Lytle v. City of Haysville ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAR 11 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RICHARD C. LYTLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 96-3197
CITY OF HAYSVILLE, KANSAS, a
municipal corporation, and JAMES
EARL KITCHINGS,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 93-CV-1322-KHV)
Jack Focht, Focht, Hughey & Calvert, L.L.C., Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Alan L. Rupe, Morrison & Hecker, L.L.P., Wichita, Kansas, for Defendants-
Appellees.
Before KELLY, HOLLOWAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Circuit Judge.
Richard C. Lytle was employed as a police officer by the City of Haysville,
Kansas from 1983 until 1991, when he was discharged after alleging that fellow
Haysville officers committed second-degree murder by failing to render
emergency aid to the victim of a police shooting. He brought suit against the City
of Haysville and its police chief, James Earl Kitchings, contending that the
defendants had attempted to cover up police officers’ misconduct and that he had
been fired in retaliation for his allegations against them. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants, and Mr. Lytle appeals.
We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the important
factual issues in this case are in reality undisputed and because the district court’s
decision involves questions of law under the appropriate balancing tests, we
believe that this case is suited for summary judgment. For the reasons given
below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Responding to a traffic disturbance on the evening of December 7, 1990,
Haysville police officer Luther Donald Meeks shot a Haysville resident, Datton
Wilson, Jr., in self-defense. Within seconds of the shooting, Officer Meeks
radioed the dispatcher to call emergency medical services. Lieutenant Bruce
Powers and Officers Lanon Thompson and Tim Stock, all of the Haysville Police
Department, appeared at the scene shortly thereafter.
Before the Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) arrived, the officers
did not render emergency aid to Mr. Wilson. The officers had received
2
instruction in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) as part of their law
enforcement training and had learned that they should not move or perform CPR
on critically injured persons who are still breathing, as Mr. Wilson was. The
EMTs arrived at the scene approximately six minutes after the shooting. They
administered CPR and transported Mr. Wilson to the nearest hospital, where he
was pronounced dead a short time later.
Approximately an hour after the shooting, Mr. Lytle arrived at the scene.
By that time, the EMTs had already left with Mr. Wilson. According to his
deposition testimony, Mr. Lytle asked Lieutenant Powers if the officers had
performed CPR on Mr. Wilson before emergency medical personnel arrived. Mr.
Lytle stated that Lieutenant Powers told him that the officers had not performed
CPR because Mr. Wilson was, in Lieutenant Powers’s words, “dead or dying
anyway.” Aplt’s App. vol. I at 209 (Tr. of dep. of Mr. Lytle, dated Apr. 26,
1994). However, in two written reports concerning the Wilson investigation,
prepared on December 8 and December 9, 1990, Mr. Lytle did not mention the
“dead or dying” comment. See id. vol. II at 598-601.
Several months after the shooting, Mr. Lytle had several telephone
conversations with Mr. Jerry Berg, an attorney for Mr. Wilson’s widow. At that
time, Mr. Lytle knew that Mr. Berg was demanding a grand jury investigation of
the shooting and threatening to sue the City. On April 27, 1991, Mr. Lytle gave a
3
statement to Mr. Berg under oath. See Aplt’s App. vol. II at 620-93 (Tr. of April
27, 1991 statement).
In his statement to Mr. Berg, Mr. Lytle explained that it was his wife who
had first contacted Mr. Berg because the shooting had been troubling her
husband. See id. at 624. Mr. Lytle then described his actions and observations on
the evening of the shooting. He said that when he first arrived at the scene,
Lieutenant Powers “just briefly told me what he wanted me to do, which was
interview Mrs. Wilson.” Id. at 628. Mr. Lytle said that he asked Lieutenant
Powers “if they had performed any type of CPR or anything on the victim and he
stated, no, he was going to die anyway.” Id. at 629. Mr. Lytle said that he “was a
little shocked because . . . that’s the first thing that should have been done,
somebody should have given [Mr. Wilson] CPR or at least applied direct pressure
to the wound.” Id.Within a week of the shooting, Mr. Lytle added, Officer Stock gave him the
same explanation as to why the officers had not performed CPR when they first
arrived at the scene: “Mr. Wilson was dying or dead anyway.” Id. at 638. Mr.
