United States v. Saavedra , 549 F. App'x 739 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT December 4, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk of Court
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 12-2149
(D.C. No. 1:11-CR-02014-BB-1)
DOMINIC SAAVEDRA, (D. N. Mex.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
A federal jury convicted Dominic Saavedra of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, possessing heroin with intent to distribute, and carrying a firearm during a drug
trafficking crime. Mr. Saavedra challenges his convictions on all counts on the ground
that an electronic scale seized during a traffic stop was the fruit of an unlawful arrest. He
also challenges his conviction on the first count, being a felon in possession of a firearm
or ammunition, on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
possessed certain ammunition found in his co-defendant’s vehicle. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History1
Around 1:00 a.m. on May 20, 2010, in a high crime area of Albuquerque, New
Mexico, Bernalillo County Deputy Sheriff Josh Hessinger initiated a traffic stop of a
Lexus with a malfunctioning license plate light. Before approaching the Lexus, Deputy
Hessinger noticed two occupants moving around in a manner that made him feel
“uncomfortable with the situation.” ROA, Vol. III at 14. He called for assistance, and a
second deputy, Jarod Beasley, arrived. The driver, later identified as Donald Howard,
was “sway[ing] back and forth” and leaning forward “as if he was retrieving something
or placing something under [his] seat.” Id. The deputies agreed the movements were
both suspicious and raised officer safety concerns.
The deputies approached the vehicle, with Deputy Hessinger on the driver’s side
and Deputy Beasley on the passenger’s side. Deputy Hessinger asked Mr. Howard to
step outside. As Mr. Howard complied, the deputy asked Mr. Howard why he was
moving around. Mr. Howard replied, “There is nothing in the car.” Id. at 17. The
1
For both Mr. Saavedra’s challenges—the motion to suppress and the sufficiency
of the evidence—we view the facts in the light most favorable to the Government. See
United States v. Rufai, 732 F.3d 1175, 1188 (10th Cir. 2013) (we view facts in the
Government’s favor on a sufficiency of the evidence challenge); United States v. Perrine,
518 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2008) (we view facts in the Government’s favor in
reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress).
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deputy found the statement odd because it was not responsive to his question. He shined
his flashlight through the open door of the car and saw in plain view “a silver colored
revolve[r] sticking out from under the driver’s seat.” ROA, Vol. I at 155. Using a police
code to indicate a weapon was present, Deputy Hessinger alerted Deputy Beasley to the
presence of the handgun. Deputy Hessinger prepared to handcuff Mr. Howard for officer
safety purposes, but Mr. Howard pulled away and began running. Deputy Hessinger
pursued.
Left at the Lexus, Deputy Beasley was aware of the presence of a firearm in the
car but not its location. He decided to detain Mr. Saavedra for officer safety purposes
and for further investigation. At the deputy’s request, Mr. Saavedra stepped out of the
vehicle. The deputy did a “pat down” of Mr. Saavedra’s person to check for weapons.
Finding no weapons, he handcuffed Mr. Saavedra and placed him in the back of a patrol
car. Deputy Beasley then notified dispatch of Mr. Howard’s flight and prepared to assist
Deputy Hessinger in the pursuit if necessary.
Deputy Hessinger quickly captured Mr. Howard, secured him in handcuffs, and
placed him under arrest for resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer. Because Mr.
Howard, the driver of the Lexus, was being arrested, department policy required the
deputies to conduct an inventory search of the vehicle and have it towed. Although Mr.
Saavedra had not been formally arrested, the deputies left him handcuffed in the patrol
car during the inventory search.
In addition to the handgun protruding from under the driver’s seat, the search
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uncovered three new pieces of evidence: (1) a fully loaded Bryco .380 semiautomatic
pistol wedged between the center console and the passenger seat—immediately next to
where Mr. Saavedra had been sitting; (2) a tin can on the front passenger side floor
containing 41 individually wrapped plastic bags of “a black tar like substance,” id. at 81,
which a field test determined was likely to be heroin;2 and (3) eight rounds of nine-
millimeter ammunition.3
Based on the location of the heroin and the second handgun, Deputy Hessinger
concluded the items had been in Mr. Saavedra’s immediate control, and he instructed
Deputy Beasley to arrest Mr. Saavedra. Deputy Beasley removed Mr. Saavedra from the
patrol car, placed him under arrest, and conducted a more thorough search of his person.
