MacArthur v. San Juan County , 355 F. App'x 243 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 10, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
ALISON DICKSON; DONNA
SINGER; FRED RIGGS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and No. 08-4148
(D.C. No. 2:00-CV-00584-BSJ)
MICHELLE LYMAN; HELEN (D. Utah)
VALDEZ; STEVEN MACARTHUR;
NATHANIEL PENN; CANDACE
LAWS; LINDA CACAPARDO;
SUE BURTON; AMY TERLAAK;
CANDACE HOLIDAY; NICOLE
ROBERTS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SAN JUAN COUNTY; SAN JUAN
HEALTH SERVICES DISTRICT; J.
TYRON LEWIS, Commissioner;
BILL REDD, Commissioner; CRAIG
HALLS; REID M. WOOD; CLEAL
BRADFORD; ROGER ATCITTY;
JOHN LEWIS; JOHN
HOUSEKEEPER; KAREN ADAMS;
PATSY SHUMWAY; JAMES D.
REDD; L. VAL JONES; MANFRED
R. NELSON; RICHARD BAILEY;
MARILEE BAILEY; ORA LEE
BLACK; GARY HOLLADAY; LORI
WALLACE; CARLA GRIMSHAW;
GLORIA YANITO; JULIE
BRONSON; LAURIE SCHAFER;
LYN STEVENS, San Juan County
Commissioner,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Dickson, Riggs and Singer (hereafter “Appellants”)
appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion for relief from this
court’s final judgment. The district court ruled that the law-of-the-case doctrine
prohibited it from considering Appellants’ new legal theories that a Navajo
Nation tribal court had subject-matter jurisdiction over defendants,
notwithstanding this court’s decision to the contrary. The court’s order also
granted defendants’ motion to enjoin Appellants from initiating any further
proceedings against them. We affirm.
Background. The factual background of this case is undisputed and is
thoroughly set forth in this court’s prior decision. MacArthur v. San Juan
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1060-1064 (10th Cir. 2007) (hereafter, “MacArthur III”).
Thus, we set forth only the procedural background necessary to resolve this
appeal. 1 Appellants and other plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Navajo Nation
tribal court against defendants San Juan County; San Juan Health Services
District (“SJHSD”); and numerous county officials, trustees and employees of
those entities (hereafter “Defendants”). Plaintiffs’ claims pertained to their
employment at the Montezuma Creek Health Clinic, operated by the SJHSD and
located in San Juan County, Utah, within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo
Nation. Some, but not all, of the plaintiffs were members of the Navajo Nation.
Only one of the Defendants, Mr. Atcitty, was a tribal member. In December
1999, the Navajo tribal court entered a sweeping preliminary injunction against
the Defendants. 2
1
Even this procedural recitation is streamlined. For example, in prior
related actions, Appellants and other plaintiffs brought numerous state and federal
law claims against the same defendants in federal court. In a 112-page decision,
the district court dismissed the majority of the claims under Federal Rule 16 and
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.
MacArthur v. San Juan County, 416 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1208-10 (D. Utah 2005).
This court dismissed the appeal as frivolous. MacArthur v. San Juan County,
495 F.3d 1157, 1158 (10th Cir. 2007).
2
The tribal court ordered Defendants to reinstate Ms. Singer and Mr. Riggs
to their employment positions; offer Ms. Dickson full time employment; expunge
plaintiffs’ disciplinary record; refrain from requiring physician assistants to
maintain time cards; and pay all of plaintiffs’ attorney fees and expenses.
MacArthur III, 497 F.3d at 1062. It further prohibited Defendants from
eliminating or interfering with certain medical services provided by the health
clinic. Id.
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– MacArthur I and II. Plaintiffs sought to enforce the tribal court’s
injunction and related tribal court orders by filing suit in federal district court,
seeking a declaratory judgment and a preliminary injunction. But the district
court ruled that it was prohibited from enforcing the tribal court orders because
Defendants enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit in tribal court, and it dismissed
plaintiffs’ complaint. On appeal, we remanded the matter to the district court,
directing it to conduct an analysis of the tribal court’s adjudicative authority over
Defendants in accordance with Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981),
before it addressed the sovereign immunity issue. MacArthur v. San Juan County,
309 F.3d 1216, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002) (hereafter “MacArthur I”). The district
court did so, and ultimately again granted judgment in favor of Defendants.
MacArthur v. San Juan County, 391 F. Supp. 2d 895, 1056-57 (D. Utah 2005)
(hereafter “MacArthur II”).
– MacArthur III. On appeal, a panel of this court ruled that the federal
courts must not recognize the tribal court orders because the Navajo tribal “court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction (i.e. adjudicatory authority) over nearly all of
Defendants’ activities.” MacArthur III, 497 F.3d at 1067. We first rejected
plaintiffs’ argument that the federal court lacked authority to do anything but
enforce the tribal court orders. We ruled that the question of whether a tribal
court has regulatory and adjudicatory authority, and thus whether a federal court
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can enforce a tribal court order, is a matter of federal law giving rise to
subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 1066.
We then began our analysis of the merits with Montana, 450 U.S. 544, “the
pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers.” Strate v.