Lytle agreed with Mr. Berg that the job descriptions for Haysville police officers
required that “[i]f the victim is still alive, proper aid should be given.” Id. at 632.
According to Mr. Lytle, the officers should have followed this policy by giving
first aid to Mr. Wilson. When questioned by Mr. Berg, he stated that the officers’
4
failure to render aid constituted second degree murder. Id. at 648-49.
Mr. Lytle admitted to Mr. Berg that he was under orders not to discuss the
Wilson case. Id. at 633. Additionally, he stated that it would have been
appropriate for him to have talked to Chief Kitchings about his fellow officers’
statements and that he should have done so. Id. at 642.
On May 15, 1991, Mr. Lytle testified before a grand jury of the Eighteenth
Judicial District of Kansas. An attorney from the law firm representing the City
of Haysville accompanied him, and Mr. Lytle gave him a transcript of the
statement to Mr. Berg. Around this time, Mr. Lytle also spoke with a reporter for
the Wichita Eagle newspaper. The newspaper ran articles that quoted Mr. Lytle
as saying that Powers, Thompson, and Stock were to blame for Mr. Wilson’s
death. The Haysville Pioneer, a local newspaper, also covered the Wilson
controversy.
After reading about Mr. Lytle’s allegations in the newspaper and reviewing
his statement to Mr. Berg, Chief Kitchings investigated Mr. Lytle’s allegations
and determined that they were unsupported. The parties do not dispute that, after
the newspaper reports of Mr. Lytle’s allegations, morale in the Department
decreased significantly. Fellow officers distrusted Mr. Lytle and refused to speak
with him. Additionally, Mr. Lytle’s charges undermined public trust in the
Department, making law enforcement more difficult. See Aplt’s App. vol. I at
5
90-123.
On July 16, 1991, Chief Kitchings terminated Mr. Lytle’s employment.
The notice of termination cited Mr. Lytle’s breach of the Department’s
confidentiality rules, but did not discuss the effect of Mr. Lytle’s statements on
the functioning of the Department. See Aplt’s App. vol III at 964-66.
After his dismissal, Mr. Lytle brought this suit against the City and Chief
Kitchings, alleging: (1) that his termination was in breach of an implied contract;
(2) that he was discharged in retaliation for speech protected by the First
Amendment (his statements to Mr. Berg and the press and his grand jury
testimony); and (3) that his dismissal violated state law against retaliation for
whistle-blowing. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and, during a
status conference, the district court orally granted their motion on all of Mr.
Lytle’s claims. As to the First Amendment claim, the district court granted
summary judgment for both defendants on the merits and for Chief Kitchings on
the additional and alternative ground of qualified immunity.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Lytle appeals the summary judgment granted against him on his First
Amendment and state-law retaliatory discharge claims. He does not appeal the
decision on his implied contract claim.
6
A. Standard of Review
We review a decision granting summary judgment de novo, under the same
legal standard applicable in the district court. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944
F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1991). The de novo standard of review is appropriate in
this case for the further reason that: “[i]n cases raising First Amendment issues .
. . an appellate court has an obligation to make an independent examination of the
whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378, 386 n.9 (1987) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because the standard of review is de novo, we “may affirm on grounds other than
those relied on by the district court when the record contains an adequate and
independent basis for that result.” Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass’n, 14
F.3d 526, 528 (10th Cir. 1994).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In deciding whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, a court must draw all reasonable inferences
7
in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
B. Issues on Appeal
1. First Amendment
Mr. Lytle first challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment
against him on his First Amendment claim. He maintains that the court’s ruling
infringes on the constitutional rights of public employees who uncover
wrongdoing in governmental agencies.
a. Pickering balancing
It is well-established that a government employer “cannot condition public
employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected
interest in freedom of expression.” Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
We undertake a four-part inquiry in order to evaluate a public employee’s claim
that his employer has infringed this interest. See Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d
803, 811 (10th Cir. 1996).