In Mr. Saavedra’s right front pants pocket, the deputy found a small black electronic
scale of the sort typically used for weighing drugs.
B. Procedural History
On July 27, 2011, a federal grand jury charged Mr. Saavedra with a three-count
indictment: (1) being a felon who “knowingly possessed, in and affecting commerce, a
firearm, a . . . model Bryco 38, .380 Auto caliber semiautomatic pistol, . . . approximately
eight (8) cartridges of Winchester brand 9mm Luger caliber and six (6) cartridges of
Remington Peters brand .380 Auto caliber ammunition,” in violation of 18 U.S.C.
2
A laboratory test subsequently confirmed the substance was heroin.
3
It is unclear where in the vehicle the nine-millimeter ammunition was found.
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§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), ROA, Vol. I at 12; (2) “knowingly and intentionally
possess[ing] with intent to distribute . . . heroin,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(C), id. at 13; and (3) “knowingly carry[ing] and possess[ing] a firearm . . .
during and in relation to . . . a drug trafficking crime,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),
id. at 13.
Mr. Saavedra moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the traffic stop. The
district court denied the motion, concluding that: (1) Deputy Beasley had reasonably
placed Mr. Saavedra in investigative detention to maintain the status quo during the
investigation; (2) Deputy Hessinger’s inventory search of the Lexus was properly
conducted according to the department’s policy; (3) the discovery of the handgun and
drugs was inevitable from Mr. Howard’s arrest and the subsequent inventory search of
the Lexus; and (4) the deputies had probable cause to arrest Mr. Saavedra after
discovering the firearm and drugs in the Lexus.
A jury found Mr. Saavedra guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced
him to 488 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Saavedra concedes (1) that Deputy Beasley did not violate the
Constitution when the deputy removed him from the Lexus and conducted a pat down
search for weapons; (2) the inventory search of the Lexus was valid; (3) the second
loaded handgun and the heroin uncovered in the search provided probable cause for his
formal arrest. He therefore does not challenge the admission of the firearm and heroin at
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trial, and he concedes the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that he
possessed these two items.4
Mr. Saavedra presents two challenges. First, he contends that when Deputy
Beasley initially handcuffed him and placed him in the patrol car, this constituted an
arrest without probable cause. He argues the electronic scale should have been
suppressed as the fruit of this purportedly unlawful arrest, and he asks us to reverse all
three convictions and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the charges.
Second, Mr. Saavedra argues there was insufficient evidence to connect him to the nine-
millimeter ammunition. Because Count 1 charged him with possession of the nine
millimeter ammunition, as well as the Bryco .380 autocaliber handgun and the .380
caliber ammunition, he argues there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction.
We address each challenge in turn.
A. The District Court Properly Admitted the Electronic Scale
Mr. Saavedra contends that when Deputy Beasley first placed him in handcuffs
and put him in the squad car, this constituted an unlawful custodial arrest because the
deputies lacked probable cause. He argues that the electronic scale must be suppressed as
a product of this purportedly unlawful arrest. As we will explain, we do not need to
determine whether Mr. Saavedra’s detention constituted an arrest because we agree with
4
Our understanding of Mr. Saavedra’s challenges and concessions is aided by
counsel’s clarifications during oral argument. Oral Argument at 02:35-15:00, United
States v. Saavedra, No. 12-2149 (10th Cir. Nov. 19, 2013).
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the district court that the deputies had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory
detention. This was sufficient to make the electronic scale admissible because it was
discovered after he was arrested, following the valid inventory search.
1. Standard of review
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we accept the factual
findings of the district court . . . unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v.
