United States v. Griffin ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT October 24, 2013
___________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 12-3282
THOMAS GRIFFIN, JR., (D.C. No. 11-CR-10187-MLB-1)
(D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
____________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.**
____________________________________
Defendant Thomas Griffin pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1343. Applying the 2011 Guidelines Manual, the presentence report (PSR)
assigned him a total offense level of 16 and a criminal history category of III, yielding a
Guideline sentencing range of 27–33 months. See U.S.S.G. § 5A. At sentencing, the
district court varied upward and sentenced Defendant to 60 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Defendant argues his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, we affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously
to grant the parties= request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed.
R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted
without oral argument.
I.
Defendant acknowledged in his plea agreement that his codefendant, Jordan
Smith, had burglarized residences and businesses and had purchased property knowing it
was stolen. Defendant then helped Smith sell these items on Craigslist by (1) letting
Smith use Defendant’s phone number as a point of contact for prospective buyers and (2)
serving as a conduit between Smith and the buyers. The PSR indicated Smith and
Defendant’s scheme involved approximately thirty residential burglaries, and some
burglaries and thefts from cars and businesses. The PSR also noted items taken during
the residential burglaries were later found at Defendant’s residence.
The PSR also listed Defendant’s criminal history, which included 19 prior
convictions. Most of these convictions were for traffic or related violations. Three
convictions were more serious. These included (1) a 2006 juvenile conviction for
residential burglary when Defendant was fifteen, (2) a 2007 juvenile conviction for auto
burglary, and (3) a 2009 adult conviction for petit theft of a lawnmower from the
backyard of a residence. Defendant was still on probation for this 2009 conviction when
he committed the instant offense. The PSR also listed numerous arrests not resulting in
conviction, including charges for misdemeanor theft, possession of marijuana, cruelty to
animals, and kidnapping. The PSR calculated a 27–33 month Guidelines sentencing
range based on the nature of the wire fraud, Defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, and
his criminal history. The PSR also stated Defendant believed he was addicted to Alcohol
and Lortab, a pain killer; however, he made no efforts to seek treatment for these
addictions prior to sentencing.
1
Prior to sentencing, the district court filed a letter pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Pro.
32(h) stating it was considering an upward variance from the Guidelines range. The
court justified the possible variance based on a number of 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) factors.
These included: (1) Defendant’s criminal history, which indicated he was an individual
undeterred from criminal activity not withstanding numerous run-ins with the law; (2) the
need to protect the public from further crimes; and (3) Defendant’s need for substance
abuse counseling, combined with his lack of interest in participating in such counseling.
In response to the 32(h) letter, Defendant provided a memorandum stating he
wished to postpone counseling until he went to prison because he was employed full-time
and was taking care of his children and his sick mother. Defendant and two others also
testified to these facts at his sentencing hearing. The court also reviewed letters
submitted by Defendant’s relatives and pastor stating he had turned his life around.
At sentencing, the court adopted its 32(h) letter and sentenced Defendant to 60
months’ imprisonment plus two years of supervised release with a special condition that
he attends a substance abuse program. The court stated: “[B]asically for the reasons set
forth in my [32(h)] letter, I feel an upward variance is appropriate to meet the factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C Section 3553. . . . I really don’t have anything to add beyond what’s in
the letter.” The court also made sure its 32(h) letter was docketed for review. Defendant
did not object to the court’s sentencing procedure. On appeal however, he now argues
that his sentence is (1) procedurally unreasonable because the court failed to adequately
explain its upward variance and (2) substantively unreasonable because the factors the
court cited do not justify its upward variance. We address each argument in turn.
2
II.
Defendant argues the district court committed procedural error in four ways.
According to Defendant, the court (1) failed to address his non-frivolous arguments for
leniency; (2) based its decision on clearly-erroneous facts; (3) failed to adequately
explain the chosen sentence; and (4) failed to consider one of the § 3553(a) factors,
namely, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6). Defendant did
not preserve these procedural challenges below. Accordingly, we review them only for
plain error. United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2012). Plain error
requires that Defendant show: (1) error; that is (2) obvious under current well-settled law;
(3) affected the Defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.A.
