Roberts v. America's Wholesale Lender , 525 F. App'x 675 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                              FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS       Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          May 7, 2013
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    WILLIAM J. ROBERTS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                        No. 12-4088
    (D.C. No. 2:11-CV-00597-DB)
    AMERICA’S WHOLESALE LENDER;                                 (D. Utah)
    BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, L.P.,
    f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans
    Servicing; RECONTRUST COMPANY,
    N.A.; COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS,
    INC.; U.S. BANK NATIONAL
    ASSOCIATION; RUSSELL S.
    WALKER,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and
    MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
    appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    William J. Roberts, appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s order
    dismissing his complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    In 2003, Mr. Roberts took out a loan from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
    (CHL), doing business as America’s Wholesale Lender (AWL), in the amount of
    $102,000 that Mr. Roberts used to refinance a property in Salt Lake City, Utah. In
    connection with the loan, Mr. Roberts executed a Note and a Deed of Trust (REFI
    Deed) that granted CHL a secured interest in the property. AWL also appeared as the
    lender on the REFI Deed. AWL later assigned its beneficial interest under the REFI
    Deed to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (BAC-HLS). In turn, BAC-HLS appointed
    ReconTrust Company, N.A. (ReconTrust) as the successor trustee.
    When Mr. Roberts defaulted on the loan, ReconTrust scheduled a non-judicial
    foreclosure sale of the property. That sale did not take place because Mr. Roberts
    and CHL/AWL agreed to postpone the sale in light of the state-court suit filed by
    Mr. Roberts in which he asserted claims against CHL/AWL for: (1) declaratory
    judgment; (2) quiet title; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) reckless/intentional infliction of
    emotional distress; (5) fraud; and (6) an accounting. The case was removed to
    federal court on grounds of diversity.
    AWL, BAC-HLS, and ReconTrust moved to dismiss. Following briefing and
    oral argument, the magistrate judge issued a comprehensive and well-reasoned report
    and recommendation in which he examined all of the claims and recommended that
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    the motion to dismiss be granted. The district court overruled Mr. Robert’s
    objections, and adopted the report and recommendation. Mr. Roberts now appeals.1
    We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for
    failure to state a claim. MediaNews Grp., Inc. v. McCarthey, 
    494 F.3d 1254
    , 1260
    (10th Cir. 2007). “Because this is a diversity case, we apply the substantive law of
    the forum state, Utah,” in analyzing the claims. 
    Id.
    In his opening brief, Mr. Roberts never mentions his claims for declaratory
    relief or an accounting. Further, he makes only passing reference to the claims for
    unjust enrichment and reckless/intentional infliction of emotional distress. These
    “arguments,” however are simply declarations without any legal support.
    Admittedly, Mr. Roberts’s discussion of the quiet title claim is slightly more detailed,
    but he once again fails to cite any relevant legal authority. Simply put, Mr. Roberts’s
    failure to adequately develop any argument means that he has forfeited appellate
    review on these claims. See, e.g., Bronson v. Swensen, 
    500 F.3d 1099
    , 1104
    (10th Cir. 2007).2
    1
    Between the time that the magistrate judge issued his report and
    recommendation but before the district court entered its order, Mr. Roberts filed a
    motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The court
    denied Mr. Roberts’s request in its order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and
    recommendation. Mr. Roberts does not appeal from that ruling.
    2
    Although Mr. Roberts does mention “mortgage fraud” in his opening brief, this
    claim is linked to an issue that Mr. Roberts never raised in the district court, and we
    decline to consider it on appeal, as explained infra.
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    We acknowledge that Mr. Roberts is proceeding pro se, but that does not
    excuse him from “follow[ing] the same rules of procedure that govern other
    litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 
    425 F.3d 836
    , 840 (10th Cir.
    2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not enough for a party on appeal to
    simply state that the trial court erred without advancing “reasoned argument as to the
    grounds for the appeal.” Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, Colo., 
    518 F.3d 1217
    ,
    1223 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead,
    [u]nder [Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure] 28, which applies equally
    to pro se litigants, a brief must contain more than a generalized assertion
    of error, with citations to supporting authority. When a pro se litigant
    fails to comply with that rule, we cannot fill the void by crafting
    arguments and performing the necessary legal research.
    Garrett, 
    425 F.3d at 841
     (ellipsis, citation, brackets and internal quotation marks
    omitted). Nonetheless, we have examined the record, considered the applicable law,
    and discern no reversible error.
    There are two issues that Mr. Roberts does raise in his brief. First, he argues
    that “AWL was a fictitious entity” and thus could not “execute any legally binding
    documents.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 7. As a result, he reasons that AWL’s assignment
    of its beneficial interest under the REFI Deed was ineffective, and ReconTrust lacked
    the authority to foreclose. The issue of whether AWL was a “fictitious entity” was
    thoroughly analyzed by the magistrate judge, who took “judicial notice of the New
    York State document . . . which shows AWL . . . is a trade name for [CHL].” R. Vol.
    1 at 822. The district court noted that Mr. Roberts’s “objection concerning the
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    corporate identity of [AWL] was carefully considered and addressed by the
    magistrate judge,” who concluded that the “claims challenging AWL’s corporate
    identity were without factual or legal basis.” 
    Id. at 843
    .
    Mr. Roberts relies on two cases to support the argument that AWL lacked the
    authority to assign a beneficial interest in the REFI Deed. But those cases, America’s
    Wholesale Lender v. Pagano, 
    866 A.2d 698
     (Conn. App. Ct. 2005), and America’s
    Wholesale Lender v. Silberstein, 
    866 A.2d 695
     (Conn. App. Ct. 2005), are inapposite.
    First, these cases apply the substantive law of Connecticut. In this diversity case, the
    substantive law of Utah applies. See MediaNews, 
    494 F.3d at 1260
    . Second, and
    more to the point, these cases hold that because a trade name is not an entity with
    legal capacity to sue under Connecticut law, AWL lacks standing to file suit in
    Connecticut state court. In this case, however, AWL did not file suit against
    Mr. Roberts. As such, AWL’s standing to sue is not an issue.
    The other issue raised by Mr. Roberts is that neither AWL nor BAC-HLS have
    standing to pursue foreclosure of the property because Fannie Mae owns the Note
    and REFI Deed. He also argues that BAC-HLS committed mortgage fraud because it
    “knew Fannie Mae was the beneficial owner of the [REFI] Deed and Note.” Aplt.
    Opening Br. at 9. Mr. Roberts, however, did not raise these arguments in the district
    court. Because he has not argued for plain-error review in his opening brief on
    appeal, the arguments are forfeited. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 
    634 F.3d 1123
    ,
    1131 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he failure to argue for plain error and its application
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    on appeal . . . surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first
    presented to the district court.”).
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    Entered for the Court
    John C. Porfilio
    Senior Circuit Judge
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