Gibson v. Horton ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 31, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
GREGORY GIBSON,
Petitioner–Appellant,
No. 09-6177
v. (D.C. No. 5:08-CV-01082-M)
(W.D. Okla.)
DANNY HORTON, Warden,
Respondent–Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Gregory Gibson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, requests a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
petition. For substantially the same reasons stated by the magistrate judge and adopted
by the district court, we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
I
* The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant to
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments;
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
In 1988, Gibson was convicted of maiming in Oklahoma state court. Gibson did
not appeal that conviction and served his one-year sentence for that offense. In 1993,
Gibson pled nolo contendre to trafficking in illegal narcotics after two former felony
convictions. He is currently incarcerated for this 1993 conviction.
After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain state postconviction relief, Gibson filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254 in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma. The case was referred to a magistrate judge, who
determined that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Gibson’s petition. Overruling
Gibson’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate’s report and
recommendation and dismissed the petition.
II
Because he did not obtain a COA from the district court, Gibson may not appeal
the district court’s dismissal absent a grant of a COA by this court. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To
obtain a COA, Gibson must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” § 2253(c)(2). When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claims, a petitioner is not entitled
to a COA unless he can show both “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). An appellate court has discretion
to resolve either the procedural or the substantive issue first. Id. at 485. Because Gibson
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proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his application for a COA. See Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider § 2254 petitions unless the petitioner is
in custody pursuant to the challenged conviction when the petition is filed. Erlandson v.
Northglenn Mun. Court, 528 F.3d 785, 788 (10th Cir. 2008). In his report and
recommendation, the magistrate judge found that Gibson’s federal habeas petition
challenged only his 1988 maiming conviction, and that Gibson was not in custody based
on that conviction when he filed his petition.
Gibson did not object to the magistrate’s determination that he was no longer in
custody for his maiming conviction. Thus, to the extent his petition sought to challenge
his maiming conviction, we are compelled to conclude that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the merits of his § 2254 petition. See Moore v. United States, 950
F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[F]ailure to make timely objections to the magistrate’s
findings or recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal
questions.”).
Gibson arguably objected to the magistrate’s determination that he challenged
only his maiming conviction. But even if we read his petition to challenge any of his
other convictions, the district court’s dismissal was proper. Gibson’s 1993 drug
trafficking offense is the sole conviction for which he was in custody when he filed this
habeas action, and Gibson has already filed two habeas petitions contesting that
conviction. For the district court to exercise jurisdiction over any second or successive
habeas petitions, Gibson would have to first seek and receive authorization from this
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court. See In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2008). He has not done so.
Accordingly, under either construction of Gibson’s petition, reasonable jurists could not
debate the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over his case.
III
We therefore DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. All pending motions
before this court are DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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