Mays v. Tulsa County Public Defender's Office , 354 F. App'x 314 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 25, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JERRY LEE MAYS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-5099
(D.C. No. 4:09-CV-00241-CVE-FHM)
TULSA COUNTY PUBLIC (N.D. Okla.)
DEFENDER’S OFFICE;
RICHARD WILLIAM COUCH,
Defendants-Appellees .
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Jerry Lee Mays, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s judgment dismissing with prejudice his claims that his
constitutional rights were violated when he was convicted due to the ineffective
assistance of his public defender. He brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
alleging that he is factually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted in
an Oklahoma state court, but he was nevertheless convicted due to his attorney’s
inadequate representation. He also requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP) on appeal. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We deny
Mr. Mays’s request to proceed IFP because he has failed to present “a reasoned,
nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on
appeal.” Watkins v. Leyba, 543 F.3d 624, 627 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation
omitted). We conclude that this appeal is frivolous and therefore will be
dismissed.
Background
After Mr. Mays was charged in an Oklahoma state court with various
crimes, defendant Richard William Couch, a public defender, was appointed to
represent him. Following a jury trial, Mr. Mays was convicted of shooting with
intent to kill, possession of a firearm, and assault and battery, all after former
conviction of two or more felonies. His convictions were affirmed on direct
appeal, and his sentences were modified to two consecutive prison terms of thirty
years each.
Mr. Mays then filed the underlying civil-rights action against his public
defender and the Tulsa County Public Defender’s Office. After evaluating the
complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the
district court dismissed the action with prejudice. The court held that the
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complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because to
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a constitutional violation by a
state actor, and neither the public defender nor the Tulsa County Public
Defender’s Office was a state actor. Further, the district court counted the
dismissal as a first “prior occasion” or “strike,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Appellate Jurisdiction and Scope of Appellate Review
Before considering the merits of Mr. Mays’s appeal, we must determine
this court’s jurisdiction. We also clarify the scope of review. This court does not
have jurisdiction over an untimely appeal. See United States v.
Ceballos-Martinez, 387 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2004).
The district court entered judgment of dismissal on April 27, 2009. On
May 1, 2009, Mr. Mays filed a motion to reconsider. Because this motion was
filed within ten days of the judgment, it tolled the time to file a notice of appeal.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A); see Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.9
(10th Cir. 2005) (explaining the general practice to treat a motion to reconsider
filed within ten days of a judgment as a tolling motion under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e)). The district court denied the motion to reconsider on May 6, 2009.
Accordingly, the deadline for filing a notice of appeal was June 5, 2009, see Rule
4(a)(1)(A), but Mr. Mays did not file a notice of appeal by that date. Instead, on
May 21, 2009, he filed a second motion to reconsider, which the district court
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construed as a motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), and denied on June 1,
2009.
Mr. Mays’s notice of appeal was filed with the district court on
July 2, 2009, one day past the deadline imposed by Rule 4(a)(1)(A). An inmate
confined in an institution may be entitled to the benefit of the prison-mailbox
rule, which provides that a notice of appeal “is timely if it is deposited in the
institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing.”
Rule 4(c)(1). A prisoner invoking this rule may show timely filing “by a
declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or by a notarized statement.”
Rule 4(c)(1). Mr. Mays has submitted an affidavit signed under penalty of
perjury in substantial compliance with § 1746 stating that he placed the notice of
appeal in the mail on July 1, 2009. He attached a copy of the envelope showing a
July 1 postmark and sufficient postage. We conclude that Mr. Mays has shown
that his notice of appeal was timely and that this court has appellate jurisdiction.
Our jurisdiction extends only to the order denying the Rule 60(b) motion,
however. The Rule 60(b) motion was filed more than ten days after the judgment,
so it did not toll the time to file a notice of appeal from the judgment. See
Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 439 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2006).
Therefore, we review the order denying the Rule 60(b) motion.
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Merits
We review an order denying relief under Rule 60(b) for an abuse of
discretion, “keeping in mind that Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary and may be
granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Butler v. Kempthorne, 532 F.3d
1108, 1110 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 952(2009). We liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings, but we do not serve as
his “attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v.
Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
In his Rule 60(b) motion, Mr. Mays challenged the district court’s
determination that defendants were not state actors within the meaning of § 1983.
He pursues this argument on appeal, although in this court he appears to limit his
claims to the Tulsa County Public Defender’s Office.
Mr. Mays’s appellate arguments consist almost entirely of conclusory
statements claiming baldly that his complaint stated a claim upon which relief
may be granted. His appellate brief comes close to disentitling him to appellate
review for failure to include any reasoned argument challenging the district
court’s judgment or pertinent legal authority. See Garrett, 425 F.3d at 841(holding that claim was waived on appeal where it was supported by “mere
conclusory allegations with no citations to the record or any legal authority for
support”); Wilburn v. Mid-South Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1281
(10th Cir. 2003) (“We . . . will not consider issues that are raised on appeal but
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not adequately addressed.”); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679
(10th Cir. 1998) (“Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are
waived[.]”); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (providing that an appellant’s brief must
contain “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the
authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies”).
Nevertheless, we have considered Mr. Mays’s argument that the district
court erred in holding that his public defender and the Tulsa County Public
Defender’s Office were not state actors for purposes of his § 1983 claims. We
find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Mr. Mays’s Rule 60(b) motion for
substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion and order dated
April 27, 2009. Moreover, we determine that this appeal is frivolous, pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), because Mr. Mays “has failed to present any legal theory
which could conceivably refute the district court’s disposition.” Davis v. Kan.
Dep’t of Corr., 507 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2007).
Prior Occasion
Having found this appeal to be frivolous and subject to dismissal under the
provisions of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), Mr. Mays is advised that the dismissal of this
appeal counts as a second “prior occasion” or “strike,” under § 1915(g). See
Davis, 507 F.3d at 1249 (holding that dismissals by district court and court of
appeals each count as a strike). Mr. Mays “is reminded that if he accrues three
strikes, he will no longer be able to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action
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filed in a federal court unless he is in imminent danger of physical injury.”
Thompson v. Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing § 1915(g)).
Conclusion
Mr. Mays’s request to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED, and he is ordered
to immediately remit the unpaid balance of the filing fee. This appeal is
DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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