United States v. Jameson , 371 F. App'x 963 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 8, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 08-5170
v. (D.C. No. 4:08-CR-00070-GKF-1)
(N. Dist. Okla.)
MICHAEL LEON JAMESON,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Michael Leon Jameson appeals the district court’s overruling of his motion
to suppress evidence obtained in the search of his home, contending the affidavit
underlying the warrant “failed to show that the prohibited material sought had
moved across state lines.” Aplt. Br. at 9. The district court denied the motion,
reasoning that the affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrant authorizing the search. We agree and affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with the terms and conditions of 10th
Cir. R. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
On November 28, 2007, Officer W. Scott Gibson, a Task Force Officer of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation assigned to the Oklahoma City Field Office
Innocent Images National Initiative, conducted a peer-to-peer (“P2P”) network
search for shared files associated with child pornography images. During the
course of this search, he observed internet protocol (“IP”) address 68.12.48.190
offering a list of files containing titles consistent with those given to child
pornography. Officer Gibson downloaded the files and determined that they
contained child pornography. He then submitted an administrative subpoena to
Cox Communications, the internet server provider, seeking the subscriber
information for the named IP address during the time frame he obtained the files.
Cox identified the subscriber as Michael Jameson, resident of 7916 S. 85th E.
Ave., Tulsa, Oklahoma. Asserting that some of the images he obtained were
“images that can be shown to have traveled in interstate and/or foreign
commerce,” Aplt. App. at 16-17 ¶ 33-34, Officer Gibson sought and obtained a
search warrant for Mr. Jameson’s address.
Officer Gibson executed the warrant at Mr. Jameson’s residence,
recovering a computer containing images of suspected child pornography. Mr.
Jameson was indicted for possessing graphic image files, which had been
transported by computer in interstate commerce, of minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
Mr. Jameson filed a motion to suppress the evidence gained from the search
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of his residence contending the warrant failed to establish probable cause because
it merely stated in a conclusory fashion that the images on Mr. Jameson’s
computer “can be shown to have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce,”
Aplt. App. at 5, without any facts to support that conclusion. Following a hearing
on the merits, the district court denied the motion. Mr. Jameson entered a
conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress.
On an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the factual
findings for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. United States v. Cantu, 405 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005). We
review the issuing magistrate judge’s findings of probable cause “very
deferential[ly],” searching only for a “substantial basis” that the underlying
affidavit established probable cause. United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 860
(10th Cir. 2005).
As we observed in United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1200 (10th
Cir. 2007), to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) or (a)(4)(B), the
government must “establish that in committing the offense, a visual image ‘has
been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce
. . . by any means including by computer.’” We held there that use of the
internet, standing alone, did not satisfy the interstate commerce element of the
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2007 version of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (a)(4)(B). 1 Id. at 1200-01. Relying
on Schaefer, Mr. Jameson reiterates his argument that Officer Gibson’s affidavit
“presented no facts concerning interstate nexus, only a conclusory statement that
such facts ‘can be shown.’” Aplt. Br. at 12 (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted). Accordingly, he contends the affidavit failed to establish there was
probable cause to believe the child pornography had been transported in interstate
commerce. We are not persuaded.
Mr. Jameson’s reliance on Schaefer is misplaced. “There is a large
difference between the two things to be proved (guilt and probable cause), as well
as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in
the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them.” United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (observing that hearsay may serve as a basis
for a search warrant, notwithstanding its inadmissibility at trial) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Soderstrand, 412
F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he quanta of proof appropriate in ordinary
judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant.” (citation,
1
Congress subsequently amended the statute. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2252A
(2006) (“Any person who knowingly mails, or transports or ships in interstate or
foreign commerce by means, including by computer, any child pornography
. . . .”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (effective October 8, 2008) (“Any person who
knowingly mails, or transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or
foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer, any child pornography . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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internal quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted)). In Schaefer, we considered
whether the defendant’s mere use of the internet was sufficient to sustain a
conviction, not whether there was probable cause to believe a crime had been
committed. Mr. Jameson has offered no persuasive authority for an expansion of
Schaefer’s rule to this context.
As the Supreme Court observed in Illinois v. Gates that “[p]robable cause
is a fluid concept – turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts – not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” 462
U.S. 213, 232 (1983). “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 238. “[T]he duty of a
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed.” New York v. P. J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S.
868, 876 (1986) (internal alternations, quotation marks, and citation omitted).
Reviewing the affidavit, we note that it contained more than a mere
“conclusory statement” regarding the alleged contraband’s travel in interstate
commerce. In Section I, the affidavit summarized the role of computers in the
distribution and receipt of child pornography. Aplt. App. at 2-3. It then
identified and defined peer-to-peer file (“P2P”) file sharing, and described the
process of P2P file sharing over the internet. See id. at 4-5. Section IV
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articulated the factual basis underlying probable cause: the affiant conducted a
keyword search on the P2P network using terms known to be associated with
images of child pornography, id. at 8; he located a P2P user offering to share with
a worldwide audience several files containing titles consistent with child
pornography, id.; he downloaded those files from IP address 68.12.48.190, id. at
9; and he identified the user of IP address 68.12.48.190 as Michael Jameson. Id.
Based on these facts, Officer Gibson’s affidavit concluded that the images “can
be shown to have traveled in interstate and/or foreign commerce.” Id. at 9-10.
As we recognized in Schaefer, “in many, if not most, situations the use of the
Internet will involve the movement of communications or materials between
states.” 501 F.3d at 1201; see id. at 1207 (“virtually every transmission over the
Internet (especially web site access) crosses state boundaries, and quite often
international borders.” (Tymkovich, J., concurring)). Viewing the affidavit
through this lens, we conclude that Officer Gibson’s affidavit provided a
substantial basis sufficient to sustain the warrant.
We AFFIRM.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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