A sentencing court must “address, in its statement of reasons, the material, non-
frivolous arguments made by the defendant.” United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 833
(10th Cir. 2008). The court need not, “recite ‘any magic words’ to demonstrate that it has
considered all of the relevant arguments, but we will not ‘presume the district court
weighed a party’s arguments in light of the § 3553(a) factors where the record provides
no indication that it did so.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d
1109, 1116 (10th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added). Rather, when a defendant makes a non-
frivolous argument for leniency, the court “must somehow indicate” it considered his
arguments and did not rely solely on the PSR or the Guideline range. See United States
v. Jarrillo-Luna, 478 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007).
3
Defendant relies on Sanchez-Juarez to argue the district court failed to address his
non-frivolous arguments for mitigation. This reliance is misplaced. In Sanchez-Juarez,
the district court failed to address the defendant’s non-frivolous arguments for leniency at
all, and instead simply restated its reliance on the PSR and sentencing Guidelines when
sentencing the defendant. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1112. Here, the court specifically
stated it had reviewed the witness testimony, the letters submitted by Defendant, and
Defendant’s sentencing memorandum. Further, in its 32(h) letter, it stated that it would
not rely exclusively on the PSR. Thus, unlike Sanchez-Juarez, the court here committed
no error, let alone plain error, as it gave some indication it had considered and then
rejected Defendant’s arguments for leniency.
B.
Sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts constitutes procedural error. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Defendant’s only argument that the court relied
on clearly erroneous facts appears in a footnote on page 17 of his opening brief. He
argues the district court relied on a clearly erroneous fact when it did not retreat from the
assertion in its 32(h) letter that Defendant was not interested in participating in substance
abuse counseling. Defendant argues this is clearly erroneous in light of the evidence he
submitted that shows he had not declined treatment, but instead wished to postpone it
until he entered prison because he had no time to engage in such treatment.
Defendant was released on bond more than one year before sentencing. In that
time, nothing in the record suggests he made any effort to find out how long a treatment
program might last or the time commitment such a program might entail. Given the
4
absence of any effort on Defendant’s part to even research treatment programs, the
court’s conclusion that he was not truly interested in substance abuse counseling was not
clearly erroneous. Thus, the court did not err.
C.
Defendant cites an unreported case for the proposition that, “if the court imposes a
sentence outside the Guidelines range, [18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)] requires the court to
provide ‘the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from [the
Guidelines range].’” United States v. Ruiz-Velgara, 302 F. App'x 765, 767 (10th Cir.
2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)). “We have never held, however, that the district
court must list the reasons why it could have chosen a different sentence and then explain
why it rejected them.” United States v. Jarrillo-Luna, 478 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir.
2007) overruled on other grounds, United States v. Lopez-Macias, 661 F.3d 485 (10th
Cir. 2011). Rather, under Gall, a sentencing explanation is adequate when it allows “for
meaningful review” and “promote[s] the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at
50 (2007). “[A]lthough a district court must provide reasoning sufficient to support the
chosen variance, it need not necessarily provide ‘extraordinary’ facts to justify any
statutorily permissible sentencing variance.” United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 807
(10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). “Generally, when a sentence that varies from the
advisory Guidelines range is nevertheless tethered to the Guidelines themselves by,
taking into account, e.g., criminal history, offense characteristics, and offense levels,
5
we . . . consider this a reasonable methodology.” 1 United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295,
1314 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the sentencing court tied its upward variance to the reasons in its 32(h)
letter. This letter notes (1) Defendant’s criminal history, which “strongly suggest[s] an
individual who is undeterred from criminal activity notwithstanding his numerous
contacts with the criminal justice system,” (2) the need to protect the public, and (3)
Defendant’s need for substance abuse counseling. These reasons are tethered to the
Guidelines themselves. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Thus, the court committed no error,
here, as it provided at least three specific reasons for its upward variance which is
sufficient explanation to allow for meaningful review of Defendant’s sentence.
D.
Neither Defendant nor his counsel raised sentencing disparity before the district
court. Thus, as with Defendant’s other procedural error arguments, “we review this
newly raised argument for plain error.” Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1248. Defendant argues that,
under United States v. Lente, 647 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2011), he need not challenge the
district court’s failure to discuss sentencing disparities to preserve the issue for appeal.
He also argues Lente mandates express consideration of sentencing disparity by the
sentencing court whenever it varies upward. Defendant reads Lente too broadly. In
Lente, the defendant “devoted much of her briefing and argument” before the district
1
More explanation may be required in the context of an upward departure. See United
States v. Proffit, 304 F.3d 1001, 1012 (10th Cir. 2002). Here, however, the court did not
depart, but rather varied upward and tethered the reasons for its variance to the
Guidelines themselves.
