Collins v. Jordan , 434 F. App'x 758 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 26, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHASE CORBIN COLLINS,
Plaintiff–Appellant, No. 11-3072
v. (D.C. No. 5:10-CV-03109-SAC)
DON JORDAN, Secretary, Kansas (D. Kan.)
Department of SRS, in his official
capacity; the KANSAS ATTORNEY
GENERAL,
Defendants–Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Chase Collins, a Kansas state prisoner, filed this § 1983 action
alleging he had been denied a copy of a psychological evaluation filed in his 2003
state court civil commitment proceeding as a sexually violent predator under the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator’s Act (“KSVPA”). He also alleges he was
unlawfully denied access to an attorney during his annual KSVPA reviews from
2003 to 2008. Upon review of his complaint, the district court concluded Mr.
Collins’ allegations of constitutional error should be pursued under a petition for
habeas corpus rather than under § 1983. The court also determined Mr. Collins
must first exhaust his state court remedies, observing that it had previously
admonished Mr. Collins in 2008 to first file a state habeas petition under K.S.A.
§60-1501 before filing a habeas petition in federal court. The court finally noted
that § 1983 cannot provide relief for any violations of state law Mr. Collins may
allege. It first ordered Mr. Collins to show cause why his complaint should not
be dismissed as stating no claim upon which relief could be granted under § 1983.
Upon review of Mr. Collins’ response, the court dismissed Mr. Collins’
complaint for failure to state a claim and concluded a habeas petition would be
the appropriate remedy once Mr. Collins had exhausted his state remedies.
We review the court’s dismissal of Mr. Collins’ complaint de novo. In this
case, however, we agree with the district court’s reasoning. Section 1983 is an
appropriate forum to challenge conditions of confinement, but habeas is the
appropriate vehicle for relief from the confinement itself. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(a); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“[A] state prisoner’s §
1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought
(damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state
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conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that
action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration.”). Since Mr. Collins argues that violations of his due process rights
necessarily compel his release from all further commitment under the KSVPA, §
1983 is not the proper forum for his allegations. Mr. Collins’ request for
appointment of counsel in support of this complaint is similarly denied as moot.
We therefore AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons stated by the
district court in its order to show cause and its later order dismissing Mr. Collins’
complaint without prejudice. Because the district court granted Mr. Collins’
earlier motion to proceed in forma pauperis, his motion for IFP filed with this
appeal is denied as moot. Appellant is reminded of his obligation to continue
making partial payments of the appellate fees.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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