Cervine, 347 F.3d 865, 868 (10th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d
1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Flores, 48 F.3d 467, 468 (10th Cir. 1995).
“We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding of the district court
and review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment.” Cervine, 347 F.3d at 868; Perrine, 518 F.3d at 1201.
2. Legal framework
“[T]he Supreme Court has identified three types of police/citizen encounters:
consensual encounters, investigative [detentions], and arrests.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478
F.3d 1108, 1115 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (quotations omitted). An encounter is not
consensual if “a reasonable person would not feel free to leave or disregard the contact”
under the circumstances. Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1119 (10th Cir. 2010).
Because both investigative detentions and arrests are nonconsensual, they are seizures for
Fourth Amendment purposes and must pass constitutional muster. See id.; Cortez, 478
F.3d at 1115.
“While there is no litmus-paper test for determining when an investigative
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detention enters the realm of an arrest, we have stated an arrest is distinguished from an
investigative detention ‘by the involuntary, highly intrusive nature of the encounter.’”
Lundstrom, 616 F.3d at 1120 (quoting Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115). An arrest must be
supported by probable cause, which exists only when “the facts and circumstances within
the officers’ knowledge . . . are sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Cortez,
478 F.3d at 1115 (quotations omitted).
In contrast, an investigative detention requires only reasonable suspicion, which
exists if the officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal
wrongdoing.” Lundstrom, 616 F.3d at 1120 (quotations omitted). Reasonable suspicion
is a less rigorous standard than probable cause. Police “need not rule out the possibility
of innocent conduct” before conducting an investigatory detention. United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). “Reasonable suspicion may exist even where it might
be more likely than not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.” See United
States v. Guardado, 699 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted).
When performing an investigative detention, “[a] police officer may take such
steps as are reasonably necessary to protect [the officer’s] safety and to maintain the
status quo during a detention.” Lundstrom, 616 F.3d at 1120; see also United States v.
Garcia, 459 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 2006). In particular, “[h]andcuffing may be
appropriate during an investigative detention—an investigative detention does not
become unreasonable just because officers handcuff an individual.” Lundstrom, 616 F.3d
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at 1122; see also United States v. Neff, 300 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he use
of handcuffs [is] appropriate as long as there [are] reasonable, articulable ground[s] for
fearing danger from the suspects.”).
3. Analysis
This case involves three distinct Fourth Amendment seizures: first, the initial
traffic stop; second, when Mr. Saavedra was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car; and
third, his formal arrest. Mr. Saavedra does not challenge the justification for the initial
traffic stop. And as we indicated above, he concedes that his formal arrest was justified
by probable cause. We are therefore concerned only with the second seizure—his
placement in handcuffs and in the patrol car.
The district court concluded that this second seizure was not an arrest but a lawful
investigative detention justified by reasonable suspicion. The Government urges us to
affirm on this basis. Mr. Saavedra contends that this seizure was a full custodial arrest.
And he argues that because the deputies did not yet have probable cause, they were
obligated to release him altogether. Had they done so, Mr. Saavedra says he might have
left the scene before the inventory search and the deputies would not have discovered the
electronic scale.
But even if Deputy Beasley lacked probable cause to arrest him, reasonable
suspicion could still justify his detention. The admissibility of the electronic scale does
not turn on whether the second seizure was an arrest or an investigative detention. The
scale is admissible so long as the deputies (1) had justification to prevent him from
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leaving the scene, and (2) ultimately had justification to search his person. First, the
deputies had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory detention for the time
period between Mr. Howard’s flight and the inventory search. Second, the inventory
search provided justification to arrest and search Mr. Saavedra. Deputy Beasley therefore
had sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Saavedra until the inventory search
provided probable cause to formally arrest him, search him, and discover the scale.
To detain Mr. Saavedra during the relevant time period, the deputies needed “a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting [Mr. Saavedra] of criminal activity,”
even if the basis for suspicion fell short of probable cause. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115
(quotations omitted). The deputies could also have detained Mr. Saavedra if they had
reasonable, articulable grounds to believe it was necessary to “protect [their] safety and to
maintain the status quo.” Lundstrom, 616 F.3d at 1120. The facts of this case satisfy
both conditions.