6
court to the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, yet it failed to address the
issue. Lente, 647 F.3d at 1034 (emphasis added). On appeal, we held the defendant’s
sentencing-disparity argument was material and non-frivolous and thus the court’s failure
to expressly address it was procedural error. Id. at 1035. As, here, Defendant did not
raise sentencing disparity before the district court at all, we find Gantt more apropos.
In Gantt, we upheld an upward variance to 20 years imprisonment from the
Guideline sentence of seven years. Id. In doing so, we rejected the defendant’s argument
that the court failed to address sentencing disparity. Id. Instead, we reiterated that the
district court need not expressly discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 1249; see
also Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1116 (holding a sentencing court “is not obligated to
expressly weigh on the record each of the factors set out in § 3553(a)”). Further, we
stated, “one can say as a general rule that when a court considers what the Guidelines
sentence (or sentencing range) is, it necessarily considers whether there is a disparity
between the defendant’s sentence and the sentences imposed on others for the same
offense.”2 Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1248–49. Here, the district court properly noted
2
Defendant relies heavily on our statement in Lente that even if a defendant did
not raise a specific argument on sentencing-disparity, a sentencing court must consider
the § 3553(a) factors, and one factor it must consider is the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar conduct. See id. at 1034. This statement, however, pertained to whether the
defendant’s sentencing-disparity argument before the district court had “colorable legal
merit and a factual basis.” Id. at 1035. Nowhere does Lente hold sentencing disparity
requires a more stringent standard of review than the other § 3553(a) factors even where
the defendant fails to raise the issue at sentencing. Further, any statement in Lente that
could be construed as mandating express consideration of sentencing disparities
whenever a sentencing court varies upward is neither “necessarily involved nor essential
to determination” of that case and is therefore dicta. Thompson v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,
7
Defendant’s Guideline sentencing range and then varied upward from that range based on
a number of § 3553(a) factors. Therefore, under Gantt, it necessarily considered any
potential sentencing disparity between Defendant and other similar offenders.
The district court sufficiently addressed Defendant’s arguments and adequately
explained its reasoning and provided a basis for us to review meaningfully the
substantive reasonableness of Defendant’s sentence. Thus, the district court committed
no procedural error, let alone plain error, in its explanation of Defendant’s sentence and
its decision to vary upward from the Guidelines range.
III.
In assessing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, the defendant need not
object at sentencing to preserve the issue. United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d
1054, 1058 (10th Cir. 2007). Thus, we review the substantive reasonableness of
Defendant’s sentence for abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 351 (2007)). “Under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, we deem a sentence
unreasonable only if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.’”
Gantt, 679 F.3d at 1249 (quoting United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir.
2009)). Put another way, we will only reverse a sentence for abuse of discretion “if the
court ‘exceeded the bounds of permissible choice,’ given the facts and the applicable law
582 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2009). At most, Lente dictates a sentencing court must
expressly consider a particular § 3553(a) factor on the record where the defendant
properly presents an argument under it which has colorable legal merit and a factual
basis. See Lente, 647 F.3d at 1034–35. Here, Defendant did not raise the issue of
sentencing disparity before the district court and, as discussed above, the district court
properly addressed his arguments for leniency. Thus, Lente has no bearing on this case.
8
in the case at hand.” United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir. 2007)
(quoting United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986). “The fact that
[we] might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Defendant claims his sentence is substantively unreasonable for three reasons.
First, he claims the Guidelines already account for all of the reasons the district court
relied on in varying upward and thus the district court “rejected the institutional expertise
of the Sentencing Commission” without giving any reason why. Second, Defendant
challenges the accuracy of the particular factual circumstances cited by the district court
in varying upward. Finally, Defendant argues his variance and resulting sentence do not
accord with comparable cases.
The record belies Defendant’s first argument. As discussed above, the district
court gave a number of reasons for varying upward that were tethered to the § 3553(a)
factors: (1) he was undeterred from criminal activity notwithstanding his numerous
contacts with the criminal justice system; (2) the public needed protection from further
crimes; and (3) he needed substance-abuse treatment. To the extent Defendant argues the
Sentencing Guidelines calculation already sufficiently accounted for these concerns, he
essentially asks us to re-weigh the evidence and the § 3553(a) factors. We decline this
invitation. “We may not examine the weight a district court assigns to various § 3553(a)
factors, and its ultimate assessment of the balance between them, as a legal conclusion to
be reviewed de novo. Instead, we must give due deference to the district court’s decision
9
that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the [sentence imposed].” Smart, 518 F.3d
at 808 (internal quotations omitted).