A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997). Montana held that, as a general rule,
“‘the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities
of nonmembers of the tribe.’” MacArthur III, 497 F.3d at 1068 (quoting
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). Montana recognized two “narrow exceptions” to that
general presumption: (1) a “‘tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements’”; and (2) a “‘tribe may . . . exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.’” Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S.
at 565-66).
Applying Montana’s general rule and two exceptions to the facts relevant
to each plaintiff and each defendant, this court ultimately ruled that Montana’s
general presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction applied to all Defendants
except one, Mr. Atcitty. Consequently, we held that Defendants’ employment
activities were beyond the regulatory and, therefore, adjudicative, authority of the
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Navajo Nation. MacArthur III, 497 F.3d 1070-1076. 3 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari review. MacArthur v. San Juan County, 128 S. Ct. 1229 (2008).
Rule 60(b) Motion. Following MacArthur III, Appellants filed numerous
motions in federal and tribal court seeking to avoid the MacArthur III decision.
At issue in this appeal is Appellants’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
motion asking the district court to alter the holding of MacArthur III, particularly
its reliance on the legal precedents set forth in Montana. In a detailed and
scholarly published decision, the district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion.
MacArthur v. San Juan County, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1251 (D. Utah 2008)
(hereafter “MacArthur IV”). It discussed Appellants’ new legal theories, but held
it was prohibited under the law-of-the-case doctrine from reconsidering the issues
answered by MacArthur III. It also granted a permanent injunction against
Appellants and their attorneys from proceeding in any forum to relitigate the
questions of jurisdiction, immunity and enforceability of tribal court orders
already decided by the Tenth Circuit in MacArthur III. Id.
In their Rule 60(b) motion, Appellants “canvasse[d] the treaties and statutes
defining the legal relationship between the United States and the Navajo Nation”
and argued that there is no express legal basis supporting Montana’s presumption
that tribal courts generally lack civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. MacArthur
3
We exercised our discretion to refuse to enforce the tribal court judgment
as to those claims asserted against defendant Atcitty, over which the tribal court
arguably had subject-matter jurisdiction. MacArthur III, 497 F.3d at 1076.
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IV, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. Appellants also argued that the federal courts lack
authority to decide the Navajo Nation’s jurisdiction in the first place. They
further asserted that the federal courts could not decide the question of the Navajo
Nation’s adjudicatory authority in this case because the Navajo Nation was not a
party to the litigation. Further, they argued that because the Navajo Nation had
entered into a contract with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) concerning its
judicial programs, pursuant to Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008), its tribal
courts were “executive agreement claims settlement courts whose acts are entitled
to full force and effect in the courts of the United States.” MacArthur IV, 566 F.
Supp. 2d at 1247 (quotation marks omitted).
In its exhaustive decision, the district court recited the history of the
relevant legislation and Supreme Court decisions preceding and culminating in
Montana’s holding that tribal courts have very limited civil authority over
nonmembers and nonmember activities within tribal boundaries. Id. at 1242-44.
It acknowledged that scholars and even some members of the Supreme Court
dispute the rule and reasoning of the Montana decision. Id. at 1249.
Nonetheless, it ruled that the Supreme Court’s decision in Montana, which
continues to be followed by the Court, is binding on all lower federal courts,
including it and the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 1245. The district court further ruled
that the Navajo Nation was not a necessary party to the determination of the
jurisdictional issues in this case, distinguishing cases relied upon by Appellants in
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which the litigation was against the tribe itself. Id. at 1245-46. The court
explained that, by bringing an action in federal court seeking enforcement of the
tribal orders, Appellants had invoked the federal court’s jurisdiction under
§ 1331, including its authority to decide the tribal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction over the Defendants. Id. at 1246-47. Finally, it ruled that the Navajo
Nation’s contract with the BIA was nothing more than a contract to provide
financial assistance, and it did not alter or supercede any of the relevant
legislation or judicial precedent concerning tribal civil authority over
nonmembers. Id. at 1247-48. Ultimately, the district court ruled that Appellants’
arguments as to the tribal court’s jurisdiction and the federal court’s authority to
resolve those issues had been answered by MacArthur III, and, thus, under the
law-of-the-case doctrine, the district court lacked any authority to deviate from
the Tenth Circuit’s mandate. Id. at 1250-51.
Analysis. Appellants argue on appeal, as they did before the district court,
that “[t]his case presents an opportunity . . . to eliminate the Montana doctrine
from application to the Navajo Nation and . . . mak[e] Navajo law the ‘Supreme
Law of the Land[,]’ binding on all Courts domestically.” Opening Br. at 5. They
contend that (1) all of the federal court decisions in this case were in excess of
their constitutional Article III authority and, therefore, are void; (2) Congress and
the Executive Branch have entered into treaties with the Navajo Nation, such that
all Navajo Nation tribal court actions are binding on the federal courts, pursuant
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to Medellin, 129 S. Ct. 360; and (3) they were denied due process by not being
allowed to litigate the applicability of the Montana doctrine before it was
mandatorily applied by the Tenth Circuit in MacArthur I.
