Dixon v. Calbone ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 8, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
TER RENCE EU G EN E D IX O N ,
Petitioner - A ppellant,
No. 06-6188
v.
(D.C. No. CIV-05-1176-W )
(W .D. Okla.)
SAM CA LBO NE,
Respondent - Appellee.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Terrence D ixon, an O klahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. For substantially the same reasons set forth by the
district court, we D EN Y a COA and DISM ISS.
Dixon challenges his June 13, 2003 conviction, following a jury trial, for
distribution of cocaine. He was sentenced to a term of thirty-three years’
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
imprisonment. Dixon sought relief on direct and collateral appeal from the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) before bringing this timely
petition in federal court. D ixon advances six grounds for habeas relief: (1) H e
was denied a fair trial because the trial court failed to give a cautionary
eyewitness identification instruction to the jury; (2) The state w ithheld
exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. M aryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (3)
The warrantless entry into his home by arresting officers violated the Fourth
A mendm ent; (4) H e received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (5) He
received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (6) The state knowingly
used perjured testimony.
Claims one and two w ere heard on direct appeal by the O CCA, and thus a
writ of habeas corpus as to either claim may not issue unless the state court
adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In order to issue a COA as to
any of Dixon’s claims, we must find that “jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
-2-
was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000). 1
W e turn first to Dixon’s claim that his right to a fair trial was impaired by
the trial court’s failure to give a cautionary eyewitness instruction. Dixon was
identified at trial as the seller of cocaine by the undercover officer who made the
purchase. Sergeant Benavides was subject to cross-examination and did not
equivocate in his identification of Dixon as the seller. W e take a highly
deferential view of state jury instructions challenged in a habeas petition, finding
error only when “they are so fundamentally unfair as to deprive petitioner of a
fair trial and to due process of law .” Tyler v. Nelson, 163 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th
Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). To prevail on this claim, Dixon
must demonstrate not merely that the trial court should have given the instruction,
but that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair in the absence of the
instruction. There is no federal case law establishing a constitutional violation on
these facts. 2 Thus, the OCCA cannot be said to have unreasonably applied federal
1
The A ntiterrorism and Effective D eath Penalty Act conditions a
petitioner’s right to appeal a denial of habeas relief under § 2254 upon a grant of
a COA .
2
W e have previously held that where an eyewitness identification is “clear
and unequivocal,” and supported by corroborating evidence, the trial court did not
commit abuse of discretion in failing to issue a jury instruction on the possible
infirmities of such an identification. United States v. M cGuire, 200 F.3d 668,
676-77 (10th Cir. 1999).
-3-
law in upholding the trial court’s discretion on this point, nor can Dixon
demonstrate any fundamental unfairness as a result.
In his second claim, Dixon alleges that the state committed a Brady
violation by failing to produce certain evidence: a piece of paper on which the
cocaine seller wrote his phone number, and photographs taken by the police after
the arrest that may show other people in the house at the time of the sale. To
establish a Brady violation in the context of a habeas petition, Dixon must show
that “(1) the prosecutor suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to
the defendant as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; and (3) the evidence was
material.” Gonzales v. M cKune, 247 F.3d 1066, 1075 (10th Cir. 2001), vacated
in part on other grounds, 279 F.3d 922, 924 (10th Cir. 2002). To establish the
evidence was material, Dixon must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” K nighton v. M ullin, 293 F.3d 1165, 1172 (10th Cir. 2002).
If he had access to both the paper and the photographs, Dixon argues, he
would have been able to buttress his misidentification defense. In light of Officer
Benavides’ eyewitness identification, however, we are hard-pressed to hold that
the OCCA misapplied federal law in denying Dixon’s Brady claim on appeal.
Further, Dixon thoroughly pursued his misidentification defense at trial, testifying
about both the paper given to Benavides and the photographs taken after the
arrest. The state offered into evidence a photograph of Timothy Dorris, the man
-4-
Dixon argues sold the drugs, to allow the jury to make a comparison. Although
the evidence Dixon alleges w as suppressed might have supported his
misidentification theory, it does not meet the standard for materiality. W e find no
fault in the OCCA’s determination on this point.