First, Mr. Howard’s actions gave the deputies reasonable grounds to suspect that
“criminal activity may [have been] afoot.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115 (quotations
omitted). They saw Mr. Howard making furtive movements that seemed to indicate he
was hiding something under his seat. Mr. Howard responded evasively when asked
about his movements and tried to mislead the deputies about the handgun under his seat.
When his misdirection failed, he fled from the deputies—a criminal act. Mr. Saavedra
correctly notes that his mere presence in a vehicle with a suspected criminal cannot
establish probable cause. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959). But he is
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mistaken in suggesting that it is also insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Under
the facts of this case, Deputy Beasley had “a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting” that Mr. Saavedra may have been involved in “legal wrongdoing” with Mr.
Howard. Lundstrom, 616 F.3d at 1120; see also Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 (Police “need
not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct” to detain a suspect for investigation.).
Second, Deputy Beasley “had reasonable articulable grounds to believe” that
detaining Mr. Saavedra was “necessary to protect [the deputies’] safety and to maintain
the status quo.” Lundstrom, 616 F.3d at 1120. At the time Deputy Beasley handcuffed
Mr. Saavedra, he knew there was at least one firearm inside the Lexus, but he did not
know its precise location. He reasonably suspected that Mr. Saavedra’s companion had
attempted to hide something from the deputies before fleeing. Under these facts, Deputy
Beasley had reason to detain Mr. Saavedra to eliminate the possibility he would access a
weapon from inside the vehicle, attempt to disturb or destroy potential evidence, or
otherwise interfere with the deputies’ investigation.
Mr. Saavedra agrees it was reasonable to remove him from the vehicle as a safety
precaution. But he argues that the deputies should have given him the option of leaving
the scene. He offers no authority for this proposition, and we do not find it persuasive.
The deputies were investigating suspicious circumstances in which at least one weapon
was present, and they reasonably concluded that detaining Mr. Saavedra was “necessary
to protect [their] safety and to maintain the status quo” while they investigated to
determine whether he posed a threat. Id.
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In short, the deputies had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Saavedra at the time
Mr. Howard fled and until the Lexus inventory search uncovered the second handgun and
the heroin. After a lawful detention, a valid inventory search, and a lawful arrest, the
deputies discovered the electronic scale pursuant to a valid search incident to arrest.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (“[A] search incident to arrest may . . . include
the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control.” (quotations omitted)).
We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to admit the electronic scale as evidence
against Mr. Saavedra.
B. Sufficient Evidence Supported Mr. Saavedra’s Conviction on Count 1
Mr. Saavedra contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of
Count 1 because the Government failed to prove that he possessed one of the two types of
ammunition found in the Lexus. As we explain below, even if Mr. Saavedra is correct
about insufficient proof that he possessed one type of ammunition, there was ample proof
to support his Count 1 conviction.
1. Standard of Review
“We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction . . . de novo.”
United States v. Rufai, 732 F.3d 1175, 1188 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). “We
take the evidence—both direct and circumstantial, and reasonable inferences drawn from
that evidence—in the light most favorable to the government and ask only whether a
reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
(quotations omitted); see also United States v. King, 632 F.3d 646, 650 (10th Cir. 2011);
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United States v. Flanders, 491 F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir. 2007). “[W]e will not weigh
conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury, nor will we
examine the evidence in bits and pieces.” United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1193
(10th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). “Instead, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution.” United States v. Doe, 572 F.3d 1162, 1171 (10th Cir.
2009); see also Irving, 665 F.3d at 1193; United States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1208
(10th Cir. 2007).
2. Legal framework
Count 1 of the indictment charged Mr. Saavedra with violating 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Section 922(g)(1) makes it “unlawful for any person . . . who
has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition.” Id. (emphasis added). Section 924(a)(2) sets the punishment for violation
of § 922(g)(1) at “not more than 10 years” of imprisonment. The indictment charged Mr.