Appellants’ lengthy and novel legal theories set forth in their Rule 60(b)
motion and their opening brief all seek, quite simply, to relitigate the very same
questions already addressed by this court in MacArthur III: namely, did the tribal
court have subject matter jurisdiction over the nonmember Defendants in this
matter, and do the federal courts have jurisdiction to answer this question. This
court has answered both questions, ruling that the tribal court did not have
jurisdiction over the nonmember Defendants and that the federal courts do have
jurisdiction to determine that issue.
Appellants are simply arguing that the Montana and MacArthur III
decisions were error. Montana has not been overruled, see Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co. Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2719-20 (2008),
and MacArthur III is both a published decision of this court and the final decision
in this case. “[T]his panel is bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court
and the published decisions of this court.” Tootle v. USDB Commandant,
390 F.3d 1280, 1283 (10th Cir. 2004). More specifically, the district court and
this panel are precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine from revisiting the issues
decided in MacArthur III.
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Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, “when a court decides upon a rule of
law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages
in the same case.” Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). Under this
doctrine, “both district courts and appellate courts are generally bound by a prior
appellate decision in the same case.” Alphamed, Inc. v. B. Braun Medical, Inc.,
367 F.3d 1280, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2004). “It is a rule based on sound public
policy that litigation should come to an end . . . by preventing continued
re-argument of issues already decided.” Gage v. Gen. Motors Corp., 796 F.2d
345, 349 (10th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted). If it were not for the
law-of-the-case doctrine, “there would be no end to a suit if every obstinate
litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms on their
opinions, or speculate of chances from changes in its members.” Roberts v.
Cooper, 61 U.S. 467, 481 (1857).
We cannot find anywhere in Appellants’ sixty-two page opening brief or
fifty-three page reply brief where they even contend the district court erred in
denying their Rule 60(b) claims under the law-of-the-case doctrine. The only
time Appellants even acknowledge this doctrine is in an argument in their reply
brief headed, “The Law of the Case Being Navajo Law Supports These
Plaintiffs.” Reply Br. at 20. There, Appellants simply make the circular
argument that one aspect of the holding of MacArthur I–remanding the case to the
district court to address the Montana doctrine in the first instance–should be
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deemed the law of the case, ostensibly in an erroneous belief this would enable
them to continue challenging the Montana doctrine.
The law of the case as determined in MacArthur III continues to control
this matter. Thus, the district court did not err in following the rulings of this
court that Montana controls the legal analysis of the jurisdictional issues and,
applying Montana, that the tribal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of the nonmember Defendants.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Appellants’ Rule 60(b)
motion.
Injunction. In its order, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to
permanently enjoin Appellants Singer, Riggs and Dickson, individually and
through their counsel of record, from seeking to enforce certain orders issued by
the Navajo tribal court in any judicial proceeding before any court as against any
of the Defendants, and it permanently enjoined these Appellants from prosecuting
any claim for damages or other relief in tribal court against the Defendants over
whom the MacArthur III decision determined the tribal court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction. MacArthur IV, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1251. We cannot
find any place in Appellants’ opening brief or even their reply brief where they
challenge that ruling. “Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed
abandoned or waived.” Coleman v. B-G. Maint. Mgmt. of Colorado, 108 F.3d
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1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the district court’s injunction against
Appellants is affirmed.
Defendants’ Rule 38 Request. Defendants request that we find Appellants’
appeal to be frivolous and to award damages to the Defendants pursuant to Fed.
R. App. P. 38. Rule 38 empowers this court to “award just damages and single or
double costs to the appellee” if we determine that an appeal is frivolous.
We are very mindful of the extreme expense and time imposed on the
Defendants by Appellants’ repeated arguments challenging the same issues
already litigated in MacArthur III. There is a strong argument for the imposition
of Rule 38 damages against Appellants for their endless attempts to relitigate the
same matters previously decided by this court. Nonetheless, we also note that the
district court spent considerable time and effort to address Appellants’ arguments,
and in so doing, concluded that, while barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine, at
least some aspects of their arguments were not frivolous. See MacArthur IV,
566 F. Supp. 2d at 1245 n.2. We respect the district court’s opinion in this
matter, and we greatly appreciate the patient and laborious effort undertaken by
the district court in issuing such a thorough decision. We therefore deny the
Defendants’ request for damages
Nonetheless, we cannot emphasize to Appellants strongly enough that this
matter is at an end. We caution Appellants that if they file any future appeal or
other motion or filing in this court seeking to relitigate any issue in this case, the
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filing may be summarily dismissed and Appellants may be subject to the
imposition of sanctions, including damages and filing restrictions, if the filing is
found to be frivolous.
The district court’s denial of Appellants’ Rule 60(b) motion and its
permanent injunction issued in MacArthur IV are AFFIRMED. Appellants’
motion to certify to the Supreme Court the question of the binding effect of the
Navajo Nation’s tribal court’s orders is DENIED. Defendants’ requests for
damages under Rule 38 are DENIED. Defendants’ combined motion to dismiss
this appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tenth Circuit Rule
27.2, is DENIED as moot.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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