United States v. Hernandez , 351 F. App'x 305 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 29, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 08-8076
v. (D.C. No. 2:07-CR-00239-WFD-13)
(D. Wyo.)
ARTHUR EDDIE HERNANDEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BRORBY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Arthur Eddie Hernandez pled guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846; 1 R. Doc. 562 at 1; 1
Supp. Rec. Doc. 315 at 2. The district court sentenced him to 151 months’
imprisonment followed by five years’ supervised release. 6 R. at 30. On appeal,
Mr. Hernandez challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence arguing
that the district court erred by failing to consider his request for a variance. Aplt.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Br. at 3, 7. As part of that challenge, he also contends that the district court did
not adequately explain how it applied the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 9.
Our jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and
we affirm.
Background
From approximately January 2006 through mid-2007, the Esteban Cornelio-
Legarda drug trafficking organization distributed crystal methamphetamine in
central Wyoming. 7 R. at 9. Mr. Hernandez, then addicted to methamphetamine,
obtained and distributed drugs from Mr. Cornelio and others during the summer
of 2007. 5 R. at 28-31; 7 R. at 9-11. Mr. Hernandez traded various small
quantities of methamphetamine with fellow addicts. Aplt. Br. at 4; see 5 R. at 28-
31. Mr. Hernandez maintains that these drugs deals were among friends and not
for his own profit. 5 R. at 28-31. As he put it, “[i]t wasn’t to make money, yeah,
it was just – to support my habit.” Id. at 31; Aplt. Br. at 4. Court-authorized
telephone intercepts recorded Mr. Hernandez participating in these drug trades. 7
R. at 9.
In April 2008, Mr. Hernandez pled guilty. A presentence report (PSR)
calculated Mr. Hernandez’s advisory Guidelines range. The base offense level
was 32, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4) (2007), and Mr. Hernandez received a three-point
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) & (b), resulting in
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a total offense level of 29. 7 R. at 12-13. With 14 criminal history points, his
criminal history category was VI, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of
151-188 months. U.S.S.G. ch. 5. pt. A. One of the convictions counted in the
criminal history computation was a 2002 state controlled substances conviction
which added two points. Had this conviction not been counted, the criminal
history category would have been V, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of
140-175 months. Aplt. Br. at 5.
Mr. Hernandez objected to the PSR arguing that the 2002 conviction should
not be counted because it arose out of a failed urinalysis while he was on
probation for another offense. 6 R. 4-6. According to Mr. Hernandez’s counsel,
when someone on state probation fails a drug test, it is unusual for the state to
charge a new crime instead of simply revoking probation. Id. Counsel suggested
that Mr. Hernandez’s waiver of counsel for the offense probably resulted in the
charge.
The district court included the two criminal history points viewing the
objection as “a collateral attack on that conviction which the Court will not
countenance here. Those two criminal history points are properly calculated.” 6
R. at 19; see also 7 R. att. 2 at i.
Discussion
We review a sentencing decision for reasonableness under a deferential
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abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007);
United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008). In a review for
procedural reasonableness, we ask whether the sentencing court erred in “failing
to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines . . . failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, . . . or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall
v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); United States v. Alapizco-
Venezuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 2008). We review the district
court’s “legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.”
United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006). Where a defendant
fails to object to the reasonableness of his sentence or to the explanation of his
sentence, we review for plain error. United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d 1209,
1218 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir.
2007).
Mr. Hernandez concedes that the 2002 conviction “is a valid, constitutional
conviction.” Aplt. Br. at 8. He argues that the district court viewed his objection
as an improper collateral attack, when in reality it was request for a variance.
Aplt. Br. at 3, 8; Aplt. Reply Br. at 3; 6 R. at 4-6. He suggests that the
government plainly understood it to be a request for a variance. Aplee. Br. at 7;
Aplt. Reply Br. at 3. Although the court mentioned the § 3553(a) factors, Mr.
Hernandez maintains that it did not explain why it included the two criminal
history points in the sentence in light of the factors. Aplt. Br. at 8-9.
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Based on our review of the record, Mr. Hernandez simply did not ask for a
variance. Rather, he asked the court to ignore two criminal history points in its
calculation of his advisory sentence. 6 R. at 4-6; 7 R. att. 2. at i. The
government did not preserve the variance issue merely by surmising that Mr.
Hernandez was asking the court in its “discretion” to not count the two criminal
history points. 6 R. at 17-18. Mr. Hernandez likewise did not object to the
district court’s explanation of its announced sentence. 6 R. at 33. Accordingly,
our review is for plain error.
Plain error requires that Mr. Hernandez establish: (1) error, (2) that is plain,
(3) which affects a defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Romero, 491
F.3d at 1178. The district court was required to compute the advisory Guidelines
sentence including the 2002 conviction. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596. We know of
no authority suggesting that a district court is required to sua sponte consider a
variance when it is not requested. Likewise, we find no procedural error in the
district court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors. The district court need not
provide a “lengthy explanation.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007);
United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 898 (10th Cir. 2008). It is apparent
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from the record and the sentencing colloquy that the district court considered the
factors. 6 R. at 28-30.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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