-7-
Moreover, in Jones the bulk packets were sent to a few prisoners, not to the
prison itself, and there is no indication that the individual items in the packets
were individually addressed. As noted above, the regulation at issue in Jones was
meant to prevent prisoners from receiving packets of materials for redistribution.
And there were concerns in Jones that (1) the bulk packets could contain
contraband, and it would be difficult to inspect every item; and (2) the
prisoner-to-prisoner solicitation of union membership, apparently aided by
distributing the mailed materials, raised security concerns because it was a
“legitimately prohibited activity.” Id. at 131-32 & n.8. Here, the newsletters
were not sent in bulk to other inmates for redistribution, they were individually
addressed, and their content is apparently not objectionable on security grounds
because the prison delivers newsletters that Mr. Parkhurst mails individually.
Another distinction between Jones and this case is a facial one. The mail
policy on which defendants relied does not concern bulk mailings to prisoners, it
concerns mail intended for someone other than the addressee. Nonetheless, we
recognize that as applied, the policy was the ground for rejecting the newsletters,
which were sent in a presumably more cost-effective manner akin to the bulk mail
in Jones, and Mr. Parkhurst has another avenue for sending the newsletters—by
individually addressing them and mailing them separately. Thus, he has lost only
a cost advantage, which, under a broad reading of Jones, may not fundamentally
implicate free speech values of publishers.
-8-
But we do not read Jones that broadly. The Ninth Circuit, in Prison Legal
News v. Cook, a case Mr. Parkhurst relies on, distinguished Jones on a number of
the foregoing bases as well as others. See 238 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001).
Cook concerned a refusal to deliver a newsletter solely because of the mailing rate
used by the publisher, Prison Legal News—the rate applicable to “Standard A”
non-profit corporation mail, which the court considered to be a species of “bulk
mail.” Id. at 1146 & n.1. The court first rejected an argument, based on Jones,
that banning standard mail does not implicate the First Amendment rights of
either publishers or prisoners because it results in only the loss of cost
advantages, explaining that the speech at issue was core protected speech, not
commercial speech, and the receipt of unobjectionable mail does not implicate the
sort of penological interests that were advanced in Jones. Id. at 1149. The court
also stated that “paying a higher rate is not an alternative because the prisoner
cannot force a publisher who needs to use, and is entitled to use, the standard rate
to take additional costly steps to mail his individual newsletter.” Id. The court
then held “that tying the receipt of subscription non-profit newsletters to postal
service rate classifications is not rationally related to any legitimate penological
interest.” Id. at 1149-50 (applying test from Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987)).
We agree with the court’s reasoning in Cook and take a narrow view of
Jones, which renders it inapplicable to the facts of this case. Thus, we cannot say
-9-
that based on Jones, defendants’ conduct was constitutional. But we decline to
read Cook for the broad proposition Mr. Parkhurst advances, that prison officials
may not force a publisher to use “a more expensive method of mailing than bulk
mail.” Aplt. Br. at x. It appears that, as in Cook, Mr. Parkhurst’s newsletters are
noncommercial speech, as they consist mainly of summaries of prisoner litigation,
but it is unclear whether any were sent pursuant to subscription. 5 And Cook did
not concern a refusal to deliver a bulk packet of mail like Mr. Parkhurst attempted
to send. We therefore cannot say that based on Cook, defendants’ conduct was
unconstitutional. 6
Moreover, the Cook court reached its decision on a developed record that
contained a number of proffered penological interests, each of which the court
rejected: “bulk mail is voluminous and generally of little value to prisoners;
substantial staff is required to sort, inspect and distribute bulk mail; bulk mail
poses security concerns; and bulk mail increases fire hazards.” Cook, 238 F.3d
at 1146. The record in this case is not sufficiently developed for a proper Turner
5
The parties have not made an issue out of any relationship between
subscription status and the First Amendment, and we express no view on the
matter.
6
The district court was of the view that Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d
1147 (10th Cir. 2007), was the same case as Cook. But in Salt Lake County, we
concluded that prison officials’ failure to deliver a publisher’s subscription
magazine was due to negligence, not to the application of bulk-rate mailing
regulations. See id. at 1162-63. Thus, Salt Lake County involved different facts
and is inapposite.
