Myers v. Koopman , 738 F.3d 1190 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                                  FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    PUBLISH                               Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       December 20, 2013
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    TENTH CIRCUIT                             Clerk of Court
    JEREMY C. MYERS,
    Plaintiff – Appellant/ Cross-
    Appellee,
    v.                                                    Nos. 12-1482, 12-1487
    BRIAN KOOPMAN, Detective in the
    Loveland, Colorado Police Department, in
    his individual capacity,
    Defendant – Appellee/ Cross-
    Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Colorado
    (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-02802-REB-MEH)
    Joseph Paul Fonfara of Fonfara Law Offices, Fort Collins, Colorado, (Randall Meyers of
    Law Office of Randall R. Meyers, Fort Collins, Colorado, with him on the briefs) for
    Plaintiff – Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
    Kent N. Campbell of Wick & Trautwein, LLC, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Defendant –
    Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    Before BRISCOE, Chief Circuit Judge, O'BRIEN and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
    PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
    Jeremy Myers challenges the district court’s dismissal of his § 1983 malicious-
    prosecution claim alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In
    his complaint, he asserted that Detective Brian Koopman obtained an arrest warrant by
    fabricating facts to create the illusion of probable cause. As a result, Myers spent three
    days in custody.
    Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we conclude that the district court
    rightly dismissed Myers’ Fourteenth Amendment claim because an adequate state remedy
    existed, but we conclude that the district court improperly dismissed Myers’ Fourth
    Amendment malicious prosecution claim as untimely after recasting it as a claim for false
    imprisonment. In fact, Myers correctly styled his Fourth Amendment claim as one for
    malicious prosecution because he was seized after the institution of legal process. The
    malicious prosecution claim is timely. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of that
    claim.
    BACKGROUND
    Because the district court entered judgment on the pleadings for Koopman, we
    accept Myers’ allegations as true. See Estes v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 
    302 F.3d 1200
    , 1203
    (10th Cir. 2002). Treated as true, Myers’ allegations paint a compelling picture of
    overzealous police work: Detective Koopman falsified an affidavit to obtain a search
    warrant for Myers’ property. Acting under authority of the warrant, law enforcement
    officers searched his property and a nearby sugar-beet laboratory. Investigators
    discovered a jar containing a white substance. Field tests incorrectly identified the
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    substance as methamphetamine. The police hailed the seizure as “a lot of dope,” and the
    media portrayed Myers as a meth manufacturer. App. vol. 1, at 56–57, 64.
    According to Myers’ allegations, Koopman then fabricated facts in an affidavit to
    obtain an arrest warrant. A judicial officer granted the warrant, and Myers surrendered on
    Friday, September 7, 2007, intending to post bond under an agreement between his
    attorney and Koopman. Myers claims that when he arrived at the police station,
    Koopman told the officer on duty to detain Myers because Koopman intended to file
    additional charges. Myers remained in custody until he bonded out on Monday,
    September 10.
    The district attorney then filed criminal charges, and Myers appeared for all
    hearings. Ultimately, further testing of the samples recovered from the raid revealed that
    they were not controlled substances. On November 15, 2007, the district attorney
    dropped all charges.
    Myers filed his complaint on November 5, 2009.1 In 2012, the district court
    granted Koopman’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing Myers’ Fourteenth
    Amendment claim because an adequate state remedy existed, and further dismissing his
    Fourth Amendment claim as untimely. Myers now appeals those rulings. Koopman cross-
    appeals, arguing that he is entitled to qualified and absolute immunity.
    1
    Myers originally filed in state court. Koopman removed the case to federal court
    on December 1, 2009.
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    DISCUSSION
    We review the district court’s decision to enter judgment on the pleadings for
    Koopman under the same standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See
    Aspenwood Inv. Co. v. Martinez, 
    355 F.3d 1256
    , 1259 (10th Cir. 2004). Under that
    standard, we apply de novo review and will uphold the dismissal only if Myers’
    allegations fail to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
    Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007).
    I.      The Fourteenth Amendment Claim
    The district court rightly rejected Myers’ Fourteenth Amendment malicious-
    prosecution claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     because Colorado law provides an adequate
    remedy. The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against deprivations of liberty
    without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. If a state actor’s harmful
    conduct is unauthorized and thus could not be anticipated pre-deprivation, then an
    adequate post-deprivation remedy—such as a state tort claim—will satisfy due process
    requirements. Becker v. Kroll, 
    494 F.3d 904
    , 921 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Parratt v.