As to the accuracy of the particular facts relied on by the district court, Defendant
argues the court erred in finding he was involved in a pattern of activity that involved
residential burglaries, which are crimes of violence, because nothing in the record shows
he knew the items he listed on Craigslist were stolen from residences. But in his plea
agreement Defendant acknowledges his codefendant had burglarized residences and
Defendant agreed to make restitution for those residential burglaries. As to the accuracy
of the district court’s assessment of Defendant’s lack of interest in substance abuse
treatment—which he admitted he needed—as discussed above, Defendant’s failure to
make any effort to even research treatment programs while out on bail supports the
accuracy of this finding and the court did not abuse it’s discretion in considering it.
Finally, Defendant’s reliance on comparable cases is unavailing. For example, in
Gantt, we upheld a sentence where the district court varied upward to nearly three times
the Guideline range, but where the sentence imposed was still only about a quarter of the
statutory maximum sentence. Gantt 679 F.3d at 1249–51. In Gantt, the Guideline
sentence for the defendant’s crime was seven years, but other defendants who committed
the same crime had been sentenced to between 10 years to life imprisonment. Id. at
1249–50. In light of this range and the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a)
factors, we held a sentence of 20 years was not substantively unreasonable. Id. at 1250–
51; see also United States v. Evans, 470 F. App'x 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming
sentence as substantively reasonable that varied upward from an applicable Guideline
10
range of 18–24 months to 60 months’ imprisonment where the defendant pleaded guilty
to one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343).
Here, Defendant’s Guideline sentencing range was 27–33 months; however, the
statutory maximum for the wire fraud at issue is 20 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343. In
determining an upward variance to 60 months’ imprisonment was appropriate, as
discussed above, the court considered a number of 3553(a) factors. As in Gantt,
Defendant’s sentence is less than three times the minimum Guideline sentence, and about
one quarter the length of the statutory maximum sentence for a similar crime. Further,
Defendant’s variance is less extreme than the upward variance in Evans. Thus,
Defendant has not shown that the district court exceeded the bounds of permissible
choice in sentencing him to 60 months’ imprisonment. Accordingly, his sentence is not
substantively unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
United States Circuit Judge
11
United States v. Griffin, No. 12-3282
EBEL, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that there is no procedural error in this case that warrants
relief. Nevertheless, I would vacate Defendant Thomas Griffin, Jr.’s sixty-month above-
guideline sentence as substantively unreasonable.
In imposing this sentence, the district court nearly doubled the usual sentence that
the sentencing commission established for the “mine run” of cases involving offenses and
defendants with criminal histories similar to Griffin’s. The district court varied upward
to such an extent because the district court determined that Griffin, like his co-defendant
Jordan Smith, was incorrigible. I cannot agree, in light of Griffin’s young age (twenty-
one at the time of sentencing); the fact that Griffin has never before served any time in
jail, let alone prison, for any of his three prior convictions1; because he was less complicit
in the conduct underlying his federal conviction than his co-defendant; and because
Griffin’s prior criminal history does not indicate that Griffin just committed the same
offenses over and over again. There is nothing in this record that justifies such a
significant upward variance.
1
See United States v. Qualls, 373 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (“Generally, a
lesser period of imprisonment is required to deter a defendant not previously subject to
lengthy incarceration than is necessary to deter a defendant who has already served
serious time yet continues to re-offend.”); United States v. Hammond, 240 F. Supp. 2d
872, 880 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (noting that “if a defendant’s prior sentences were measured in
months or days, a federal sentence of just a few years would likely provide a significant
deterrent”); cf. United States v. Mishoe, 241 F.3d 214, 220 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that, “if
a defendant served no time or only a few months for the prior offenses, a sentence of
even three or five years for the current offenses might be expected to have the requisite
deterrent effect”).
I recognize that we must afford the district court’s sentencing decision significant
deference, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 49, 51-52 (2007), and that it will be
a rare sentence that is substantively unreasonable, see United States v. Fraser, 647 F.3d
1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2011). And there are factors in Griffin’s case that would probably
justify a sentence above the guideline range. But here the variance goes too far, and the
resulting sixty-month sentence is substantively unreasonable.
2