-10-
analysis, which requires a reasonableness inquiry: “when a prison regulation
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89;
see also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989) (applying Turner to a
publisher’s First Amendment rights to send subscriptions to prisoners). Under
Turner and Thornburgh, there are four relevant considerations: (1) “whether the
governmental objective underlying the regulations at issue is legitimate and
neutral, and that the regulations are rationally related to that objective,”
Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414; (2) “whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open,” id. at 417 (quotation omitted); (3) the
scope of the “impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will
have on others (guards and inmates) in the prison,” id. at 418; and (4) whether
there are any “obvious, easy alternatives [that] may be evidence that the
regulation is not reasonable, but is an exaggerated response to prison concerns,”
id. (quotations omitted).
The first consideration is mandatory. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (“[T]here
must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.”) (quotation omitted)
(emphasis added). And it presents a stumbling block here. Until filing their
supplemental brief, defendants never advanced any penological objective against
which the reasonableness of WPP #5.401 IV(C)(1)(k) can be judged. In their
-11-
supplemental brief, they claim that the district court considered the Turner
factors, a proposition we reject, and that it “found the logical basis of the rule to
be the same as . . . the rule in Jones.” Aplee. Supp. Br. at 6. As discussed above,
there are a number of material distinctions between this case and Jones.
Defendants’ reliance on Jones is therefore a poor fit on the first prong of the
Turner analysis. Because defendants failed to identify in the district court a
legitimate penological interest served by their refusal to deliver the newsletters,
and they have not remedied this failure on appeal, we need not analyze the other
Turner factors. Instead, we remand on Mr. Parkhurst’s official-capacity claims
for injunctive relief for further development of the record and a proper Turner
analysis by the district court. This conclusion does not preclude us from
reviewing the district court’s grant of qualified immunity on Mr. Parkhurst’s
individual-capacity claims for damages, to which we now turn.
V
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quotation
omitted). Although our review of the grant of qualified immunity is de novo,
Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2387 (2009), it differs from consideration of other summary judgment decisions:
-12-
“When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional
right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established.” Martinez v. Beggs,
563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009). We have discretion to determine “which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in
light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 129 S. Ct.
at 818. As our foregoing discussion shows, it is unclear whether defendants
violated one of Mr. Parkhurst’s constitutional rights. Therefore, this is an
appropriate case to address the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis
first.
“A plaintiff can demonstrate that a constitutional right is clearly established
by reference to cases from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit, or the weight of
authority from other circuits.” Gann v. Cline, 519 F.3d 1090, 1092 (10th Cir.
2008) (citation and quotation omitted). The “weight of authority” standard
requires something more than “a handful of decisions from courts in other
circuits” that have not been “broadly accepted.” Christensen v. Park City Mun.
Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2009). Mr. Parkhurst has relied only on
Cook to meet his burden on the second prong. As we have distinguished Cook on
a number of bases, we conclude that he has failed to meet his burden to show that
any constitutional right to the delivery of his newsletters in the manner that he
sent them was clearly established at the time of defendants’ conduct. Even if
-13-
Cook were applicable, a lone case from another circuit does not satisfy the
“weight of authority” standard. See id.Mr. Parkhurst’s other arguments do not require a different outcome. He
claims that in the course of granting defendants qualified immunity, the district
court resolved a number of factual disputes against him, contrary to the court’s
duty in a summary judgment proceeding. Chief among these is his contention that
the refusal to deliver the 693 copies of his newsletter was not based on the mail
policy but was due to the content of the newsletters, which he characterizes as
embarrassing to defendants. However, this is nothing more than a contention
made in his summary judgment response brief, which was not sworn, and in any
event is a conclusory, self-serving statement unsupported by any evidence. In
fact, Mr. Parkhurst stated only that he “believes, and is prepared to prove” that
nondelivery was due to embarrassment. R., Doc. 18, at 4. At summary judgment,
the nonmoving party cannot rest on allegations but “must bring forward specific
facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which he
or she carries the burden of proof.” Simms, 165 F.3d at 1326 (quotation and
alteration omitted).
Mr. Parkhurst also points to a number of factual errors in the district
court’s decision, claiming they indicate that the district judge never read his
response to the summary judgment motion. Regardless of the accuracy of this
allegation, we have read his response and conclude that none of the alleged
-14-
factual errors concern any material facts that preclude summary judgment in
defendants’ favor on qualified immunity.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED with respect to the grant
of qualified immunity to defendants on Mr. Parkhurst’s individual-capacity claims
for damages. The judgment of the district court is REVERSED with respect to
mootness, and REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent
with this Order and Judgment with respect to Mr. Parkhurst’s official-capacity
claims for injunctive relief. Mr. Parkhurst’s motion for leave to proceed without
prepayment of fees or costs is granted and we remind him of his continuing
obligation to make partial payments until his filing fee has been paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
-15-