First, we consider whether the speech in question addresses a matter of
public concern. Matters of public concern are those of interest to the community,
whether for social, political, or other reasons. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 145-149.
In contrast, matters of only personal interest to government employees are not
8
protected by the First Amendment. See id.Second, if the speech does address a matter of public concern, the court
must consider both employee’s interest in expression and the government
employer’s interest in regulating the speech of its employees in order to maintain
an efficient and effective workplace. See Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 811 (citing
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)); Moore v. City of
Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 931 (10th Cir. 1995). Speech is protected if the
employee’s interest outweighs the interest of the government employer. See
Moore, 57 F.3d at 931. This process of weighing the respective interests is
known as “the Pickering balancing test.”
Third, if the speech is protected, the employee must show that the speech
was a substantial or motivating factor for the challenged governmental action.
See Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 811 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). Finally, if the employee shows that the speech
was a substantial or motivating factor, the employer must be given the opportunity
to show that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected
speech. See id.The Supreme Court has explained why a public employee’s speech is not
given unqualified protection, but rather is balanced against the employer’s interest
in efficient public service:
9
Government agencies are charged by law with doing particular tasks.
Agencies hire employees to help do those tasks as effectively and
efficiently as possible. When [an employee] . . . begins to do or say
things that detract from the agency’s effective operation, the
government employer must have some power to restrain [him].
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674-75 (1994).
Thus, “the government as employer . . . has far broader powers [over
speech] than does the government as sovereign.” Id. at 671. Outside government
workplaces, “[t]he First Amendment demands a tolerance of ‘verbal tumult,
discord, and even offensive utterance,’ as ‘necessary side effects of . . . the
process of open debate . . . .’” Id. at 672 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 24-25 (1971)). Within government workplaces, however, the First
Amendment demands considerably less: “The government cannot restrict the
speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency. But where the
government is employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achieving
its goals, such restrictions may well be appropriate.” Id. at 675.
In balancing the employee’s interest in expression against the government’s
interest in efficiency, a court must consider “the manner, time, and place of the
employee’s expression,” as well as the events leading up to it. Rankin, 483 U.S.
at 388. It is relevant “whether the statement impairs discipline by supervisors or
harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working
relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes
10
the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of
the enterprise.” Id. Additionally, an employee’s responsibilities in the workplace
are relevant to the Pickering balancing. See id.; Koch v. City of Hutchison, 847
F.2d 1436, 1449-50 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc). “The burden of caution
employees bear with respect to the words they speak will vary with the extent of
authority and public accountability the employee’s role entails.” Rankin, 483
U.S. at 390.
In the instant case, in conducting the required First Amendment inquiry, the
district court began by identifying the particular speech at issue. Although Mr.
Lytle’s complaint refers to three categories of allegedly protected speech--his
statements to Mr. Berg, his statements to the press, and his grand jury testimony--
the district court considered only the first two categories. It reasoned that the
defendants contended in their summary judgment motion that Mr. Lytle had not
been terminated for his grand jury testimony and that Mr. Lytle did not dispute
this contention in his objection to the defendants’ motion. See Aplt’s App. vol.
III at 1093 (Tr. of Status Conference dated April 30, 1996) (“The way I read [the
summary judgment briefs’ discussion of the grand jury testimony] was that
plaintiff claimed the termination was for talking to the attorney or for talking to
the media and not specifically for talking to the grand jury.”). The district court
then concluded that Mr. Lytle’s statements to Mr. Berg and the press did “touch a
11
matter of public concern.” Id. at 1106.
Next, the district court conducted the Pickering balancing. It found that
Mr. Lytle’s interest in expression was outweighed by the City’s interest in
efficient public service and that his speech was therefore not constitutionally
protected. See Aplt’s App. vol. III, at 1106-07, 1113-19. As a result, the district
court did not consider the third and fourth parts of the First Amendment inquiry
(whether Mr. Lytle’s speech was a substantial or motivating factor for Mr. Lytle’s
discharge and whether the discharge would have occurred in the speech’s
absence).