Saavedra with possession of the Bryco .380 handgun, the .380 caliber ammunition, and
nine-millimeter ammunition found in the Lexus.
“[T]o obtain a conviction . . . under § 922(g), the government was required to
prove that” Mr. Saavedra (1) “had previously been convicted of a felony,” that (2) “he
thereafter knowingly possessed” a firearm or ammunition, and that (3) “such possession
was in or affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1128
(10th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 1997).
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Mr. Saavedra does not challenge the Government’s proof on the first or third elements—
his prior felony conviction or the interstate commerce requirement. We are therefore
concerned only with whether the Government proved that he “knowingly possessed” a
firearm or ammunition.
Because the statute defines the crime disjunctively, a felon violates the statute if he
or she knowingly possesses “any firearm or ammunition” that was in or affected
interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). When a crime is defined
disjunctively in the statute, the Government may obtain a conviction by proving “any one
of the allegations”—even if the indictment charges in the conjunctive, as it did in Mr.
Saavedra’s case. See United States v. Pauldino, 443 F.2d 1108, 1112 (10th Cir. 1971);
see also United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1246 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[A] crime
denounced in the statute disjunctively may be alleged in an indictment in the conjunctive,
and thereafter proven in the disjunctive.” (quoting United States v. Powell, 226 F.3d
1181, 1192 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000))).
“Possession can either be actual or constructive.” Michel, 446 F.3d at 1128.
Constructive possession exists when a person “knowingly holds the power and ability to
exercise dominion and control over” the object. United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207,
1211 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). To prove constructive possession, the
Government “must present ‘evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the
defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband.’” Michel, 446 F.3d
at 1128 (quoting United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1994)).
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3. Analysis
The indictment charged that Mr. Saavedra was a felon and had knowingly
possessed the Bryco .380 autocaliber handgun and two types of ammunition—six
cartridges of .380 auto caliber ammunition and eight cartridges of nine-millimeter Luger
caliber ammunition. ROA, Vol. I at 12-13.
Mr. Saavedra concedes that the evidence was sufficient to show that he possessed
the Bryco .380 handgun, which was found immediately beside the passenger seat where
he had been sitting, and the .380 auto caliber ammunition, which fit the Bryco handgun.5
But he argues that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he possessed the nine-
millimeter Luger caliber ammunition. Mr. Saavedra points to the Government’s failure
to establish where in the vehicle the nine-millimeter ammunition was discovered, and he
notes that the nine-millimeter ammunition did not match his Bryco handgun or the
handgun found under Mr. Howard’s driver’s seat.
Even if Mr. Saavedra were right that the Government did not prove he possessed
the nine-millimeter ammunition, this would not entitle him to relief. “It is settled that
where a crime denounced disjunctively in the statute is charged in the conjunctive, proof
of any one of the allegations will sustain a conviction.” Pauldino, 443 F.2d at 1112; see
5
Mr. Saavedra’s opening brief seems to argue there was insufficient evidence to
show possession of the handgun and all ammunition. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 16-17.
The Government understood this as a challenge to Counts 1 and 3. Aplee. Br. at 16. At
oral argument, Mr. Saavedra’s counsel clarified that his sufficiency challenge is directed
only to the 9mm Luger caliber ammunition. Oral Argument at 14:15-15:00, United
States v. Saavedra, No. 12-2149 (10th Cir. Nov. 19, 2013).
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also Lott, 310 F.3d at 1246; Powell, 226 F.3d at 1192 n.4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) defines
the crime of being a felon in possession of a handgun in the disjunctive—it forbids any
person who has been convicted of a felony from possessing “any firearm or
ammunition.” Id. (emphasis added). As Mr. Saavedra acknowledges, the evidence was
sufficient to establish his possession of the Bryco .380 handgun. This is enough to satisfy
the statutory element at issue and to convict him on Count 1.
III. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Saavedra’s conviction.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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