    Taylor, 
    451 U.S. 527
    , 535–44, (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.
    Williams, 
    474 U.S. 327
     (1986)).
    Here, Myers alleges that Koopman conjured up facts to create the illusion of
    probable cause for an arrest warrant and subsequent prosecution. Such lawlessness could
    not have been anticipated or prevented pre-deprivation, but a post-deprivation malicious-
    prosecution claim serves as an effective antidote. Colorado law provides that remedy.
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    See, e.g., Hewitt v. Rice, 
    154 P.3d 408
    , 411 (Colo. 2007) (outlining the elements of a
    malicious-prosecution claim under Colorado law). The existence of the state remedy
    flattens the Fourteenth Amendment peg on which Myers now tries to hang his § 1983
    malicious-prosecution claim.
    Myers pitches two replies: First, he argues that his Fourteenth Amendment claim
    is cognizable, despite the state remedy, because the claim also rests on a violation of the
    Fourth Amendment. For this position he offers no affirmative argument—legal or logical.
    Instead, Myers tries to distinguish Becker v. Kroll, on which the district court relied. But
    Becker itself relied on Supreme Court precedent, which has clearly held that post-
    deprivation state tort remedies satisfy due process requirements. See 
    494 F.3d at
    921
    (citing Parratt, 
    451 U.S. at 544
    ). Myers offers no authority suggesting that the existence
    of an underlying Fourth Amendment violation alters the analysis. Second, Myers
    contends that in his case the state tort remedy is inadequate because it is now time-barred.
    We reject that argument as well. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the provision of
    an adequate remedy, but that remedy need not run in perpetuity. Myers had an adequate
    remedy. He let it wither. Due process has been duly satisfied.
    II.    The Fourth Amendment Claim
    The district court wrongly dismissed as untimely Myers’ Fourth Amendment
    claim under § 1983. Section 1983 creates a “species of tort liability” that provides relief
    to persons deprived of rights secured to them by the Constitution. Carey v. Piphus, 
    435 U.S. 247
    , 253 (1978) (quotations omitted). The first step “is to identify the specific
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    constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright v. Oliver, 
    510 U.S. 266
    , 271 (1994).
    Courts then look to common-law torts as analogies to determine the contours—including
    the accrual date—of § 1983 claims. See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 
    359 F.3d 1279
    , 1286 (10th
    Cir. 2004). Here, the district court fixed false imprisonment as the proper analogy for
    Myers’ § 1983 claim—even though his complaint asserted malicious prosecution. In fact,
    Myers correctly styled his claim as one for malicious prosecution because he was seized
    after the institution of legal process.
    The applicable statute of limitations is two years for both false imprisonment and
    malicious prosecution,2 but the two claims do not accrue simultaneously. A claim of false
    imprisonment accrues when the alleged false imprisonment ends. Wallace v. Kato, 
    549 U.S. 384
    , 389 (2007). A claim of malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal
    proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. See Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    , 489 (1994); Robinson v. Maruffi, 
    895 F.2d 649
    , 654–55 (10th Cir. 1990). Myers
    filed his complaint on November 5, 2009—within two years of the malicious prosecution
    accrual date, but not within two years of the false imprisonment accrual date.
    What separates the two claims?—the institution of legal process. Unreasonable
    seizures imposed without legal process precipitate Fourth Amendment false
    2
    Claims under § 1983 are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations.
    Wallace v. Kato, 
    549 U.S. 384
    , 387 (2007). The forum state in this case, Colorado,
    provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. 
    Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102
    (1)(a). Federal law determines the date on which the claim accrues and,
    therefore, when the limitations period starts to run. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.
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    imprisonment claims. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 (concluding that false imprisonment
    was the proper analogy where defendants did not have a warrant for the plaintiff’s arrest
    and thus detention occurred without legal process). Unreasonable seizures imposed with
    legal process precipitate Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims.3 See Heck,
    
    512 U.S. at 484
     (where detention occurs with legal process the “common-law cause of
    action for malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy”). Like rain and snow, the
    claims emanate from the same source, but under different conditions.
    In Wilkins v. DeReyes, we employed the legal-process distinction. 
    528 F.3d 790
    (10th Cir. 2008). DeReyes allegedly obtained an arrest warrant for Wilkins based on
    fabricated evidence gathered by using coercive interrogation techniques. 