In this appeal, Mr. Lytle challenges the district court’s application of the
Pickering test, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that the City’s
interest in efficient public service outweighed his interests in free expression. 1
1
Mr. Lytle does not argue that there are any underlying factual
disputes that affect the Pickering balancing and that should have been submitted
to the jury. In this regard, we note that although the Supreme Court has
concluded that “[t]he inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not
fact,” see Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7, there is some debate as to whether
underlying disputes whose resolution might affect the Pickering balancing should
be decided by the court or by the jury. See Waters, 511 U. S. at 693 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that the plurality opinion does not clarify what issues in the
Pickering balancing are for the court and what issues are for the jury).
This circuit appears not to have reached that question, and other
circuits are divided. Compare Joyner v. Lancaster, 815 F.2d 20, 23 (4th Cir.
1987) (concluding that matters underlying the Pickering inquiry “‘were not
factual issues for the jury,’” but “‘involved questions of constitutional law for the
court’” quoting Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329, 1337 n.11 (4th Cir. 1984)) with
Casey v. City of Cabool, Mo., 12 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[A]ny
12
He focuses on his status as a whistle blower, contending that because he “was a
sincere whistle blower who felt the police department had failed to investigate his
complaint,” see Aplt’s Opening Br. at 17, his statements were protected under the
First Amendment. Significantly, Mr. Lytle does not challenge the district court’s
finding that the grand jury testimony is not at issue in his First Amendment
claim. 2
underlying factual disputes concerning whether the speech at issue was protected
should have been submitted to the jury.”).
In the instant case, because Mr. Lytle does not contend that the district
court improperly resolved factual issues underlying the Pickering balancing, we
need not resolve this issue.
2
This circuit has concluded that a witness’s sworn testimony in a court
proceeding is entitled to heightened protection under the First Amendment. In Melton v.
City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 714 (10th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds,
928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc), we stated that a witness’s interest in
testifying at trial was “so strong in this case that any disruption or impairment of the
enterprise would have to be extreme in order to justify preventing trial testimony.” We
found no evidence that the witness’s trial testimony affected the operation of a police
department and further noted that the witness “had a clear public duty to testify.” Id. at
715. “In many instances, that duty might be enhanced by judicial compulsion. Certainly
we would not expect a public employee to suffer contempt in order to preserve the
efficiency and effectiveness of a public employer, even the police department.” Id.Accordingly, we concluded that the plaintiff police officer’s interest in testifying clearly
outweighed what little disruption might have occurred.
Other circuits have adopted a similar view. See, e.g., Green v. Philadelphia
Housing Authority, 105 F.3d 882, 888 (3d Cir.) (noting the strong interests favoring
subpoenaed testimony because it implicates “not only the integrity of the truth seeking
process and the effective administration of justice, but also the public’s interest in
protecting court-ordered conduct”), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 64 (1997); Pro v. Donatucci,
81 F.3d 1283, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that the government had “no legitimate
interest” in regulating an employee’s trial testimony and resolving Pickering balance in
favor of the testifying employee); Wright v. Illinois Dept. of Children & Family Servs, 40
F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[S]urely an employee summoned to give sworn
13
Upon considering the factors relevant to the Pickering balancing we
conclude for the reasons set forth below that the district court properly found that
the City’s interests outweigh Mr. Lytle’s interest in speaking to Mr. Berg and the
press about a confidential police investigation and that as a result, these
statements are not protected by the First Amendment. Our application of the
Pickering balancing renders it unnecessary for us to consider the third and fourth
stages of the general First Amendment inquiry.
b. Pickering Applied to this Case
As the district court found and the parties acknowledge, Mr. Lytle’s
statements to Mr. Berg and to the press involve matters of public concern. See
Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 796 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Speech which discloses
any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance on the part of city
testimony in a judicial proceeding has a compelling interest in testifying truthfully and the
government employer can have an offsetting interest in preventing her from doing so only
in the rarest of cases.”); Smith v. Hightower, 693 F.2d 359, 368 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he
first amendment protects the right to testify truthfully at trial.”).