Dixon’s third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims for relief were defaulted in
state court because Dixon failed to raise them on direct appeal, as required by
Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Procedure A ct. Okla. St. tit. 22, § 1086. W e are
precluded from reviewing claims defaulted on adequate state procedural grounds
unless Dixon demonstrates “cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.” Smith v. M ullin, 379 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir. 2004). Because Dixon
does not present evidence sufficient to meet the “cause and prejudice” or
“fundamental miscarriage of justice” standards, we are foreclosed from
considering those claims on the merits. See Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253,
1265-66 (10th Cir. 2001).
W e have excepted ineffective assistance of counsel claims from the normal
procedural default rules, precluding them “only when ‘trial and appellate counsel
differ’ and the ‘claim can be resolved upon the trial record alone.’” M ullin, 379
F.3d at 926 (quoting English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998)).
Although Dixon’s trial and appellate attorneys were different, a petitioner has not
benefitted from “separate” counsel when both trial and appellate counsel work in
the same Public D efender’s office. Cannon v. M ullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1173 (10th
-5-
Cir. 2004). In this case Dixon was represented at trial and on appeal by attorneys
from the Oklahoma City Public Defender’s office. Accordingly, we must look to
the merits of Dixon’s claims. See Hickman v. Spears, 160 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th
Cir. 1998).
Under the two-part test established by the Court in Strickland v.
W ashington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Dixon must prove that “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “any
deficiencies in counsel’s performance [were] prejudicial to the defense.” Id. at
688, 692. W e examine such claims with a “strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at
689. In applying the Strickland standard, “we look to the merits of the omitted
issue” in the context of counsel’s overall defense strategy. Neill v. Gibson, 278
F.3d 1044, 1057 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hooks v. W ard, 184 F.3d 1206, 1221
(10th Cir. 1999)). Further deference is credited to the OCCA under A EDPA, in
that we grant relief only if the OCCA unreasonably applied the Strickland
standard. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
The first issue Dixon points to is his appellate counsel’s failure to argue
that the arresting officers lacked probable cause to enter his home and arrest him. 3
3
It is unclear whether counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in failing to
challenge the arrest and search is limited to appellate counsel or extends to
Dixon’s trial counsel as well. In Dixon’s brief in support of his state petition for
post-conviction relief, he argued that trial counsel “failed to challenge this error
(continued...)
-6-
Specifically, Dixon alleges that because the arresting officers had no cause to
make a warrantless entry into his home, counsel should have moved to exclude
any evidence obtained pursuant to that search. As noted in the m agistrate judge’s
report, had appellate counsel raised this issue, the OCCA would have limited its
review to plain error in light of trial counsel’s failure to object at trial. See
M itchell v. State, 136 P.3d 671, 696 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006). Although we have
not examined the validity of arrests made following a “bust” signal given by an
undercover agent invited into a home to complete a drug purchase, other circuits
have found that warrantless entries by arresting officers under similar
circumstances do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Janik,
723 F.2d 537, 548 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478
(9th Cir. 1996). Dixon cites no case law in his brief that would have led his trial
or appellate counsel to believe Dixon’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated or
that a motion to suppress would have been sustained. As a result, we determine
that the OCCA did not misapply Strickland in dismissing Dixon’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on this issue.
3
(...continued)
properly.” Because there is no evidence in the record indicating the arrest
violated the Fourth Amendment, we are not required to distinguish between the
two as to this underlying issue. To the extent that Dixon’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claim incorporates the first and second claims in this petition, there
was no constitutional error on those claims, and hence neither trial nor appellate
counsel were ineffective in failing to raise those issues.
-7-
Dixon finally argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to
challenge the prosecution’s presentation of perjured testimony. In his brief to this
Court, Dixon does not specify which testimony was perjured, or adduce any
evidence of perjury beyond his facial claim. Even construing his claim liberally
and referencing his brief to the district court on this issue, Dixon’s allegation that
the testimony of Officers Benavides and Carter was inconsistent with their earlier
statements does not provide us with adequate guidance to address his perjury
claim. Consequently, we are precluded from finding that the OCCA misapplied
Strickland as to this underlying issue.
Dixon’s request for a COA is DENIED and his petition is DISM ISSED.
Because we conclude that Dixon presents a “reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on
the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal,” M cIntosh v. U.S.
Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted), we
G R A N T his motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
-8-