    Id.
     at 793–94.
    This Court said that where detention occurs after the institution of legal process, a
    plaintiff can claim that the legal process itself was wrongful, and thereby state a “Fourth
    Amendment violation sufficient to support a § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of
    action.” Id. at 799.4
    3
    Unreasonable seizures that occur after the institution of legal process can also
    form the basis for Fourteenth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims where an
    adequate state remedy does not exist. See Mondragon v. Thompson, 
    519 F.3d 1078
    , 1082
    (10th Cir. 2008).
    4
    See also Nieves v. McSweeney, 
    241 F.3d 46
    , 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (concluding that a
    § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim involving an arrest pursuant to a warrant is akin to a
    claim for malicious prosecution based upon the common-law distinctions between the
    torts of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution); Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 
    63 F.3d 110
    , 117 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Whiting v. Traylor, 
    85 F.3d 581
    , 583–86 & n.8
    (Continued . . .)
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    Here, the district court did not consider whether Myers had been imprisoned
    before or after the institution of legal process. Instead, apparently overlooking Wilkins, it
    simply assumed that because Myers premised the claim on a violation of the Fourth
    Amendment it was “in the nature of false imprisonment” and accrued on the date of his
    release. App. vol. 1, at 32–33.
    In fact, here, as in Wilkins, detention occurred after the institution of legal process.
    Myers was arrested pursuant to a validly issued—if not validly supported—arrest
    warrant. “[T]he issuance of an arrest warrant represents a classic example of the
    institution of legal process.”5 Wilkins, 
    528 F.3d at 799
    . Myers’ suit, then, challenges the
    probable-cause determination that generated the legal process. As we said in Wilkins,
    “This link supplies the necessary connection between the malicious prosecution cause of
    action and Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment allegations.” 
    Id.
    Koopman attempts to repurpose Wilkins. He contends that even if this is a
    malicious-prosecution claim, it accrued upon the institution of legal process. To do so, he
    plucks one statement from Wilkins: “[D]etention was thus preceded by the institution of
    legal process, triggering the malicious prosecution cause of action.” 
    Id.
     Read in context,
    (11th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing malicious prosecution and false arrest based on whether
    detention occurred before or after the institution of legal process).
    5
    See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 654 cmt. c (1977) (“Criminal proceedings
    are usually instituted by the issuance of some form of process, generally a warrant for
    arrest, the purpose of which is to bring the accused before a magistrate in order for him to
    determine whether the accused shall be bound over for further action by a grand jury or
    for trial by a court.”).
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    however, it is clear the institution of legal process “triggers” a malicious-prosecution
    claim only in the sense that a claim before (or without) the institution of legal process
    would be for false imprisonment. Id. at 798–99. Koopman’s reading would set this Court
    against the “the standard rule that [accrual occurs] when the plaintiff has a complete and
    present cause of action.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (alteration in original) (quotations
    omitted). A malicious-prosecution claim is not cognizable until all the elements are
    satisfied, and one of the elements is that the original action terminated in favor of the
    plaintiff. Wilkins, 
    528 F.3d at 799
    . As such, this Court has held that a malicious-
    prosecution claim does not accrue until proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor.
    Mondragon, 
    519 F.3d at 1083
    .
    The district court adopted the wrong analogy because it overlooked a pivotal
    detail—Myers’ detention occurred after the institution of legal process. In fact, Myers
    properly stated a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution, which accrued on
    November 15, 2007, when the proceedings resolved in his favor. He timely filed his
    complaint within two years on November 5, 2009.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Myers’
    Fourteenth Amendment claim and reverse the district court’s dismissal of Myers’ Fourth
    Amendment claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed, in part,
    and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Koopman’s
    arguments regarding absolute and qualified immunity should be addressed in the first
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    instance by the district court.6
    Case number 12-1482 is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and
    REMANDED.
    Case number 12-1487, the cross-appeal, is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
    6
    This Court does not have jurisdiction over Koopman’s cross-appeal because he
    prevailed fully below and the district court’s judgment did not leave open the possibility
    of future litigation. See Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v. Roper, 
    445 U.S. 326
    , 333 (1980).
    Thus, we grant Myers’ motion to dismiss Koopman’s cross-appeal. We decline to
    consider his immunity arguments as alternative grounds for affirmance because he did
    not propose them as such until his reply brief. See M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
    
    565 F.3d 753
    , 768 n.7 (10th Cir. 2009).
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