In the instant case, because Mr. Lytle has not challenged the district court’s
conclusion that his grand jury testimony was not at issue in his First Amendment claim,
see Aplt’s App. vol. III at 1093-94, we need not decide what weight to afford this
testimony in the Pickering balancing.
However, we do note that Chief Kitchings stated to a reporter that Mr. Lytle “ha[d]
a duty and obligation to testify to the grand jury” and that he did not terminate Mr. Lytle
because of his grand jury testimony. See Aplt’s App. vol. III at 1017 (transcript of July
17, 1991 telephone conversation between Chief Kitchings and Phil LeBeau.).
14
officials, in terms of content, clearly concerns matters of public import.”). We
therefore proceed to balance Mr. Lytle’s interest in expression against the City’s
interest as an employer in regulating the speech in question.
We begin with Mr. Lytle’s interests, noting the significance of the fact that
he has accused government officials of serious wrongdoing. “When balancing the
rights of the employee against those of the employer, an employee’s First
Amendment interest is entitled to greater weight where he is acting as a whistle
blower in exposing government corruption.” Id. at 797.
Nevertheless, there are also several important aspects of Mr. Lytle’s speech
that diminish his interests under the Pickering inquiry. In considering the time,
place, and manner of the disputed speech, this circuit has considered whether the
employee used “less disruptive internal channels, rather than going outside the
city administration.” Id. at 798; see also Johnsen v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 3
891 F.2d 1485, 1494 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that the court should consider
whether the employee “used internal complaint procedures” and finding that the
“[p]laintiff’s decision to contact outside agencies prior to using the complaint
mechanism of the school was unnecessarily disruptive because there was no
indication that the internal mechanism would not be sufficient.”).
Here, according to Mr. Lytle’s own account, Lieutenant Coleman was the
only person within the Haysville Police Department whom he had informed of the
15
“dead or dying” comments before he spoke to Mr. Berg about the Wilson case.
Although he had submitted two written reports regarding his investigation of the
Wilson shooting, these reports had a significant omission: Mr. Lytle failed to
included any statements about the “dead or dying” comments. Further, Mr. Lytle
made no other written record of them before he spoke to Mr. Berg. Additionally,
before he spoke to Mr. Berg, Mr. Lytle had not discussed these alleged comments
with Chief Kitchings, and he has offered no justification for his failure to do so.
Even as to Lieutenant Coleman, there is no indication that, before he spoke to Mr.
Berg, Mr. Lytle followed up his initial conversation about the “dead or dying”
comments in any way. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he burden of caution
[an employee] bear[s] with respect to the words [he] speak[s]” varies with his job
responsibilities. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390. Mr. Lytle’s responsibilities as a police
officer who had worked on the Wilson investigation clearly called for a degree of
caution that he failed to exercise. We therefore conclude, just as in Johnsen, that
Mr. Lytle’s failure to pursue his allegations internally indicates that his speech
was “unnecessarily disruptive.” Johnsen, 891 F.2d at 1494. That conclusion
diminishes the weight we afford his interest in the Pickering balancing.
Moreover, a government employee’s interest in whistleblowing is entitled
to little weight if a reasonable person in his shoes would not have believed that
there was government corruption or wrongdoing. Cf. Moore, 57 F.3d at 933
16
(assuming, without deciding, that recklessly false allegations of wrongdoing “are
either unprotected by the First Amendment or, at least, that such intentional
falsity would weigh heavily against protection”); Johnsen, 891 F.2d at 1493(affording less weight to an employee’s interests because her erroneous statement
was “at least careless and could be characterized as reckless in light of the
predictable impact that such a statement would have upon the public”). Thus,
under the Pickering inquiry, we must consider whether there was a reasonable
basis for Mr. Lytle’s two principal allegations of wrongdoing: (1) that his fellow
officers committed second degree murder by failing to render aid to Mr. Wilson
and (2) that the Department sought to coverup the officers’ misconduct.
As to the failure to render aid to Mr. Wilson, we do not believe that it was
reasonable for Mr. Lytle to conclude that there was government misconduct. The
evidence indicated that the officers’ decision not to perform CPR was based on
the training that they had received. Moreover, Mr. Lytle himself had been trained
not to move or give first aid to critically injured persons who are still breathing,
because doing so risks further injury and might do more harm than good. See
Aplt’s App. vol. I at 305 (Tr. of dep. of Mr. Lytle, dated Feb. 24, 1993).
Although Mr. Lytle’s suggestion that direct pressure should have been applied to
Mr. Wilson’s wound may merit evaluation by the Department, there is no
evidence in the record indicating that the officers’ failure to render first aid was
17
motivated by an intent to harm Mr. Wilson or reflected reckless indifference to
his welfare. 3
We reach a similar conclusion as to Mr. Lytle’s allegation of a Department
coverup. We note that, as evidence of such a coverup, Mr. Lytle points only to
the following: after the shooting, Mr. Lytle reported Lieutenant Powers’s “dead
or dying” comment to Lieutenant Coleman, and Lieutenant Coleman did not order
Mr. Lytle to make a report. See id. vol. III at 825-27. We do not believe that this
evidence indicates that the Department was engaged in a cover-up. The record
merely indicates that Lieutenant Coleman failed to order Mr. Lytle to submit a
report. It does not suggest that Lieutenant Coleman, or anyone else, forbade,
discouraged, or otherwise sought to prevent Mr. Lytle from filing reports that
discussed the “dead or dying” comments either with Lieutenant Coleman or Chief
Kitchings.
Having concluded that Mr. Lytle’s interests are significantly diminished by
his failure to pursue his concerns within the Department and by the lack of a
reasonable factual basis for his allegations, we now consider the interests of Mr.
Lytle’s employer. As explained below, we conclude that those interests are
3
Under Kansas law, second degree murder (the offense that Mr. Lytle
accused the officers of committing) is defined as “the killing of a human being
committed: (a) [i]ntentionally; or (b) unintentionally but recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-
3402 (1995).
18
entitled to substantial weight.
We first note that there is undisputed evidence that, by speaking with Mr.
Berg and the press, Mr. Lytle breached general Department confidentiality rules
and specific orders not to discuss the Wilson matter with persons outside the
Department. See, e.g., id. vol. III at 1083-85 (recording no objections to the
district court’s statement that Mr. Lytle “admitted to Mr. Berg that he was under
orders not to discuss the Wilson investigation”). Moreover, the City and Chief
Kitchings presented affidavits from several officers and employees demonstrating
the effect of Mr. Lytle’s breach of confidentiality rule. According to these
affidavits, after they learned of his statements to Mr. Berg and the press, Mr.
Lytle’s coemployees no longer trusted him with confidential information
regarding the Wilson investigation, or any other sensitive police matter. See id.vol. I, at 90-123. For example, they stated that, “[a]fter the allegations it seemed
that no one really wanted to work with [Mr.] Lytle due to no trust,” id. at 90 (aff.
of Mylain E. Anthis); that “[i]t was very hard to conduct telephone conversations
with [Mr. Lytle] in the same room, in fear that I could be speaking about a case,”
id. at 92 (aff. of John Coleman); and that “I no longer trusted [Mr.] Lytle--nor did
his fellow officers and employees,” id. at 111 (aff. of Debbie Mann). According
to these officers, this lack of trust significantly damaged department morale and
made it more difficult to do their jobs. See, e.g., id. at 110 (“Morale in the
19
Department decreased significantly after [Mr.] Lytle’s statements.”), 116 (aff. of
Michael McElroy) (“No one wanted to work with [Mr.] Lytle. I had to tell the
officers that they had to at least be polite to him. In [l]aw [e]nforcement, officers
have to work together and share information.”).
This circuit has recognized the importance of confidentiality to the
performance of police officers’ responsibilities. “Any breach of confidentiality .
. . reflects negatively on an officer’s ability and competence to perform his job,
and each officer’s competence affects the overall effectiveness of the
department.” Melton, 879 F.2d at 715. Moreover, personal loyalty and
confidence are especially important among police officers, who are charged with
ensuring public safety and who often must work together in life-and-death
situations. See Moore, 57 F.3d at 934 (The “need [for workplace harmony] is
particularly acute in the context of law enforcement, where there is a ‘heightened
interest . . . in maintaining discipline and harmony among employees.’” quoting
Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 861 (10th Cir. 1989)); Koch, 847 F.2d at1452 n.22 (“A number of cases have emphasized the heightened governmental
interest in maintaining harmony among employees in the law enforcement
context.”). These concerns are even greater in a relatively small department,
where a minor disturbance in morale might loom large. See Aplt’s App. vol. I, at
105 ¶¶ 4, 5 (Tr. of dep. of Chief Kitchings, dated Nov. 20, 1995) (citing a
20
Haysville police force of 15 officers and a Haysville population of approximately
8,000); see also Moore, 57 F.3d at 934 (finding that “the small size of the
department increased the likelihood and severity of disruption”).
Although Mr. Lytle has not contested the defendants’ evidence regarding
the damaging effects of his breach of confidentiality on the Department, he does
argue that these effects were not considered at the time of his dismissal. Mr.
Lytle notes that Chief Kitchings did not mention the effect of the statements to
Mr. Berg and the press in the letter of termination or in interviews with the news
media after the discharge. See Aplt’s App. vol. III, at 1019-22 (Tr. of interview
with Judy Conklin, Haysville Pioneer, dated July 17, 1991); see also id. at 964-66(Notice of termination, dated July 16, 1991). He further notes that Chief
Kitchings later testified during his deposition that it was not until after the
termination that he became aware of workplace disharmony. See id. vol. I at 144
(Tr. of dep. of Chief Kitchings dated September 12, 1994), vol. III at 944-46 (Tr.
of dep. of Chief Kitchings, dated Oct. 12, 1995). According to Mr. Lytle, Chief
Kitchings’s failure to mention the effects of his breach of confidentiality until
well after his termination precludes us from considering these effects in the
Pickering balancing.
We are not persuaded by this argument. In weighing the government
employer’s interests, the primary consideration is the impact of the disputed
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speech “on the effective functioning of the public employer’s enterprise.”
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. Thus, rather than examining the explanation offered at
a particular time by an individual decisionmaker such as Chief Kitchings, we must
evaluate the effect of Mr. Lytle’s statements on the Department as a whole. We
acknowledge that, in certain instances, a decisonmaker’s failure to mention
certain adverse effects of the challenged speech may constitute some evidence
those effects did not really occur or did not significantly impair the functioning of
the government entity. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388-89 (citing the
decisionmaker’s testimony that the disruption of office functions was not a
consideration when the employee was terminated in support of the conclusion that
“there is no evidence that [the speech] interfered with the efficient functioning of
the office”). However, the fact that an official does not mention a particular
adverse effect of the challenged speech in a termination letter or in various other
statements concerning the challenged employment action does not necessarily
preclude the government employer from invoking such an effect in articulating its
interests under the Pickering inquiry.
In the instant case, Chief Kitchings’s failure to specifically mention the
effects of Mr. Lytle’s breach of confidentiality rules on Department morale and
efficiency does not diminish the weight we afford these effects in the Pickering
inquiry. As we have noted, our decisions recognize that there is often a close
22
connection between a police department’s confidentiality rules and the morale and
effective functioning of the police force. See, e.g., Melton, 879 F.2d at 714.
1989). When he terminated Mr. Lytle, Chief Kitchings did mention the
confidentiality rules, and the effects on morale and efficiency documented by the
Department were foreseeable results of Mr. Lytle’s violation of those rules.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we believe that the Pickering balancing
tips in the defendants’ favor. The only factor weighing on Mr. Lytle’s side of the
scales is Mr. Lytle’s whistle blower status, and the significance of even that
factor is substantially diminished by Mr. Lytle’s failure to pursue his allegations
within the Department and by the unreasonableness of his beliefs about
government wrongdoing. Mr. Lytle’s limited interests are far outweighed by the
Department’s interest in maintaining confidentiality and avoiding workplace
disruption. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to
the defendants on Mr. Lytle’s First Amendment claim. 4
4
Because we conclude that there was no First Amendment violation, we
need not consider whether Chief is entitled to qualified immunity. See Martinez
v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 28 Kitchings 4 (1980) (“[I]t is not necessary for us to
decide any question concerning . . . immunity . . . because . . . [t]he first inquiry in
[immunity analysis] . . . is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The answer to that
inquiry disposes of this case.” (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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2. State-Law Retaliatory Discharge
We also disagree with Mr. Lytle that the district court erred in granting the
defendants summary judgment on the state-law retaliatory discharge claim. When
exercising jurisdiction over pendent state claims, we must apply the substantive
law of the forum state and reach the same decision we believe that state’s highest
court would, just as we would if our jurisdiction rested on diversity of citizenship.
See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (citing Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
In Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988), the Kansas Supreme Court
stated that a whistle blower retaliatory discharge claim requires, inter alia, proof
“by clear and convincing evidence, . . . [that] a reasonably prudent person would
have concluded the employee’s co-worker or employer was engaged in activities
in violation of rules, regulations, or the law pertaining to public health, safety,
and the general welfare. . . .” Id. at 690. In this case, the district court ruled that
Mr. Lytle had not proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that a reasonable
person would have concluded that the officers at the scene had committed second-
degree murder. See Aplt’s App. vol. III at 1134-35.
Mr. Lytle argues that the district court erred in applying a clear and
convincing standard of proof. He suggests that the appropriate standard is
preponderance of the evidence, citing Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 874 P.2d 1188 (Kan.
24
1994). Ortega held that a retaliatory discharge claim must be proven “by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . [that is] clear and convincing in nature.” Id. at
1198. Ortega added that “clear and convincing” is a quality, rather than a
quantum, of proof. See id. According to Ortega, evidence “is clear if it is
certain, unambiguous, and plain to the understanding. It is convincing if it is
reasonable and persuasive enough to cause the trier of facts to believe it.” Id.Although Ortega involved retaliation for filing a workers compensation
claim, rather than for whistle blowing, see id. at 1190, we believe that the Ortega
standard governs this action. As the Ortega court stated, “[w]e find no
justification for applying different standards of proof in whistle-blowing and
workers compensation retaliatory discharge cases.” Id. at 1194.
In discussing Mr. Lytle’s First Amendment claim, we concluded that Mr.
Lytle did not have reasonable grounds for believing there was wrongdoing, either
by the officers at the scene or in the Department’s internal investigation. We
reached this conclusion based on the preponderance of the evidence standard that
governs Mr. Lytle’s First Amendment claim. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S.
279, 286 (1991) (noting that civil actions are normally subject to the
preponderance of the evidence standard). This standard does not incorporate the
additional requirement that the quality of the evidence be “clear and convincing.”
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (describing “clear and
25
convincing” as an “intermediate standard of proof” — i.e., in between
“preponderance of the evidence” and “beyond a reasonable doubt”). Because we
do not think it was even “more probable than not,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1182
(6th ed. 1990), that a reasonable person could have believed there was
government wrongdoing, we definitely do not think the evidence of government
wrongdoing was “certain, unambiguous, and plain to the understanding.” Ortega,
874 P.2d at 1198. Thus, we do not believe a reasonable jury could find in Mr.
Lytle’s favor on the state-law retaliatory discharge claim. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248. We agree with the district court that the defendants are entitled to
summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on Mr. Lytle’s First Amendment and state-law retaliatory
discharge claims. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
26